

JPRS-UMA-94-041

12 October 1994



**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Central Eurasia**

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### ***Military Affairs***

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# Central Eurasia

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-94-041

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12 October 1994

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## ARMED FORCES

### Journalist on Crime, Black Market Arms in Military

94UM0594A Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA  
GAZETA in Russian 16 Sep 94 p 6

[Article by Yuriy Mikhaylov: "Grachev's Mercedes Was Invented by Warrant Officer Pronin"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

#### Trophies

I decided to go Russian-style through a guard regiment that had recently been brought home from Germany—without greeting anyone and without introducing myself. In a word, in silence. I did not want to awaken the duty officer who was sleeping there in broad daylight. And I knew that if I aroused the control point detail they would start dragging their feet army-style.

Quietly, on tiptoes I sneaked past the negligent guard and...it was as though I had stepped on a land mine.

Boys! I had stumbled on a child's potty. That was their alarm....

Along with the officer in charge of the control point, a preschool child wearing bows looked out the doors. Dragging a Barbie doll by the leg, the girl reached for her metal treasure. And the sergeant, half awake, was so frightened that his cockroach mustache bristled. Finally he started to yell:

"Stop: Where the hell do you think you're going?"

I had no choice, I had to ingloriously turn myself in. I showed my documents. And then the proceedings began.

They told me to wait for all the phone calls and arrangements in the visitors' room, right here at the control point. Although I had a hard time squeezing in there. Judge for yourself: The 9 meter room was almost stuffed to the ceiling with things.

"Trophies," a woman who was rocking a child in a stroller laughed.

"They brought them all from Germany. And now they have nowhere to put them."

"So do you live here?" I could not contain my amazement.

The woman nodded. Then she said that it was even worse for others. Even though it was only a waiting room at the control point, at least it was a separate area. And many people live in the barracks with the soldiers. Sheets are all they have for dividers. Last summer some families simply made their homes in containers. Military Diogenes.

Even according to obviously understated official figures, in the Russian army today there are 167,000 homeless families of officers. Of these 12,000-14,000 are from the Western Group of Forces.

The child started to scream at the top of his voice. The woman bent down to change his diaper. I tried to talk to the girl:

"What is your name?"

"Katya."

"And what does your papa do?"

"He steals."

"What?"

"He steals."

Surprised at my inability to understand, after all I did not speak clearly in childhood either, she pointed to the cans of stewed meat on the box:

"Papa brought them. From the warehouse."

The woman was so upset she was waving her hands:

"Why are you talking nonsense, Katka! We have nothing to eat. For the third month in a row we have not been paid...." and then her face turned very red and she bit her lip until it bled. Even without words it was all clear. And we were terribly embarrassed. Especially me.

In the Russian language there are about 50 synonyms for the word "to steal." Thus it is possible to "borrow" a couple of cans of stewed meat from the warehouse to feed hungry children. And it is possible to "take over" a little plant. The difference is not really very great. For a can of stewed meat they can lock you up but for stolen billions they will now assign you to any post. Even in the army.

#### From the 'Taiga' to the British Seas the Military Mafia Is Stronger Than All

Among the individuals charged with corruption, 25.8 percent are workers of law enforcement organs.

Alas, the breakdown has not passed the Armed Forces by.

In the words of the chief of the Smolensk administration of the FCS [Federal Counterintelligence Service], Major General Vladimir Dyatlenko, one of the main tasks of the local counterintelligence workers is to fight against theft and sale of arms.

I saw dozens of guns confiscated by Chekists from mafia in uniform. Shells, grenades—these are even more common loot. But four rapid-fire aircraft cannon....

Several more officers from the Russian army were arrested recently. And they were extremely high ranking. Workers of the FCS, RUOP [Russian Directorate for Combating Organized Crime], and the Administration for Military Counterintelligence in Long Distance Aviation of the Russian Federation Air Force during the course of an operation confiscated a mountain of stolen arms in the military compound of a local aviation regiment. In addition to the traditional automatic rifles and pistols they discovered two Mukha antitank one-time grenade throwers, two RPG-18 grenade throwers, 20 3-millimeter shells for an AM-23 aircraft cannon (they are in great demand), 11 SP-39 special cartridges, and 16 PP-7 special cartridges.

The figures would not seem so bad for official reports. But specialists understand that what was confiscated is only a drop in the bucket. The military mafia is alive and flourishing. Moreover, it is acquiring an international, truly planetary scale.

A "special section" counterintelligence officer I know who worked for a long time in the Western Group of Forces said that the Germans were scared to death of the brutality of the "red" mafia. Ordinary police units avoid fighting them. Therefore, for example, in the criminal police of the land of Brandenburg they have created a special secret subdivision with the telling name "Taiga." It works against our military mafia.

**Several officers and generals of the Western Group of Forces have sold dozens of Mercedes.**

According to operational figures of the German special detachment Taiga and our counterintelligence, one of the transfer points of the "great Mercedes highway" was a forest garrison on the western outskirts of Russia where I was sent on assignment.

I did not see the accumulation of Western limousines of the latest makes in the guard regiment.

I had to look for the tracks of the automobile affairs, of course, in my own back yard, in my native Moscow. It is to the capital that the threads of mafia affairs extend. Just take the recent arrest of a worker of the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI), Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Pryadkin.

He was arrested on 12 July of this year. The secret lieutenant colonel (incidentally, he is a former KGB officer) came to the attention of the special services as one of the participants in a criminal group for buying up and selling vehicles of questionable origin from Germany. From Pryadkin's "nine" they took a revolver equipped with shotgun shells, a forged permit to bear it, and also 19 7.62-millimeter armor-piercing incendiary shells.

In the Moscow-area village of Udelnoye in the home of the arrestee and also in three garages nearby operations workers found another 1,350 5.6-millimeter shells, 20 armor-piercing incendiary shells, an RGD-5 grenade, an icon of the "12 apostles," a uniform of a militia lieutenant, several serial numbers from various automobiles, and a Rosa radio station which is used for communication only with high state leaders.

Although Pushkin—and this was the code name, according to operational information, by which the FAPSI worker was known in the criminal community—did not manage to take advantage of his direct communications with the power-houses of this world; his highly placed protectors did not make him wait. So much pressure was brought to bear on the investigation that soon Pryadkin was set free. "He will get off"—workers in military counterintelligence say hopelessly.

**'We Were Sent by Pavel Sergeyevich'**

**The chief of the Main Administration for International Military Cooperation, Colonel-General F. Markovskiy, was mixed up in machinations with apartments.**

During October-December 1993 he granted the Nadezhda Joint-Stock Company credit for an overall sum of R6 billion at 10 percent annually, while the Central Bank of the Russian Federation was offering credit at an interest of 210 percent annually. It would be interesting to know whose

pocket received this considerable difference? Just the lost advantage for the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation amounted to more than R5.8 billion. This sum would have been enough to pay a month's monetary allowance to military servicemen of a large military district.

Dreams would come true for the tank guards who were brought out of Germany and were hoping for prompt acquisition of housing and wages if Colonel General F. Markovskiy had not scrounged 12 prestigious apartments without being on any waiting list through the Nadezhda Joint-Stock Company! Moreover, he overpaid or, more simply, threw to the wind 74.5 million rubles from the treasury.

You have to take care of those closest to you first. It is not surprising that the Arbat leaders did not think about the people living in containers and tents, at control points, and attics of barracks. That same Colonel General F. Markovskiy, Major General V. Kosarev, chief of the Administration for Information and the Press, and Ye. Agapova, the minister's press secretary, are sleeping well in their luxurious "pads" on Rublev Highway. Although they had good apartments in Moscow, they acquired even better ones without putting their names on any lists.

They followed the example of their boss. I do not know whether Army General Grachev has already moved to the presidential home on Osennaya Street, which is in the ecologically clean Krylatskiy. Famous mansions are located there. In one garage there is room not only for two of the latest Mercedes costing 150,000 marks each but also for a limousine which was given by the ZHV commander Colonel-General M. Burlakov to the minister's son as a gift. They say that Warrant Officer V. Pronin, the one who drove the silver "Mercies" across the Pashina border will drive a third one across as well. The wheels are in motion. Incidentally, why is Grachev in such a hurry to move? After all, he is not a homeless major. He could take his time. It is not bad living in his "privatized" dacha in a heavenly corner of the Moscow area. For his chic villa with its elegant room with a fireplace, a sauna, a swimming pool, a billiard room, and innumerable rooms and nooks the poor army general has to pay **all of R183,600**. A truly ridiculous price!

And Marshall of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov has to pay more for his poor dacha—**R871,400**. True, Yevgeniy Ivanovich did not argue. In addition to the official one he is building two more houses on his land. Each one has approximately 250 square meters. He will probably let pilots from Germany who do not have apartments live there. After all, he commanded the 16th Air Army there.

Lieutenant General N. Katilov, chief of the Main Apartment Operations Administration, sent the largest bill for a dacha to Colonel-General V. Yakovlev. Almost R1 million or, more precisely—**R899,400**.

But the richest, and everyone knows this, of course, is the commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces, Colonel General M. Burlakov. And he also has the largest area of land for his dacha. It was not in vain that Matvey Prokopyevich in recent years, sometimes in Hungary, sometimes in Germany, mastered the intricacies of a market economy. He knows that land is the major wealth. Soon he

will build such rock palaces on it that Boris Nikolayevich himself will be envious. I believe that there will be a Russian Camp David near Moscow!

But let us get our heads out of the clouds and get back to the earth of Bryansk and Smolensk. Here they still shudder when they recall the flights of the Arbat generals and colonels. These are Khlestakovs in officers' uniforms! Like a password they immediately say the magic phrase: "We were sent by Pavel Sergeyevich."

I myself witnessed how disturbed the Smolensk construction specialists were. The regular commission from the Ministry of Defense made up of one general and two colonels had brought two "foreign" contractors with them. Wanting to write the largest foreign currency order they could, they laid out their plans in bold strokes, making broad hints that they were protected by the Russian Federation defense minister himself.

A half year later the first beautiful cottages were to be accepted by the high-ranking officers who were the new residents.

But the construction was not even started for a long time. And recently the contractors finally presented their cottages...on paper. And here the Smolensk specialists tore their hair out. Instead of what was promised, which were almost palaces, which would adorn the city, from the plans one could see meager barracks of the southern model. How the tank operators would live in the winter in unheated premises with the local temperatures of 30 degrees below zero, it seems, had not been considered by anybody from the Moscow leadership. But still that was not the most terrible thing.

**When constructing housing for the military they are trying to use prohibited asbestos materials which are distinguished by their high cancer-causing qualities, that is, they contribute to contracting cancer.**

And, according to estimates of military medical experts, 15 percent of the illness of military personnel and their families is caused by unfavorable ecological conditions for their life and work.

But the army has special organizations, and they include high-ranking military bureaucrats whose job it is to monitor the construction of various military facilities, including housing for military servicemen. One of them is called the Gostekhnadzor Inspectorate.

**Recently counterintelligence workers arrested three inspectors from Gostekhnadzor; they were caught red-handed taking bribes in the amount of 5,000 Deutsche marks.**

#### **Millions and Billions Lost**

After returning from Germany, the tank operators wander around homeless. The Deutsche marks allotted to them by the Germans are running out like water through their fingers. And at a time like this their immediate leaders in Moscow are conducting underhanded foreign currency operations.

**The main armored tank administration illegally received from foreign economic organizations the ruble equivalent from mandatory sale of currency in an amount of about R1 billion.**

The appetites of the military engineers are more modest. Thus the administration of the chief of engineering forces with the complicity of the chief the financial and economic service of the Main Administration for International Military Cooperation, Major General V. Ulyanov, according to an agreement with the all-Union association Oboroneksport, bypassing the established procedures, received consumer goods valued at a total of \$80,000. One wonders who ended up with it.

But the real foreign currency motherlode is in selling surpluses of military and technical property. Revenues from this are to go for solving the housing problem in the Russian army. But in reality?

The specialized state autonomously financed enterprise (SGKhP) took its time in transferring the funds earned from the sale of military property to the account of the Ministry of Defense. From September 1993 through May 1994 there were always extremely significant sums in the accounts of the SGKhP.

The money was in commercial circulation and it was by no means the underprivileged officers who gained from it. On the contrary, with the money it earned the enterprise bought not apartments for officers and warrant officers who had been withdrawn from divisions abroad, but office furniture, computers, and limousines, and the premises it occupied were repaired at a cost of almost a quarter of a million rubles.

**Disguised as "secret mail," \$9 million were shipped out of Poland in violation of the laws of this country.**

This foreign currency affair was headed up by the chief of the Main Administration of the Military Budget and Financing of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, Colonel-General V. Vorobyev. He gave orders to withdraw from account No. 07010 in field administration No. 47659 (Poland) of the Central Bank of Russia 50 billion zloty, which not long before that had been \$5 million in Moscow. The zloty were converted at private exchange points in Poland through foreigners (for which the commission was about \$300,000). The \$9 million that was received (according to Polish laws the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense could not ship out foreign currency) was sent secretly by military transport aviation to Germany. Here the \$5 million was again converted to Deutsche marks and deposited into account No. 400404004, military unit, field post office 44601. The remaining millions were transferred to Belgium to the account of one joint venture. One wonders whose relatives are on its board.

The answer to this question could reveal the true causes of the zeal of the "fighters against Polish inflation." One is convinced of this also from the example of the closed joint-stock company Technological and Intellectual Development of Russia (TIRR).

It contracted to have a multiple apartment residential building constructed in Smolensk for the tank operators of Colonel V. Sumarokov, to be paid for in Deutsche marks.

The chairman of the board of the fund, Mr. Petrosyan assured the "returnees" from Germany on his oath that the building would be released for occupancy in August 1994. I was at the construction site recently. Not a thing had been

done. There was not even a foundation. So with these rates of construction the tank operators will have to wait until the next century before they can move into their new housing.

Incidentally, are they waiting? For having received the money (335 million) the "honest merchants" spent about R160 million on the planned work. The rest got lost somewhere. Or rather, it is in commercial circulation for the fund with a flashy name. And no arbitration court can force TIRR to return the money to the tank operators.

I do not know what a member of the board of the joint-stock company of the TIRR Fund, a former chief of the general staff, minister of defense "for a day," Army General Moiseyev is thinking about. But he is the one who got the order for TIRR. It is good to be a general! Especially an army general.

Recall the famous question from the classics: What is happening in Russia? The answer: "They are stealing..." Some are stealing stewed meat from the warehouse. Others—millions and billions. But it is no longer theft—it is business.

### Col-Gen Kondratyev Discusses Peacekeeping Mission

95UM0010A Moscow *CHESTY IMEYU* in Russian  
No 5-6, May-Jun 94 [Signed to press 10 Jul 94] pp 2-6

[Interview with Col.-Gen. Georgiy Kondratyev by Larisa Kudryavtseva: "Peacemaking Is a National Concern"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

#### Calling Card

Col.-Gen. Georgiy Grigoryevich Kondratyev was born 17 November 1944 into a worker's family in the city of Klitsy in Bryansk Oblast. In 1962, he entered the Kharkov Guard Tank School. He began his career as an officer in Germany. He commanded a platoon and a tank company. After graduation from the Military Academy of the Armored Troops in 1973, he served in Moscow Military Oblast. In 1983-85, he was trained at the Military Academy of the General Staff. After the academy, he served in the Carpathian Military District, in Afghanistan (1986-88), in the Transbaykal region, and in Turkestan Military District in the posts of first deputy commander, army commander, and first deputy commander of the district troops. In December 1991, he was appointed commander of the troops of Turkestan Military District. In June 1992, he became deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation. He is married. His daughter Natalya is married to a serviceman. His son Yuriy is finishing school.

"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God."—Gospel of Mark, the Sermon on the Mount.

—"Lately it has been happening more and more often that the politicians make a mistake and the military people have to pay for it."

"I saw flowers scattered on the road and people were hugging and kissing Russian assault troops."

"If we have left the 'cold war' behind, there is no reason to withdraw to our own circle."

"Russia is still paying for peace in the CIS."

#### Our Information

The following have been detached from the Armed Forces of Russia to perform peacemaking functions:

—27th Guard Motorized Rifle Division (Volga Military District)

—45th Guard Motorized Rifle Division (Leningrad Military District)

—201st Motorized Rifle Division (Tajikistan)

—a separate battalion of airborne troops (Yugoslavia)

There are 135 military observers in different UN missions.

The total number of personnel performing peacemaking tasks has reached 16,500.

1990.... The film "Afganskiy islom" [Afghan Breakdown] is being made in Dushanbe. Mikele Plachido flew there and I, as the film's main consultant, was supposed to meet him. I arrive and find that there is shooting at Shakhidon Square. I excuse myself from Plachido, saying that I urgently need to go to the leadership of the republic. When I arrive, I say: "I am the first deputy commander of Turkestan Military District." In response I hear: "Allah sent you from heaven! Take a division and establish order." Naturally I told him that I will do this only in the event that I receive an order from the minister of defense. Such an order was received, they made the division totally combat ready, and within three days order was established. Within three days! We countered armed and brutal mobs with the power of the Army. I note: practically without force. I then became convinced that the lives of people are more valuable than any political designs or calculations.

But the city of Uzgen was burning on 4 June 1991. It was burning in the full sense of the word—more than 700 houses were in flames.... And I had to bring an airborne assault brigade to Uzgen. They entered the city but could not see it on account of the smoke. It was impossible to drive through it because of the bodies lying on the streets. Our assault troopers put out the fires and saved people.... But still, there were so many who perished, who were burned up! We buried them for a whole week. The mullah in Uzgen sang a prayer for more than 1,500 people, whereas in the press they wrote that 292 died.

Our meeting with Col.-Gen. Georgiy Grigoryevich Kondratyev, deputy minister of defense of Russia and commander of the Russian troops in "hot spots" and peacemaking forces, had been put off for a long time. For the same reasons. "He flew to the Dniester Region," "we are expecting him from Tajistan," or "he is in Ossetia," they would answer in the secretariat.

And it seemed to be in accordance with the saying: there would be no good fortune if it were not for the misfortune. After a trip to South Ossetia, let us put it this way, Georgiy Grigoryevich became slightly indisposed. In response to the question of what happened to him, he answered tersely: "It happens. It would seem to be a random thing...." When Kondratyev health got better, the attending physician allowed us to meet with him.

[Kudryavtseva] Georgiy Grigoryevich, what feeds war? Why are the conflicts not quieting down?

[Kondratyev] You are asking purely political questions. I am a military man. Although lately it has been happening more and more often that the politicians make a mistake and the military people pay for it.

Those events in Fergana.... Of course the reason for what happened was certainly not a dispute in the bazaar about some strawberries, as they tried to convince us. The conflict had been building up for a long time and certain "interested persons" inflamed the local nationalists. The president of the USSR then made the decision to resettle or, put more simply, to deprive the Turks-Meskhetintsy of a homeland. It seems to me that that was a mistake. It is common land. Why were people driven from it? Of course a place was found for them but blood was shed.

And why did the events in Osh take place? Everything is on the surface, again because of the political short-sightedness of the authorities. In Kyrgyzstan, they passed a law on the language: we are going to speak Kyrgyz only! But they forgot that in Osh and in the oblast more than 40 percent of the inhabitants are Uzbeks. They stopped hiring them and refused to enroll them in higher institutes of learning. How is that possible? There is the conflict.... Those are bitter lessons. Yes, it seems that many of today's politicians did not profit from them.

[Kudryavtseva] Today the people in the "hot spots" are putting a great deal of hope on the peacemaking forces of Russia, on the "blue helmets."

[Kondratyev] By the way, the history of Russian peacemaking forces began back in 1973, when 36 Soviet observers took part in an operation under the UN flag to monitor the conditions of a truce in the Middle East. Since that time our observers have repeatedly been sent to different places with the same mission but military contingents of neither the USSR nor Russia have participated in full-scale operations to keep the peace.

The picture has now changed somewhat. More than 16,000 Russian soldiers are keeping the peace in different regions. Life has forced this. The conflicts have grown and we were forced to react.

In July 1992, we brought a paratroop regiment to Tskhinvali. I saw flowers scattered on the road and people were hugging and kissing Russian assault troops. There were Georgian and Ossetian women! I was also there recently: houses are not burning, children are not dying, and women are not crying. And this is to the credit primarily of our peacemaking soldiers. We nevertheless understand that peace at the point of a bayonet cannot last long. Political decisions are needed. I spoke about this with the leadership of South Ossetia, which cannot imagine being part of Georgia. There are analogous problems in Abkhazia as well. But can one really act without considering the consequences? A Georgian man is married to an Ossetian woman and an Ossetian man to a Georgian woman. One settlement is Ossetian and next to it is a Georgian settlement. Should they be separated by a fence or wire? I offer no solutions. But at this time, when the hottest heads have cooled off a

little, it is very important, in my opinion, to resolve the political questions through negotiations.

But we are taking such tiny steps.... There are negotiations in Geneva under the mediation of an envoy of the UN general secretary with the Georgian and Abkhazian sides on the execution of an operation by UN forces to keep the peace in Abkhazia. But so far they have not had any positive results. There are many unresolved questions on both sides. And I would go beyond that and say that there was no particular desire of the UN representative to give a mandate to carry out this operation. Therefore, at one of the meetings of the heads of state of the CIS, Eduard Shevardnadze stated that if there is no such mandate then let such a peacekeeping operation be carried out by the countries of the CIS. And this is what was decided.

[Kudryavtseva] How are our boys serving in Yugoslavia?

[Kondratyev] Worthily. According to the command of the UN peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia, our subunits have shown themselves in the very best light. Take even the events in February, when a unit of our battalion had to make a 400-km march to Sarajevo along the line separating the Serbs from the Croats. This task was performed successfully, which is still another confirmation of the great proficiency of the "Russian battalion" (as the UN people call our boys).

[Kudryavtseva] The situation in Tajikistan is cause for concern. They are continually calling for the evacuation of the 201st Division and the like. What is your opinion?

[Kondratyev] There is no doubt that the situation in Tajikistan is a difficult one. But there is hope. Talks between the Tajik authorities and the opposition are somewhat encouraging in the sense that it is possible to reach a peaceful agreement. We do not intend to withdraw the troops from there. On the contrary, at the meeting of the heads of state of the CIS countries, there was discussion of the strengthening of the Tajik-Afghan border as the southern boundary of the CIS.

Our 201st Division is part of the peacemaking forces of Russia. And there they are involved not in combat but rather in purely peacekeeping operations.

By the way, the role of the 40th Army when it was in the territory of Afghanistan likewise no longer appears as unequivocal as was generally thought in recent times. It is sufficient to see how many Afghans have died in the last three years at the hands of their fellow Afghans....

[Kudryavtseva] Georgiy Grigoryevich, are there problems with the training of personnel for peacekeeping forces?

[Kondratyev] No, I do not think so. For these purposes, as you know, we took not only the 201st in Tajikistan but also another two divisions and a some of the airborne assault troops. They are rather well manned. We changed the system for combat training itself and included in it situations that officers and personnel may encounter in the performance of peacekeeping functions.

In their training, of course, we utilize the experience of countries that have long been involved and participate in the carrying out of peacekeeping measures. This is the

purpose of the planned first Russian-American command and staff exercises for peacekeeping questions with the involvement of 250 men and a group of officers of the regiment and brigade echelon from each side. Are they needed or not? The Duma still has its doubts. I think that they are needed. I think that if we have left the "cold war" behind there is no reason to withdraw to our own circle. We need to go out into the world arena and show what we are capable of doing and, to some extent, gain some experience.

[Kudryavtseva] Georgiy Grigoryevich, what is need in the recent development of peacekeeping?

[Kondratyev] The work has been finished on a law on the provision of military and civilian personnel for the actions of peacekeeping forces. Its absence has given rise to many questions and problems and much blame. After all, there was no overall mechanism and there were no legal guarantees. Individual decrees first of the Supreme Soviet and then of the Duma, under which we acted, clearly could not resolve the problem totally.

An edict of President of Russia B. Yeltsin established an interdepartmental commission, in which various ministries and departments are participating. It assesses the situation and resolves the peacekeeping tasks. The commission has two cochairmen—Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Viktorovich Lavrov and myself. It is very important that we can now resolve questions not only in the scope of the Ministry of Defense but also by going to other ministries. Peacekeeping in Russia is becoming a national concern and one of the matters for foreign and domestic policy.

[Kudryavtseva] Will the support of the peacekeeping forces be expensive for Russia?

[Kondratyev] Of course it is not cheap, especially for the Ministry of Defense of Russia. Look, what is the result? We say that peacekeeping is an integral part of the domestic and foreign policy of Russia. In practical terms, it would seem that two years ago the Armed Forces temporarily took on the performance of peacekeeping functions and are still performing them. And they are bearing all the costs. In 1993, for example, tens of billions of rubles [R] from the budget of the Ministry of Defense of Russia were spent for peacekeeping operations. This money could have been used to build many houses for the families of officers without housing.

Two years ago, we made some proposals, first to the Supreme Soviet and then to the Duma.... They discuss them, coordinate them with all sorts of committees and commissions, and life goes on. And, accordingly, the expenditures increase. What are we proposing? For the purpose of the schooling and special training of military personnel for the performance of peacekeeping functions in the Armed Forces of Russia, the establishment of a permanent special military contingent (peacekeeping forces of Russia) that would be supported in a separate line of the federal budget. This is a national concern.

I am certain that however costly a peacekeeping mission may be for Russia and no matter what difficult economic

circumstances it may be in, we are obligated to participate in a most active way in the restoration of peace in regions that are in flames.

[Kudryavtseva] How is cooperation going? After all, the maintenance of peace is a task not just for Russia, is it not?

[Kondratyev] Important decisions were made back in March 1992 at the meeting of heads of state in Kiev and then they were developed in May and July of that same year in Tashkent. In particular, for the purpose of helping each other on the basis of mutual agreement to settle and prevent any conflicts on an interethnic and political basis that involve the violation of human rights, it was decided to establish a group of military observers and collective forces, henceforth called groups in support of peace. But the fact is that until now these good intentions have remained on paper only. In reality, it is basically Russia that pays for peace in the CIS.

It is well known, for example, that collective peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan were established on the basis of a decision by the heads of state of the CIS. The Russian side contributes the 201st Division reinforced by personnel numbering about 6,000. And there is one battalion each from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Russia's expenditures for the support of its part of the collective peacekeeping forces amounted to about \$1.8 billion just for six months. Naturally the support of the battalions with a strength of 350 to 400 men is a great deal less expensive. And only the support of the combined staff of the collective peacekeeping forces was divided among the countries whose subunits are located there. And even for this Russia pays 50 percent. The other countries comprising the CIS do not bear any expenditures at all. Does this mean that only Russia needs peace in Tajikistan?

Or let us take the bilateral agreements between Russian and Moldova and between Russia and Georgia. Here as well, the lion's share of the expenses is on the shoulders of Russia.

In Moldova, in the Dniester Region, for example, Russia has four battalions, whereas each of the conflicting sides has one battalion. In 1993 alone, the Ministry of Defense of Russia spent \$1.6 billion for the support of peace in Moldova. That is the arithmetic....

[Kudryavtseva] Georgiy Grigoryevich, I would like to know a little more about you. Everyone knows the expression: "It is a poor soldier who does not dream of becoming a general."

[Kondratyev] Did I dream of becoming a general? You know, I did not, although my father was an officer and so were my grandfather and great-grandfather. By the way, my great-grandfather held a very substantial position in the Russian Army. And I myself began in a Suvorov school. I studied in Voronezh. You remember the film "Officers" and the big-eared Vanyusha? Just like him, we washed stairs from the top to the bottom, we ran to the zoo, and we very much loved candy. I wanted to be a pilot and even now I am sometimes drawn to the control stick. But apparently that is not my fate. The nature of my service means that I spend up to 300 hours in the air but as a passenger. I finished the tank school, the Academy of the Armored Troops, and the

Academy of the General Staff. (Georgiy Grigoryevich finished all of these educational institutions with gold medals—L.K.).

And how can you forget the first place where you served? After all, it was there where I developed as an officer and where my daughter was born. I was a platoon leader for three years and a company commander for two. By the way, about our company. Today there are three colonel generals from the same company serving in the Armed Forces of Russia! They are Nikolay Ivanovich Zvenchukov, chief of the Academy for Economics, Finances, and Law; Sergey Aleksandrovich Mayev, deputy commander in chief of the Ground Forces for armament; and myself. That is the kind of platoon leaders we were....

[Kudryavtseva] And what do you appreciate most in people?

[Kondratyev] Honesty. Conscientiousness. You have to be yourself and establish your authority through your actions. There is no other way to self-affirmation.

[Kudryavtseva] One last question. What would you, Georgiy Grigoryevich, wish for the readers of the journal CHEST IMEYU and for yourself in this difficult time in which we are living?

[Kondratyev] Yes, it is a difficult time. But one must survive. One must live! And, in my opinion, it is necessary always to remember and think about the Motherland, no matter how that may sound. But above all it is necessary to have peace. Russia must not be allowed to be engulfed in flames. I want only peace, happiness, and calm for my Motherland and for my people. I have had enough of fighting!

[Comment from Kudryavtseva] I recently called the office of the deputy minister of defense of Russia and they told me: "Georgiy Grigorevich is not in Moscow. He is on a trip...." I did not try to find out exactly where Kondratyev flew this time. Alas, there are no fewer "hot" spots in the territory of the former Union. And, as they say, there are more than enough worries, problems, and missions for Georgiy Grigorevich. That is the kind of job that he has.

## POLICY

### Finance Ministry Letter, Defense Ministry Commentary

MM0310114394 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 28 Sep 94 p 2

[Feature comprising letter from Deputy Finance Minister A.A. Astakhov to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Chief Editor V.L. Chupakhin, followed by "Editorial Office Commentary" and "Information From Russian Federation Ministry of Defense," under the general headline: "1995 National Defense Expenditure Must Be Protected by Law. Lack of Protection for 'Military Items' in 1994 Budget Is Manifesting Itself as Chronic Underfunding of Russia's Armed Forces"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the eve of the new legislative season KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is continuing the debate on the problems of implementing the 1994 defense budget. The

Finance Ministry has responded to the article by our parliamentary correspondent Vladimir Yermolin on this topic

Letter from Finance Ministry [subhead]

To KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Chief Editor Mr. V.L. Chupakhin  
Esteemed Vladimir Leonidovich!

The Russian Federation Finance Ministry leadership has carefully familiarized itself with journalist V. Yermolin's article in your newspaper of 15 September "Who Will Protect the Protected Items in the Military Budget: the State Duma, the Government, or the President?"

We have sympathy for and understand the alarm and concern expressed in the deputies' speeches at the Russian Federation State Duma Defense Committee emergency session which was the subject of the aforementioned article.

Unfortunately, for reasons unknown to us, the Finance Ministry did not receive an invitation to this session and we were consequently unable to provide the necessary explanations about the issues concerning the funding of the military items in the 1994 Federal Budget which the deputies discussed. Clearly, it was largely for this very reason that a series of inaccuracies crept into the piece, which caused incorrect conclusions to be drawn and distorted the true state of affairs.

Evidently, owing to his being very busy and having limited time, the article's author failed to do any thorough work on the Law "On the 1994 Federal Budget" to which he regularly refers. I would first of all like to draw your attention to the fact that this law does not stipulate the funding of the protected budget items "...in any circumstances," it only requires that this funding be carried out "in full." What is more, not one of the protected budget items (and there are three of them in all) stipulated the funding of the Armed Forces' current expenditure for the purchase of food and clothing, and payment for municipal services. We are talking only about wages and pay. As V. Yermolin rightly underlines, it was the State Duma which adopted the law and only it is at liberty to change it. But it is our (the Finance Ministry's) task to execute this law and not to ignore it.

The incorrect interpretation and deciphering of the Federal Budget's protected items led to confusion in the figures for funding these items adduced by V. Yermolin.

The Russian Federation Defense Ministry expenditure for the purchase of food, clothing, and payment for municipal services is funded in the amounts stipulated by Article 16 of the law in question, basically in accordance with the revenue received by the Federal Budget.

At present the Federal Budget's revenue base is continuing to shrink. The reasons for this are well known. The crisis in the Russian economy has still not been overcome.

Over the eight months of the current year, actual receipts by the Federal Budget in taxes and payments has amounted to 65 percent of the projected figures allowed for in the 1994 Federal Budget. Drawing from other sources of income based on the sale of state securities and other revenue, total receipts into the Federal Budget for the period in question has only just exceeded 70 percent of the projected figures.

In connection with the current situation, the Russian Federation Government has tasked the Finance Ministry with determining on a monthly basis the ceilings for budgetary appropriations for the different areas of expenditure envisaged for 1994, including that of national defense, proceeding from the amounts of projected revenue as well as credits from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation to offset the Federal Budget deficit.

For example, more than 2.5 trillion rubles [R] will be appropriated in September for Russian Federation Defense Ministry expenditure, of which in excess of R1.5 trillion is to go toward the upkeep of the Army and Navy, including wages and pay.

Indeed, as the article's author rightly emphasized, on 14 September 1994 only 70 percent of the Armed Forces' requirements were met in appropriations for servicemen's pay and civilian employees' wages. But, first of all, September is not over yet, and, second, as things stood on 16 September, the Finance Ministry had transferred R1.1 trillion for these purposes to the Defense Ministry.

At present our ministry's leadership is taking all the necessary measures to settle up in full with the military as quickly as possible.

As concerns the distribution of appropriations allotted on a monthly basis as current funding for the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, this is the prerogative of the ministry itself in the person of its minister, who has been invested with the appropriate rights.

The Finance Ministry regularly requests from the Defense Ministry a breakdown of appropriations being made to the Armed Forces for the coming month corresponding to the items of expenditure sanctioned by federal law for:

- the Armed Forces' upkeep;
- the purchase of arms and military hardware;
- research and development;
- capital construction;
- servicemen's pensions.

In accordance with our requests, the Defense Ministry informs us in a letter signed by A.A. Kokoshin, Russian Federation first deputy defense minister, or V.V. Vorobyev, chief of this department's Main Directorate for the Military Budget and Financing, about the distribution of the established maximum funding: on receipt of the information from the Defense Ministry our task is to allocate the agreed budgetary appropriations, as well as to look for all possible means of using the estimated allocations of Federal Budget revenues as fully as possible.

It follows from the above that it is not the Finance Ministry but the Defense Ministry which bears responsibility for actually paying servicemen and civilian employees their pay and wages, for satisfying in full measure the funding of the protected items of expenditure in the Russian Federation Federal Budget. At the same time, in individual questions connected with decisions by organs of the legislature and executive, the appropriations allotted by the Russian

Finance Ministry to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry may be strictly targeted in nature (such as capital from the Russian Federation president's and Government's reserve funds, the implementation of Russian presidential edicts and directives, and decrees and directives of the Russian Federation Government); otherwise, the Finance Ministry's opinion during the routine budget year is as yet recommendatory in nature with regard to the distribution of appropriations from the budget.

Moreover, the Finance Ministry has nothing to do with the Defense Ministry's distribution of appropriations allotted for capital construction in specific regions. This is again the military department's prerogative.

In conclusion I would like to underline that we are ready to work in a constructive and businesslike manner with your newspaper. We are ready to meet with your journalists more frequently, provide them with essential information, provide explanations and consult with them, jointly search for a way out of this most complex of situations, and jointly overcome the problems which arise.

Respectfully,

Deputy Minister A.A. Astakhov.

#### Commentary by the Editorial Office

It is true that Article 36 of the Russian Federation Law "On the 1994 Federal Budget" concerning protected items does not mention any kind of "protection" for expenditure on national defense. Wages (and pay) are subject to payment in full. Not just those of military personnel but those of everybody paid from the budget. That is, in this case the concept of "maintaining the Armed Forces" comes down exclusively to the pay and wages of employees of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The state guarantees the Russian soldier R15,000 a month, but as regards clothing, heat and lighting in the barracks, food for his meals, and medication if, God forbid, he becomes sick—all this is dependent on the successful collection of taxes, increasing production, and dealing with inflation....

The state also has an obligation to pay Russian officers without fail (about how it does this, more later), but where are they to live and where do they get the money to ensure that the weapons and equipment entrusted to them are always at the ready? The state also passed this question on to the military, the Defense Ministry. We can only thank the Finance Ministry in the person of Andrey Andreyevich Astakhov for drawing our attention to this feature of the 1994 Federal Budget.

We would very much like to think that our parliamentarians will also take note of this. Work on the 1995 budget is only just beginning. The clear absurdity of a situation where basic provision for the Army's functioning is not protected by law must be rectified. The state must not only guarantee financial support for its Armed Forces but its upkeep as a whole. Otherwise, the Army will begin to be treated like a trader's stall. And in order that the military carry out their duty, they will have to take control of power supply systems, heat-supply lines, gas mains, and so on, without which the normal maintenance of combat readiness is simply impossible. Or take another scenario: They lay down their arms

and go home. We think that neither one nor the other scenario suits our society. The mistakes in the current budget must be put right.

Now on the subject of "protected" funding. Here, incidentally, the concept of "in full" does not in our view conflict with the concept of "in any circumstances." How otherwise should "protection" be understood in this case: only in the following way—come what may you must pay the money "in full." Otherwise, there's no guaranteeing what will happen.

Therefore, we are today also providing information from the Defense Ministry's Main Directorate for the Military Budget and Financing, whose specialists agreed to arm us with particular facts in our debate with the Finance Ministry.

We believe that, as a result, the readers will finally get to the bottom of the Russian Armed Forces' funding problems. We will only add that 33 percent of servicemen and civilian employees in the Russian Federation Armed Forces have still not received their money for August. In September they will only receive their pay for August. This is how the lack of protection for military budget items—a classic example of robbing Peter to pay Paul—is manifesting itself.

One last thing. We have the least possible interest in pillorying someone in the pages of our newspaper. It is much more important, as in this case, when a clash of standpoints creates an opportunity to present the big picture for any problem. We hope that this is useful information on which our legislators may base their thoughts and actions. What is more, we can only express our gratitude to the Finance Ministry for showing an interest in establishing the truth. Also, we definitely welcome the offer of constructive and businesslike cooperation.

#### **Information From the Russian Federation Defense Ministry**

The limits set by the Finance Ministry allow the Defense Ministry only to pay servicemen's pay and civilian personnel's wages, but all other expenses connected with the upkeep of the Army and Navy remain unfunded.

For this reason, so as not to simply paralyze the troops' vital activity, the Defense Ministry has been forced to sacrifice promptness in paying pay and wages and divert up to 30 percent each month from the capital received from the Finance Ministry into feeding the personnel, expenditure connected with the maintenance of military hospitals and preschool and educational establishments, payments for fuel, the transportation of troops, the maintenance of buildings and installations, and so on, without which the very existence of the military units and combined units is unthinkable.

As a result of this, a flawed practice has developed in the Armed Forces whereby the situation on the first day of each month is such that unpaid pay and wages amounts to R400 billion or more. For example, on 1 September 1994 the debt in terms of these payments amounted to R416.6 billion.

In September, the Defense Ministry (as things stood on 14 September) had received, if you take the debt for August

into consideration, only R791.0 billion (52 percent of the amount required for pay and wages)

In these circumstances, the Defense Ministry was forced to put only R586 billion toward paying pay and wages, providing only 44 percent of the required amount, and not 70 percent as indicated in the Finance Ministry's article and letter, inasmuch as the remaining R205 billion was channeled into other vitally important needs of the Armed Forces: R35.0 billion in payment for food, R40.0 billion on fuel; R25 billion on accommodations and maintenance expenditure; R10 billion on rent for communications channels; R30 billion on transport expenditure; R5 billion on clothing and related gear; and R60 billion in other expenses.

The tight situation with the funding of the troops is also made worse by the fact that the Finance Ministry is passing on payment orders to the Central Bank of Russia to transfer appropriations for the upkeep of the Army and Navy despite the absence of funds at the Ministry of Finance's Main Administration of the Federal Exchequer. The Finance Ministry evidently thinks here that the act of passing on these payment orders to the Central Bank of Russia amounts to carrying out its funding obligations. For example, between 22 September 1994 and the present, the Defense Ministry has not received funding from a Finance Ministry payment order to the sum of R416.6 billion to settle pay and wages arrears for August. Many similar cases can be cited.

It is for this very reason that the information in the Finance Ministry's letter about the transfer of R1.1 trillion to the Defense Ministry in September (as of 16 September) does not correspond to the facts. By the date in question the Defense Ministry had received R791 billion, of which the reader may satisfy himself from the bank documents (transaction slips) published today [an accompanying collage depicts financial documents bearing the official stamp of the Russian Central Bank]. And Mr. A.A. Astakhov too will clearly be not uninterested in looking directly at the bank documents for himself and drawing the appropriate conclusions.

#### **Duma Defense Committee Session on Finances**

95UM00084 Moscow KRISNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
27 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Yermolin: "Nearly One Third of Emergency Supplies Have Been Polished Off. The State Duma Committee on Defense Is Not Losing Hope of Helping the Army With Money"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the second time this month, the State Duma Committee for Defense chaired by Sergey Yushenkov is conducting a session devoted to the problem of financing the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Now, besides Ministry of Defense representatives, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of the Economy experts have participated in the discussion of urgent problems as interested parties.

As for the alarming numbers that characterize the financial position of the Armed Forces, we have repeatedly appealed to them in recent times. Let's recall that the Ministry of Defense received 14.6 trillion rubles for nine months

instead of the R27.2 trillion prescribed by law. RF Armed Forces Rear Services Chief Colonel-General Vladimir Churanov stressed the need to "make protected" the budget items for financing rations and clothing supply and also deliveries of petroleum, oil and lubricants. For the time being, the army is already being clothed and fed in part by using emergency supplies. Nearly one third of the emergency supplies "have been polished off". Or this fact. Today, the annual flying time of our military pilots is ten times less than their American colleagues. In 1995, they plan to conduct only command post exercises. People and equipment will not be sent out into the field.

A Ministry of the Economy spokesman added somber colors to the overall picture. Already 600,000 of 1,100,000 defense industry engineers and skilled workers have turned out to be unemployed. These are irretrievable losses of our defense intellect. We also need to give up on military science. By the year 2000, the Armed Forces will not receive a single scientific development.

I will point out that we still saw an attempt to find coordinated decisions at the session even with the objectively existing claims of various departments against each other. Ministry of Finance spokesmen also stated their proposals. As we all know, dividing the miserly receipts into the state treasury has become this department's sad lot. If a budget revenue item is 63 percent, then a budget expenditure item is also 63 percent, respectively. In the process, it was announced that neither the president nor the government have determined the priority directions of financing.

In the final analysis, the Committee decreed to recommend to the State Duma Soviet that it examine the issue of placing onto the Duma's work agenda an RF Government report on the execution of the Law on the Federal Budget for 1994 in the portion affecting expenditures for national defense.

#### **Vorobyev: Army's Tasks 'Cannot Be Resolved' on Budget**

MM0410114194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 1 Oct 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Colonel-General Vasilii Vorobyev, chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Military Budget and Finance Main Directorate, by Lieutenant-Colonel Ivan Ivanyuk; date, place not given: "Money for Country's Defense: It Is Pointless and Dangerous To Economize on Army Reform"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Government is working on the 1995 budget at full speed. In the near future it is planned to submit it to the State Duma. There is hope that the defective practice of the last few years whereby the country would exist for almost six months of the year without a ratified budget will be done away with once and for all.

We have talked repeatedly about the important role played in the life of the Armed Forces by decisions adopted in this sphere. Now the editorial office has asked Colonel General Vasilii Vorobyev, chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Military Budget and Finance Main Directorate, to say what studies on defense spending are being carried out

in the military department and what the prospects are for an improvement in Armed Forces funding next year.

[Ivanyuk] Vasilii Vasilievich, how do you view the fact that now, as the preparations to adopt next year's budget are entering a crucial phase, a number of anti-Army articles have appeared in the mass media and some people are once again trying to depict the Army as some kind of monster that swallows up virtually all the country's resources?

[Vorobyev] It would of course be naive to think that this is mere coincidence. If you look at newspaper files for last year and the year before, it is easy to see that similar campaigns were carried out then too. Everyone who is dependent on budget funding has an interest in creating the right public opinion and influencing the allocation of appropriations. That is normal, and there would be nothing reprehensible in it at all were people's lobbying of their own interests and the press debate to be conducted honestly. But those people who are currently whipping up the latest anti-Army wave are by no means motivated by a desire to seek objectivity; they just want to get a bigger piece of pie from the common table. The defense of their country and their fatherland are mere words to these people.

The worst element is that other forces are also joining the fight over the budget—people not averse to "hotting up" the situation within the Army and Navy and trying to destabilize the social situation, and even people who want to destroy our Armed Forces. To attain their objectives they use all manner of conjecture, insinuation, and even downright lies. How else can you evaluate the statement made by one writer who claimed in his effort to demonstrate the dramatic increase in military spending that today a soldier's boots cost as much as Italian women's shoes? In actual fact a soldier's boots cost 45,000 rubles [R], while high-quality imported women's shoes cost at least five times that. Although more often than not the talk that all the country's problems can be resolved by cutting military spending takes an apparently scientific form, and various comparisons are made that have nothing to do with life itself however.

[Vorobyev] I certainly think that everyone knows how difficult it was to adopt this year's budget, which has been approved by legislative bodies at R40.6 trillion, just 46 percent of the Armed Forces' real requirements. However, when validating these requirements we acted not out of any good intentions but on the basis of fundamental documents, namely the need to implement the military doctrine adopted by the Security Council and the Russian Federation Laws "On Defense" and "On the Status of Servicemen," as well as Russian presidential edicts and government decrees on defense matters. At the same time we carried out, and still do carry out, all the estimates of the appropriations needed for the upkeep of the Army and Navy directly, based on the government's prescribed norms for personnel pay and the current prices and rates for materials and services, and also bearing in mind the Finance Ministry's relevant recommendations.

However, the Defense Ministry budget application was ignored and a purely abstract approach was taken to the military budget. The proportion of military spending in 1993 GNP (5 percent) was used as a base, and this figure was

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transferred to the hypothetical amount of 1994 GDP. The figure was so to speak plucked out of the air.

[Ivanyuk] Vasily Vasilyevich, most of our readers are probably vague as to why that approach is wrong.

[Vorobyev] We are told that there is not a single developed country in the West where military spending exceeds 5 percent of GDP. That is certainly true: In the United States, Britain, and France the figures are 4.7, 3.7, and 3.3 percent respectively. But the people who manipulate "bare" percentages fail to cite other extremely eloquent figures. For instance, if you look at military spending in absolute terms the following picture emerges: The United States spends \$297.2 billion, while Britain and France spend 42.0 billion and 44.7 billion (U.S. dollars) respectively. But if you try to present our military budget in U.S. dollars, it only amounts to \$6.5 billion. Western military spending also accounts for quite sizeable sums per capita. Last year the per capita figures were as follows: In the United States—\$1151.9, Britain—\$726.1, and France—\$794.3.

It is wrong to use the same ratio between Russia's military spending and GDP as in other countries for a number of reasons. Our country has a special geopolitical position and its own Armed Forces structure, and the economy is going through a period of transition. After all, prices of arms bought by NATO armies virtually reflect the world level, while in our country they are influenced by domestic factors, by production costs. And if you examine defense spending you are bound to take into consideration industrial manufacturers' price indexes which affect the cost of military output. The jump in the price of this output over the last few years by hundreds and sometimes even thousands of times is due not only to inflationary processes in the economy and the tremendous energy-intensiveness and material-intensiveness of defense output, but also to the drastic reduction in production and the need to organize production of the output that Russia lost following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

[Ivanyuk] Your opponents may retort that our country is in a complex economic position and spending should be cut.

[Vorobyev] Military spending is being cut, and that has affected all areas of the Armed Forces' activity. This year compared with 1990 spending on the upkeep of the Army and Navy at comparable prices dropped by almost a factor of three. Spending linked with the production of arms and military hardware has declined most dramatically. Whereas in 1990 spending on their procurement totaled 43.8 percent of total military spending, this year the figure was down to just 21.1 percent, i.e. it had almost halved. At comparable prices spending on the procurement of arms and hardware dropped from R30 billion in 1991 to R3.4 billion in 1994 (at 1991 prices).

It is easy to say that we do not need heaps of weapons and we must produce fewer. But this year's truncated procurement of arms and military hardware results in their production becoming unprofitable and could even lead to enterprises' refusing to carry out the state order. And the Army and Navy will receive no new arms and hardware; on the contrary, it is estimated that new arms and hardware may account for just 5 percent of the arsenal by the year 2006 given this wholesale reduction in funding.

In short, the process of cutting certain items of spending is not as simple as people who judge these problems at a superficial level may think. I personally—and I am not the only one—am alarmed by the cutbacks in spending on research and experimental-design work in this period from 18.6 to 5.7 percent of military spending. In the NATO countries this figure has fluctuated over the last few years between 9.8 and 11.2 percent. Our economizing on research and development work today could make it necessary to increase appropriations in these areas many times over in the future, when we suddenly remember and start rebuilding our lost scientific and technical potential and cooperation in scientific studies and developments.

[Ivanyuk] So are you saying that we have already crossed a line that we should not have crossed in the allocation of defense spending?

[Vorobyev] That is indeed true, and I am not fueling the situation at all. Nor one should one forget that the Armed Forces are currently undergoing reorganization and are constantly on the move—which inevitably entails an increase in spending on a number of military budget items. Appropriations primarily have to be increased on the provision of social guarantees for servicemen discharged into the reserve. Our analysis has shown that reducing the numerical strength of the Armed Forces by 1 January 1996 to the level prescribed by legislation will require an extra R1.8 trillion just to discharge personnel.

By and large the military budget today has an explicit social thrust. Spending on the payment of monetary allowances and wages, payment of pensions, housing construction, food, the upkeep of hospitals, clinics, schools, kindergartens, etc. represents over 60 percent of all military spending. How can we economize on that?

A number of other factors also necessitate additional defense spending. Russia was forced to invest very considerable material resources in providing amenities for troops in new basing locations in order to ensure the withdrawal of troops from East Europe and the former USSR republics. And what about Russia's peacemaking activity? What about the upkeep of other installations and structures which are necessary not only to the Armed Forces but also to the whole country? Why should all this spending be covered by a truncated military budget?

[Ivanyuk] Vasily Vasilyevich, this is all budgetary theory which some state officials and deputies obviously fail to understand. Yet take the practice of funding: It is wretched.

[Vorobyev] Certainly, the implementation of this year's military budget is indeed proving very difficult. In the first nine months of the year the Armed Forces received R14.6 trillion out of R27.2 trillion, or just 53 percent of what they were entitled to by law. I believe that this year's approach whereby current funding was made dependent on budget receipts has been utterly discredited. It not only destabilizes the situation in the Armed Forces but also directly damages the country's economy.

Let me cite a few more concrete facts and figures. As of 1 September the Defense Ministry owed R3.3 trillion for food, electricity, and municipal services. With the allocated funds the Defense Ministry can only provide itself with 59

percent of the required fuel and less than half the required aviation fuel. Today district and fleet fuel stocks are below the prescribed current storage norms, which also means a reduction in the level of troops' combat training. The lack of liquid boiler fuel stocks is casting doubt on the possibility of providing troops with basic necessities during the winter period. In the first eight months of the year R402.8 billion was supplied instead of the R1.8 trillion allocated in 1994 for Army and Navy food supplies. Right now R253 billion is needed for the procurement of seasonal produce alone. The preparation of housing and barracks for the winter is being disrupted—as of 20 September less than a third of the scheduled amount had been allocated for spending on quarters and utilities.

Inadequate allocation of appropriations for recycling arms and military hardware is creating the preconditions for extremely dangerous incidents. Thus, 85 decommissioned nuclear submarines are still in their permanent basing areas. The quite recent flagrant case where the electricity supply to the Strategic Rocket Forces' Central Command Post was cut off indicates that the alarm has already been sounded countrywide. The reason being failure to settle Mosenergo [Moscow power supply company] accounts.

The truth is that over the last few months the Finance Ministry has only given us money to pay monetary allowances and wages and virtually not a cent for other matters involved in the upkeep of the Armed Forces. But how are soldiers to be fed, the sick to be treated, and housing to be built? A special commission set up within the Defense Ministry has ruled that funds must be diverted for some emergency payments by delaying payment to people.

I find the stance espoused by my opponents, who state publicly on television that there is not enough money to pay wages in the Army, in particular because exercises are being held and fuel procured, quite incomprehensible. They evidently cannot imagine there not being even enough fuel for exercises now—sometimes there is not enough to get a soldier to hospital in time or bring bread to a unit.

[Ivanyuk] The Defense Ministry is also being reproached with being uncontrolled and the intradepartmental monitoring system with being ineffective. Hence, people say, there are all manner of violations and abuses....

[Vorobyev] There is indeed plenty of criticism over abuses in the use of material and monetary funds in the Army and Navy. The wave of economic crime has certainly affected the Armed Forces too. But no matter what you say, no major scandal comparable to those taking place in the country has been discovered in the Army or Navy. And statistics attest that the proportion of these offenses in the Armed Forces is far smaller than in our state as a whole. In the first eight months of the year losses, shortages, and thefts of material assets and monetary resources dropped by 15 percent in the Army and Navy. Nonetheless the abuses have regrettably not been eradicated. But those who are trying to manipulate these facts keep quiet about one thing: They have virtually all been revealed by Defense Ministry monitoring and auditing bodies, and the toughest measures have been taken against the culprits.

I must explain that various levels of monitoring are exercised in the Armed Forces, even though they are described

by one term—departmental monitoring. Technical and engineering services supervise themselves—admittedly, not always effectively. Monitoring in the rear services is exercised under the leadership of the deputy defense minister. While financial or what can be called independent monitoring is exercised under the leadership of the defense minister, who approves the plans for documentary audits and examines their results.

Financial monitoring is being constantly refined, and we are prepared to accept any advice and good wishes in this respect. On one condition—that it is competent. For instance, the idea crops up periodically of creating a unified, centralized monitoring and auditing inspectorate directly subordinate to the defense minister. Accepting that proposal would certainly not improve matters and would on the contrary destroy an effective and very reliable system, based on the state system of monitoring under the leadership of the Russian Federation Finance Ministry.

[Ivanyuk] There have been claims in the press on several occasions that the Defense Ministry is itself to blame for holdups in the payment of monetary allowances and wages. People say that the money is "put into circulation" [oborachivat] and that someone profits from this. Is that true?

[Vorobyev] It is, but these are just isolated incidents. I can say for sure that in the last two years there have been three such cases. And no prosecutor's office can reproach us with failing to hand over material pertaining to offenses in a timely manner. We are waging a merciless war on these offenses. The Prosecutor's Office is currently carrying out an investigation into Major General Yu. Karev, former chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Financial and Economic Service. He did indeed put money into circulation; however, you would have thought he had a noble objective—there was not enough money to build housing. Nevertheless it emerged that he was dismissed right away: An offense is an offense, and financial discipline cannot tolerate that kind of thing.

I would draw the attention of those who are trying to reproach Army and Navy financial personnel with some kind of unscrupulousness to one simple detail. It does not take a great brain for any of them to steal. You do not need the chief of any other service, say, nor do you have to enter into a conspiracy with anyone or surmount any obstacles. He has the keys, he opens the safe, he takes any amount. A lieutenant who takes on the job after graduating from school is entrusted with hundreds of millions of rubles. He has just one immediate boss above him, the unit commander—not like a platoon commander, say, who is supervised by everyone from the deputy company commander to the commander of the battalion, the regiment, or the division.... At the same time you can literally count our violations on your fingers because, profoundly aware of the specific nature of our profession, we try to do everything we can to raise exceptional probity and decency in every student from his first days at school and then in the officer during his practical work. And these people must be thanked for their honest, selfless work rather than be the object of idle conjecture.

As for "circulating" money, I would like to say this. You have to be very far-removed from the troops' life to say that.

People in every military camp wait for money like a breath of fresh air. Scarcely has it arrived before all the officers' wives know about it and a line virtually forms up in advance outside the finance offices, because families are chronically short of money to pay for housing and food. That is something else which indicates what kind of uncontrolled trading there can be in the Army and Navy.

[Ivanyuk] Vasily Vasilyevich, nonetheless what are the Armed Forces' prospects as regards the 1995 budget? Are there any concrete studies?

[Vorobyev] The picture here is fairly clear but it is by no means rosy. Despite the obvious untenability of the Finance Ministry's approaches to the formation of the military budget this year, the Ministry is employing the same methods to plan defense spending in 1995. The abstract rate of 1.34, applied to this year's military budget, has reappeared, calculated on the basis of GDP of R1.210 trillion forecast by the Economy Ministry and a 5.08-percent share for defense spending. Evidently this year's experience has taught us nothing.

It is quite obvious that amid the reform and cuts in the Armed Forces defense spending should be decided directly. So that is what we have done. We have submitted all our estimates to the Finance Ministry. There are no complaints regarding our methods of calculation but the Finance Ministry has rejected them, citing lack of money. Serious disagreements have arisen again.

I think that defense spending can only be cut once the main military reforms have been carried out, and that costs money—plenty of it. I have already cited the figures on several occasions. So we have to make up our minds once for all: Either we hunt out money for this purpose, or we dramatically reduce future defense spending, or a reduction in defense spending without reform of the Armed Forces will result in the loss of their combat capability. There are assessments that have been carried out not only by us but also by Western experts which indicate that the problems of ensuring national security that confront the Russian leadership cannot be resolved with the military budget at its present level. That is all.

#### **Col-Gen Kolesnikov on General Staff Functions, Flank Limits**

MM0610131594 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 5 Oct 94 p 5

[Interview with Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov, Russian Federation first deputy defense minister and chief of the Armed Forces' General Staff, by Igor Korotchenko under the "Army" rubric; place, date not given: "Mikhail Kolesnikov: 'The Threat of Direct Aggression Against Russia Has Declined Significantly.' But the Chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces' General Staff Thinks That the Flank Limits Imposed on Russia Reduce the Country's Defense Capability"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Korotchenko] Mikhail Petrovich, what is the role of the General Staff within the overall structure of Russia's Armed Forces?

[Kolesnikov] The General Staff's role is determined primarily by its place in the overall system of organs of military and state management. A brief historical digression is unavoidable here, I think.

In the history of the development of Russia's organs of military management there have been periods (from 1718 to 1832) when the General Staff existed independently of the military department. But the experience of the separate existence of these organs did not prove its worth and, from 1832 to the present, with a break in 1905-1908, the General Staff has been an integral part of the military department, nowadays the Defense Ministry.

Today the General Staff is the main organ for operational control of the Armed Forces, ensures leadership of their organizational development, training, and use in warfare, and is the entity that coordinates the activity of branches of the Armed Forces, combat arms, Mobile Forces, and the main and central directorates of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry.

This mission involves a huge range of tasks. The most important of these are the elaboration of proposals on the main questions of the preparation of the country for defense, on the structure, composition, stationing, and tasks of the Armed Forces, on equipping them with arms and military hardware, on training military cadres, and on the defense budget. The General Staff carries out strategic and operational planning and the planning of the Armed Forces' mobilization deployment and leads military intelligence. It plans and carries out together with local organs of state power and management the drafting of citizens for military service.

In addition, one of the most important tasks is the timely notification of the Russian Federation president and the country's top state and military leadership of any real or potential military threat to the Russian Federation's national interests and security.

On instructions from the Russian Federation president, the General Staff is currently working on the draft Blueprint for the Organizational Development of the Armed Forces and Other Forces of the Russian Federation for the Period Through 2005. This is a very major and responsible task which we are carrying out together with the other ministries and departments concerned so as to ensure the reliable defense of Russia's borders whatever the changes in the composition and structure of the Armed Forces.

Those are just a small proportion of the tasks entrusted to the General Staff. They give some idea of its role in the overall structure of Russia's Armed Forces.

[Korotchenko] Could you tell our readers about the structure of the General Staff and the tasks resolved by its main directorates?

[Kolesnikov] Organizationally speaking, the General Staff consists of main directorates: operational, organization and mobilization, intelligence, international military cooperation, and the directorate of the Russian Federation Armed Forces chief of communications (which has the status of a

main directorate), and also independent directorates: international treaties, electronic warfare, military topographic, military scientific, personnel, military strategic research center, and so forth.

As for the directorates' tasks, they follow from the tasks resolved by the General Staff and, moreover, they are mostly clear from the titles of the directorates themselves.

In my view, it is important to emphasize that the General Staff is a unified entity. And as a rule it resolves the tasks confronting it on the basis of close collaboration among all its directorates. Moreover, we work together with practically all organs of state power and management on questions of ensuring national security, maintaining international military cooperation, and ensuring the vital activities and the constant and reliable functioning of the Armed Forces.

It is important to note that the structure of the General Staff is not ossified. It is the first to change as the tasks it performs are clarified. In addition, ad hoc temporary formations can be set up where necessary to resolve tasks that arise suddenly. I must say that the level of training, broad outlook, and great professionalism of the generals, admirals, officers, and employees make it possible to carry out such reorganizations without any difficulties and complications in work.

[Korotchenko] In the General Staff's view, what are the sources of military danger to Russia today?

[Kolesnikov] We recognize, and this is noted in our military doctrine, that the threat of the unleashing of large-scale war and direct aggression against Russia has decreased significantly today. Nevertheless, this danger has not been totally eliminated. Social, political, economic, territorial, religious, national and ethnic, and other contradictions, which have not disappeared and still exist between states, may be potential sources of the emergence of armed conflicts and wars in contemporary conditions.

Moreover, the desire of a number of countries to resolve problems by using means of armed struggle has not disappeared. This is particularly dangerous in combination with attempts by such states to gain access to nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems for them, and the latest military technologies.

Unfortunately, a very real threat to the Russian Federation's national interests stems from the growth of aggressive nationalism and Islamic extremism in a number of countries, including some states of the near abroad.

Territorial claims by certain adjoining states in combination with attempts to ignore Russian state borders and to exploit its economic zones in their own interests can also be singled out among other sources of military danger to Russia.

Finally, we have to take into account the uncertainty and contradictoriness of the military-political situation in the world and the mountainous stockpiles of weapons. We must also bear in mind historical experience, which indicates the possibility of unpredictable changes in international relations. But this is getting into the realm of politics.

On the basis of these realities, we must have Armed Forces capable in a crisis of reliably neutralizing any of the sources of military danger and of safeguarding Russia's national interests.

I will emphasize once again that most of the aforementioned sources of military danger are potential and at present do not decisively influence the situation. They can be neutralized or weakened by overcoming the crisis phenomena in Russia and strengthening its state institutions and economic and defense potential, and also by making effective use of foreign policy means.

[Korotchenko] How is the control of strategic nuclear forces organized?

[Kolesnikov] Despite all the changes under way in our society and the world as a whole, the organization of control of strategic nuclear forces has been and remains, as the military saying goes, at an unlowerable [nesnizhayemyy] level.

Our strategic nuclear forces are the guarantee of the Russian state's national security, its pride, and the foundation of its might. There can be no indulgences, still less slackening of requirements regarding reliability, stability, timeliness, concealment, and constant readiness for use.

Despite the disintegration of the USSR, the system for the control of the strategic nuclear forces has operated and continues to operate reliably, ensuring the security of nuclear weapons, including those outside Russia's territory.

At present we have a harmonious system for the control of strategic nuclear forces which includes organs, control posts, and combat control and communications systems. The "backbone" of the system is the alert-duty forces performing alert duty and service. The performance of the set tasks ultimately depends on their training, morale, and provision with all types of allowances [dovolstviye].

I want to stress that the system for the control of strategic nuclear forces is maintained in constant readiness to convey orders for their combat use to the launcher, ship, or aircraft and ensures the total exclusion of any possibility of unsanctioned use. In accordance with the accords that have been reached, our strategic nuclear forces are currently not targeted. At the same time the system ensures their timely targeting if necessary.

The right to use the strategic nuclear forces belongs to the Russian Federation president.

[Korotchenko] Does the potential of the General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate make it possible to inform Russia's military-political leadership reliably in good time of the emergence of factors threatening the interests of the country's national security?

[Kolesnikov] To be extremely laconic, I could say: "Yes, it does." But I would like to offer certain explanations for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's readers.

What is the Main Intelligence Directorate? It is military intelligence. Its most important task is to ensure the timely detection of armed attacks in preparation or threatening developments and to warn the top leadership of the country and the Armed Forces about this.

It is perfectly obvious that this task is resolved in collaboration with other appropriate departments, involving the comprehensive use of all intelligence efforts and resources. The reliability of the resultant information is guaranteed by the processing of a multitude of data obtained from different and independent sources. All spheres are covered: political, economic, military-technical, and, of course, military.

In general I can say that we pay the closest attention to these questions. The reasons for this attention are understandable, I think. The world will remain troubled for a long time to come, and it is impossible to grasp all the intricacies of world politics unless you have timely and reliable information.

[Korotchenko] What could you say about the problem of the flank restrictions imposed on Russia under the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe?

[Kolesnikov] This problem arose a while ago, but it has now assumed special importance for us. As is well known, the strength and vitality of any treaty lie in its consonance with the real conditions of the situation. When the CFE Treaty was signed four years ago (19 November 1990) the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries, rigidly countered by the NATO bloc, were in existence.

But implementation of the CFE Treaty began (from 17 July 1992) in totally different geopolitical conditions. A situation arose whereby so far as Russia and its Armed Forces are concerned the treaty commitments regarding regional division and flank restrictions on armaments are to some extent not only becoming meaningless but are creating serious difficulties in their organizational development. Essentially the disintegration of the USSR brought about a shift in the proportions of arms levels for the grouping of Russian Armed Forces stationed in the central part of the country's European territory and its northern and southern flanks.

As a result, out of a total level of 6,400 tanks, 11,480 armored fighting vehicles (AFV's), and 6,415 artillery systems with a caliber of 100 mm or more, after 1995 we can station no more than 700 tanks, 580 AFV's, and 1,290 artillery systems in regular units of the Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts. Yet in terms of area these two districts constitute over half of the European part of Russia's territory. That is, this quantity of equipment does not meet contemporary demands for the creation of minimum sufficient defensive groupings of troops and therefore cannot satisfy us, which is the crux of the problem.

In reality in the Leningrad Military District and North Caucasus Military District we need 1,100 tanks, 3,000 AFV's, and 2,100 artillery systems. Including 600 tanks, 2,200 AFV's, and 1,000 artillery systems in the south of Russia. This potential would not be detrimental to the security of the treaty's other signatory states, and, what is more, Russia is prepared to offer additional political guarantees here.

In order to solve this problem the Russian Federation president has sent a special message to the treaty's main signatory countries. Under the auspices of the Russian Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry active work has

been under way for over a year in both the Joint Consultative Group in Vienna and in the course of bilateral meetings and consultations.

So far our approaches are not meeting with understanding from our Western treaty partners. This is forcing us to reflect on the existence in the new partnership relations of the "double standards" of the time of confrontation between blocs. However, we are hoping for progress in this sphere and that our Western partners will realize the need to adapt the CFE Treaty as a most important condition for ensuring its viability. If this does not happen, we will be forced temporarily—pending total stabilization of the situation in the Caucasus region—to exceed somewhat the levels of conventional arms and equipment laid down for the flank region.

[Korotchenko] How are questions of military-technical policy being resolved in conditions of decreasing defense appropriations?

[Kolesnikov] That is a very urgent and, to put it mildly, painful question for us. In the prevailing economic situation in the country, the implementation of military-technical policy is one of the main tasks of military organizational development. Here we are running up against a number of problems that the Armed Forces will be unable to resolve themselves. The main reason is the sharp reduction in financial appropriations for defense needs.

According to the law "On the Federal Budget for 1994," which provides for 8.442 trillion rubles [R] for purchases of arms and military equipment and R2.433 trillion for research and development work, the volumes of purchases of arms and military equipment are halved. This does not make it possible to meet even the Armed Forces' minimum demands or to preserve the scientific and industrial potential to develop and produce the main types of arms and military equipment.

In addition, the inadequate funding for purchases of arms and military equipment makes it necessary to channel over 30 percent of the allocated funds into ensuring the operation of equipment in the forces, primarily strategic nuclear forces control systems and intelligence, into ensuring nuclear security, and into equipping the Mobile Forces.

It is already clear that this unprecedented reduction in the state defense order will have an adverse impact not only on the Armed Forces but also on Russia's defense complex as a whole.

The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that even the funds provided for by the federal budget are being allocated to the Defense Ministry extremely spasmodically and not in full.

Production of arms and military equipment at many defense industry enterprises is decreasing, and at some it has been entirely halted. With a view to alleviating the problem of nonpayments the Defense Ministry together with the Finance Ministry is carrying out work to expedite adoption of a decision on the funding of defense spending on a credit plan basis.

Implementation of this decision will make it possible at least somehow to support the Russian defense complex and

largely to preserve production of the most important types of arms and military equipment at a minimum level. We are doing everything possible to equip the Russian Army with modern types of arms and military equipment. We see the solution here partly in focusing efforts on creating a limited quantity of highly efficient arms systems, in maximum interbranch standardization in the models of arms and military equipment developed, in supporting existing and future advanced technologies, and in expanding the sphere of their "dual use."

[Korotchenko] Is there even a theoretical possibility of the theft of radioactive materials from facilities belonging to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry's 12th Main Directorate?

[Kolesnikov] There is neither a theoretical nor any other possibility of the theft of radioactive materials from facilities of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry's 12th Main Directorate. The point is that the materials in question are not stored at all at facilities belonging to that directorate. They are kept at enterprises of the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy. The handling and safekeeping of these materials are exclusively the prerogative of that ministry.

As for nuclear munitions, their safekeeping at facilities of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry's 12th Main Directorate is guaranteed and ensured by a time-tested system of organizational and technical means which gives no grounds for doubting its reliability.

[Korotchenko] What problems have arisen as a result of the switch to the mixed principle in Army and Navy manpower acquisition?

[Kolesnikov] In general I will remark that the transition to the mixed principle in manpower acquisition is taking place in accordance with the outlined plans and is one component of the military reform that is being carried out. It envisages primarily an increase in the strength level of the Army and Navy because of the shortage of draft resources and—most importantly—an increase in the proportion of professionals, especially in posts determining the combat readiness of units and subunits.

Today around 30 percent of posts for enlisted men and sergeants are manned by volunteers. The overwhelming majority of them honestly and conscientiously perform their duty in the most difficult conditions. By the year 2000 we are hoping that half of the Army and Navy will be professionals.

But this is a new venture for us, and naturally not everything is going as smoothly as we would like. Problems far beyond the abilities of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry to solve immediately arose.

Everything runs up against the shortage of funding. When we hire someone for contract service, we are assuming commitments to pay him for his labor and to ensure social and everyday conditions, the main one being housing. I will not go into the situation regarding the latter. That is a very serious problem for the Army as a whole.

But can the pay of R170,000-175,000 which is all we can offer given the allocated funds be regarded as sufficient incentive to recruit on contract a sergeant tank commander, for instance?

The second problem is the imperfection of the legislative and normative base. Documents of fundamental importance to us like the Statute on the Performance of Military Service and the Statute on the Material Responsibility of Servicemen, which were drafted by the Defense Ministry as long ago as last year, have still not been examined and adopted. There is no mechanism for implementing a number of the benefits provided for contract servicemen by the Russian Federation laws "On the Status of Servicemen" and "On Military Service Obligation and Military Service."

The question of the registration of citizens recruited for contract military service in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Moscow Oblast is also problematical.

There are other problems as well. But I have deliberately dwell on those which we will be unable to solve by our own efforts and which threaten to discredit the very idea of contract service and to inflict direct harm on the prestige of the Armed Forces.

[Korotchenko] What are the main criteria for the selection of personnel for the General Staff?

[Kolesnikov] In any institution (irrespective of the scale of the tasks that are being resolved) every leader, whatever post he occupies, pays special attention to selecting his "team," as the saying goes nowadays. This is based on certain universal criteria for selecting subordinates which have been formulated and tested by life itself.

Naturally, we are no exception. We opt for officers and generals who have a high general military training and who have shown their mettle in practical work among the troops and in the management organs of branches of the Armed Forces, combat arms, districts, large strategic formations, and combined units.

A sine qua non is an extremely high sense of responsibility for assigned work. Special attention is paid to the ability to make a profound, comprehensive analysis of every new development in military matters and military art and to draw conclusions and formulate proposals for decisionmaking, to knowledge of military history and the General Staff's traditions, and to the ability to display creative initiative, organization, and, if you like, selflessness in work.

Moreover, competence, experience of work, age, health, communication skills, and the ability to withstand physical and moral and mental stress are constantly borne in mind.

General Staff officers are not born. So we particularly appreciate people's ability and desire to improve their professional military qualities and their attitude toward military duty and the job to which they are devoting the best years of their lives.

[Korotchenko] How much does a Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff officer receive, and what value is placed on the labor of his counterparts in the top military management organs of the NATO countries?

[Kolesnikov] By virtue of the nature of their activity General Staff officers and generals resolve extremely complex, multifaceted, and responsible tasks. So I regard this not as an idle question but as one dictated by sincere interest on the part of the newspapers and therefore of its readers.

It has to be admitted that many of our fellow citizens are unfortunately clearly in the grip of philistine ideas and are still convinced that General Staff officers make piles of money. I am not going to try to change anyone's mind about this. I will simply cite specific figures, and let readers draw their own conclusions.

The pay of officers in the General Staff, as in the Armed Forces as a whole, is made up of post salary, military rank salary, and length-of-service payment. Depending on this the pay, for instance, of a colonel with 20 years' service is R482,000-495,000 per month. In addition, there is a one-shot bonus for the conscientious performance of official duties of three months' pay per year, and also one month's pay of material assistance per year. Taking these payments into account, monthly pay is R602,000-617,000, in other words \$265-272.

Finally, there is the comparison you ask for, although I do not think it is very proper to discuss this. The comparison is "not in our favor." A U.S. Army colonel with the same 20 years' service gets \$4,500-6,000, our French counterpart \$5,200-6,200, our English counterpart \$5,100-5,900, and our German counterpart \$5,300-6,300 per month, in other words over 20 times more.

In conclusion I would like to say the following. The general nature of your questions, which cover a wide range of military problems, and the wish to learn about the work of the General Staff, in my view, indicates that a broad readership has a sincere and serious interest in these matters. We are always prepared for and open to such discussions.

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#### Experience of Totskoye Exercise Pondered

MM3009145794 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 29 Sep 94 p 2

[Article by Gennadiy Miranovich under the "Pictures From Life" rubric: "'Blue Helmets' in the Russian Interior, or an Afterword on an Exercise Destined To Go Down in History"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Totskoye Range-Moscow—Yes, those to whose lot it fell to represent the peacemaking forces of Russia and the United States in the command-staff exercise held near Orenburg at the beginning of September really did have an enviable task, for the very fact that it took place, as Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation minister of defense, remarked in his speech to the soldiers and officers of the 27th Motorized Rifle and 3d Infantry Divisions, is of global significance. Nevertheless, people remain people even when they "make history." In this case people so different from and similar to one another. But this human aspect of the exercise, which might not yet have been

fully evaluated by the experts, will probably be described best of all in pictures from life, which were not provided for in the staffs' plans.

#### Journalistic 'Abruptness'

During one of the news conferences or a briefing, of which there seemed to be plenty in the course of the command-staff exercise at the Totskoye Range, somebody remarked: So much has been written about this exercise that the royalties could be used to refund much of the expenditure connected with holding it.

I do not know about refunding expenditure, which, incidentally, was calculated very scrupulously by both U.S. and our financiers. I only know that the Americans spent less than had been presumed. But there is no doubt at all that both Russian and foreign mass media took a very lively interest precisely in the nonfinancial aspect of the matter. You should have seen how, crowding one another, our brothers with a television camera, still camera, or dictaphone at the ready rushed to the training points, where, in general, as is always the case in a command-staff exercise, it was hard to discover anything eye-catching. This zeal was understandable: For we were present at the laying of one of the first bricks in the foundations being built for new relations between armies which had opposed each other for many years.

How did this "peacemaking brick" turn out? As regards the television and radio interior, so to speak, of the exercise created by the mass media, it did, as is known, prove quite motley, ranging from the hysterically categorical "Yanks get out!" to the ironically forgiving "Well, friend, shall we do a bit of fighting?" The factual side of the palette is equally motley. From one newspaper you learn that neither the Americans nor the Russians had even small arms, although everyone was armed. From another you learn that the peacekeeping operation was rehearsed by entire divisions, although the total number of participants did not exceed the size of a motorized rifle battalion.

I personally, as an eyewitness of what happened, was dealt the final blow by the ITAR-TASS report that "Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev...landed by helicopter at the epicenter of the explosion (meaning the nuclear explosion conducted on the Totskoye Range during a troop exercise in 1954—G.M.) and had a telephone conversation with U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry." Simply a staggeringly wild fantasy sprinkled with real facts. The point is that the minister and the persons accompanying him, including journalists, really did land at the epicenter. Only there were no telephone conversations there with America. That happened in a totally different place. They do not know what they are talking about, as the saying goes....

How much "abruptness" there was over the explosion itself and its consequences. Evidently under the impression of what he had read, Colonel General Aleksey Kirillovich Mironov, retired, "reached" me by telephone. "Somewhere there is a training film devoted to those events, so why not show it to the general public?" he literally beseeched me. Indeed, why not show it if we want people finally to learn the truth?

But enough of comments on all sorts of frightening reports. About soldiers of the 3d Infantry Division of "green berets" hiding behind masks. About disguised CIA agents.... I will merely remark that U.S. soldiers really did change their clothes. Some flew off in our paratrooper undershirt, some in a blue beret, some in a traditional Russian cap with earflaps. In general, with flagrant violations of military uniform—a result of amicably exchanging items of uniform with Russian soldiers. "This is the only violation to which I will have to resign myself," Brigadier General Leonard Holder, division commander, said on leaving. "Me too," Major General Anatoliy Sidiakin, commander of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, smiled on looking at his own equally bizarrely dressed soldiers.

#### Professionals Do Not Like Fuss

An embarrassing thing happened one day. Finding himself where the Americans were stationed, our medical specialist at once launched into sanitary educational work with regard to the equipment of people engaged in food preparation. The transatlantic cooks, wearing camouflage dress, listened patiently to a lecture on white coats and chef's hats. But when our Aesculapius literally fell upon them on seeing that they were working while armed, the representatives of U.S. military field cooking were thrown into confusion: You cannot beat off an enemy attack with ladles and saucepans, they said.

Yes, this is the approach of these imperialists: If you go into the field, then learn military matters properly, without needless conventionalities. Also, as far as I understood it, their professionals very seldom have recourse to buildings of various kinds. On arriving at the place where they have to fulfill a task, they get down to it without unnecessary words or fuss. Of course, experience tells here—the majority of soldiers have been in service between five and 10 years, including in "trouble spots." Despite this apparent disregard for drill training, however, no lack of organization or any manifestations of indiscipline on their part were encountered. There were no recorded instances, for example, of a U.S. jeep exceeding the prescribed speed limit in a military camp or of an officer who had spent too long visiting Russian colleagues, even if he was attached to the division staff, not arriving back in his own camp by the prescribed hour, however many kilometers he had to cover on foot on the range. If you consider that their professionals are less governed by various kinds of instructions and regulations, compared with ours, then things do not seem too bad with regard to discipline there.

About regulations, by the way. As is well known, a peace-making soldier has to be able to do a lot of things: give first aid to a casualty, neutralize a munition or a mine, etc. But he must also have the tact of a diplomat and the "nose" of a customs officer. This means the ability to reconcile people who have seized each other by the throat and to determine faultlessly whereabouts in a vehicle weapons or drugs are hidden—you cannot prescribe this in instructions. Likewise, you cannot make advance provision for all situations in which a soldier fulfilling a peacemaking mission might find himself.

In such cases the Americans rely (naturally, within the bounds of what is permitted) on the peacemaker's experience, intuition, and sensible initiative. Here is just one

episode by way of an illustration. At a joint checkpoint Senior Lieutenant Meylaf [name as transliterated] and Lt. Lebedev received a scenario instruction about an armed attack on the post entrusted to them. While Lebedev was setting his soldiers tasks to repel the attack, Meylaf's subordinates had opened fire for effect (hypothetically, of course) without being given any orders. That is, the U.S. soldier is far freer than the Russian soldier to make a decision to use weapons. He does so when he deems it necessary and is personally responsible for his actions before the law. But in our country the commander is known to answer for everything. So even if they thrash you, please be good enough to wait for the order....

And yet. Although in our country, as one general remarked, "instructions are strict, sloppiness is also without parallel," but we are also "able to do some things." When the small engine that generates light and heat for the tents stopped working in the Americans' field camp one night, and their much-vaunted professionals were shivering with cold, afraid to poke their noses out of their much-vaunted sleeping bags, everything was resolved by our epic soldier Ivan (unfortunately, I did not manage to learn his name). This militarized Levsha [left-hander] spat and blew in the right places and gave something a turn, and the engine naturally started working again. Again without unnecessary words or fuss.

#### Lessons of Glasnost

Here it is probably impossible to disagree with Sergey Yushenkov, chairman of the Duma Committee for Defense, who believes (ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 6 September 1994) that "national-communist and destructive forces suffered the most crushing defeat at Totskoye." In the deputy's opinion, this resulted from the fact that they were forbidden nothing and were allowed to operate within the framework of the law.

Indeed, the representatives of the press, those who came to the range, like Viktor Anpilov and his "team," to make a protest, and all kinds of "expert observers" were all granted freedom of action. Incidentally, it would be appropriate to ask those who are still displeased: When did any of us ever heed public remarks in matters relating to army training? But here everything was done with due regard for public opinion.

In short, an atmosphere of unprecedented frankness, compared with former concepts, was created on the exercise. Here it could at once be seen who is who: Who really wants to show concern for the fatherland, and who wants just to draw attention to himself once again.

What can be said of the latter? Having "blown their cover" and realized that no interest was being shown in them and no obstacles were being created, they very quickly withdrew. But it is worth talking about one of them, who was there, so it seemed to me, on business.

I met Dmitriy Mankov, chairman of the ecology party in Orenburg Oblast, on the range when hardly anyone was left there. "I want to see what they have left behind," he said, motioning toward the departing column.

I do not know what the results of Mankov's work on the exercise will be, for quite a close eye was kept on ecology

there even without him. At any rate, there was no waste to be seen on the range. Special cellophane containers had been prepared for it, incidentally. But still both his persistence (he was on the range throughout the exercise) and his informal approach to the matter win you over. You feel that the man is an unostentatious fan of his own land. Maybe, as Dmitriy Mankov proposes, it really is worth thinking about the status of observers of this kind on similar exercises? This strikes me as a serious question, if we are seriously concerned about strengthening the local population's trust in military activity.

But the chief lesson of glasnost is probably that the site of the epicenter of the nuclear explosion on the Totskoye Range is becoming a place of pilgrimage for delegations of various kinds, tourists, journalists, film crews, including foreign ones, etc. People here are already saying that we should take money from those who want to see our living history.

Well, maybe in time even this natural depression, which seems to have been ironed flat, where only wormwood grows, will become a lucrative place. Only the prospects for our peacemaking activity should not be linked, as certain party newspapers do, with the upcoming presidential election in Russia. For, if they do link it, this means that they themselves are willy-nilly preparing something that is no longer an "Atlantis" exercise.

## STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

### Investigation of Power Shut-Down to Central Command Post

95UM0006A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
28 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by Viktor Litovkin: "Moscow Power Company Officials Who Cut Off Strategic Power Could Get Up to Three Years"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Major General of Justice Ivan Lebed, military procurator of the Strategic Missile Forces, has instituted a criminal case in connection with the shutoff of electric power to the Central Command Post of the Strategic Missile Forces on September 21 of this year.

It will be recalled that on account of the military's debts to the power administration, electric power to the Central Command Post was cut off for more than four hours. If not for the prompt action of missile officers who switched on their self-contained reserve power systems, the nuclear missile situation could have gotten out of control, with unpredictable consequences. Specialists with whom I spoke at the time said that the missile forces were blind and deaf for almost a minute, and that during that time climate controls at nuclear weapon storage facilities could have been disturbed, the humidity and temperature conditions could have changed, and communications with the General Staff and other units in the nuclear security system could have been disrupted.

Maj Gen Lebed told the newspaper that a criminal case had been instituted under Article 171 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code, which establishes liability for officials for overstepping their authority or official duties. And in

instances where such actions do not have serious consequences, those at fault for the offense may be sentenced by a court to three years' imprisonment.

The procurator declined to identify the officials of the Moscow Power Joint-Stock Company involved in the case. He reported only that witnesses are currently being questioned and that some of them may later be prosecuted as defendants. The questioning has already begun, and investigators will interview a total of about 20 people. The case is being handled by Colonel of Justice Mikhail Dekan, a Strategic Missile Forces investigator for especially grave crimes, and Major of Justice Yevgeniy Mishchenko, a Strategic Missile Forces procurator and criminologist.

In the opinion of the military procuracy, the crime consists in that government Decree No. 307 of April 8, 1994, which regulates relations between electric power consumers and producers, establishes a list of organization and facilities to which energy resources may not be restricted, much less cut off. They include facilities and troop units of the Ministry of Defense, and facilities of the nuclear-missile triad are at the top of the list.

The commander of the Central Command Post of the Strategic Missile Forces had sent repeated letters to Mr. P. Sinyukov, director of the Power Inspectorate (Moscow Power) and to Mr. G. Piliposhyan, director of the inspectorate's western district office, and warned them about this. But high-handedness at all levels, said the general, is unfortunately become a regrettable tradition.

Gen Lebed told me that he had instituted the criminal case against civilians at his own initiative, and not by order of the Russian General Procuracy. The law gives him this right. In addition, Russian law allows military investigators and prosecutors to conduct criminal cases involving civilian officials.

"The military procuracy is subordinate to the General Procuracy, and we are under civilian jurisprudence in a single system of coordinates," Ivan Ignatyevich told me. "We have every right to conduct all investigative activities." True, he noted that preventive restrictions with respect to the defendants will be chosen not by the Strategic Missile Forces Procuracy, but by the General Procurator or the Chief Military Procurator. The court to which this unique criminal case will later be forwarded is also their decision.

## GROUND TROOPS

### Discussion of Tandem Unit Infantry Fighting Vehicle

94UM0601A Moscow TEKHNIKA I MOLODEZHI in Russian No 9, Sep 94 (Signed to press 06 Aug 94)  
pp 23-23

[Article by Andrey Beskurnikov: "A Tandem for the Motorized Infantry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Back in the fifties, some military specialists reached the conclusion that armored equipment would lose its former importance after the appearance of intercontinental nuclear missiles and mass-destruction weapons. Four decades later, the forecasts have not proven true. Armor continues to dominate on the battlefield, and in

the NATO member countries (and not only there) they continue to improve and create new models of armored vehicles, including the wheeled ones that are our topic.

These include armored personnel carriers, combat scout vehicles, communications vehicles, repair and evacuation vehicles, and self-propelled chassis for antitank and air-defense systems.

As for the similar equipment of the fatherland, its developers should have kept to the rule of "tactics - technology - economy," but often neglected it. As a result the 60s through the 80s saw a violation of the relationship between the production of armored equipment, its accumulation in the line units, and the capabilities of the domestic economy. Hence the subsequent crisis. But then, this applies not only to armored equipment.

Analysis of the use of wheeled vehicles in the conflicts of those years shows that the tactical performance specifications issued to their designers by no means always corresponded to the requirements of modern warfare. Thus in 1969 during the Soviet-Chinese armed conflict near the region of Daman Island, it was necessary to force the adversary to retreat to his own territory. The decision was made to attack him on the then-best armored personnel carrier, the BTR-60PB, which had protection against small-arms fire. But as it turned out, their hulls could not stand up to the 7.62-mm, B-32 Chinese armor-piercing bullets, and the power plant also proved to be a fire hazard. The Chinese would allow them to come into minimal range and then would shoot them up.

In December 1979, motorized rifle units equipped with the BMP-1 were introduced into Afghanistan as part of the "limited contingent." And again, it was a revelation to the high command that their sterns, sides and roofs did not always withstand hits from armor-piercing bullets. And again there were casualties among the crews and motorized riflemen on board.

We should add that the armament of our armored personnel carriers, even that of the latest BTR-80, allowed fire with the hull weapon only from place, since the poor strength of the hull roof on which the turret race was mounted did not impart the necessary stability, and thus firing accuracy, to the machinegun.

But the 25-mm subcaliber round fired from the cannon of the American M2 infantry fighting vehicle can penetrate 25.4-mm armor at a range of 1600 m and at an angle of impact of 60 degrees, while the new one, with an enriched-uranium core can penetrate 33-mm plates of the hardest steel. So we must strengthen the protection of the wheeled combat vehicles and equip them with cannon no lighter than 25 to 30 mm, and with launchers for antitank guided missiles. Then they could move with the tanks, engaging personnel and armored targets with equal effectiveness, and destroying field fortification structures. Of course the equipment will inevitably become heavier, and this inevitably will have a negative effect on mobility and off-road capacity, and in addition, the assault-force compartment will shrink and will be able to accommodate fewer soldiers, and the crew will be in very cramped conditions.

A small vehicle with combined propulsion, designed for a squad of motorized riflemen, does not have these defects. In rough terrain it moves on tracks, "picking up" its wheels, but moves over roads on its wheels, raising its track system. The commander and the mechanic-driver control the vehicle, and the six soldiers dismount and move out on the battlefield, while the rocket-launcher man will await the appearance of armored targets. Five riflemen is not enough for combat actions.

Incidentally, such equipment is by no means new. Experimental models of such armored personnel carriers were developed at the end of the 60s by a teacher of the Academy of Armored Troops, Col. D.A. Antonov. Depending on the situation, their tracks could be lowered to the ground and the wheels raised between them. Probably with time Antonov would have achieved an optimal combination of weapons, armored protection, mobility and size of assault force, only the leadership at that time could not decide what sort of vehicle it should be, a "combat taxi," merely delivering soldiers to the battlefield, or equipment capable of moving with the tanks and delivering effective fire. But then, the well-armed and protected tracked infantry fighting vehicles (see "TM" No 8, 1994) had been around for a while, so why reinvent the wheel, so to speak? The fact is that wheeled armored personnel carriers are cheaper to make and operate. They are easier to drive and the drivers for them can be trained more quickly. It is worth noting that they are less noisy, and in their off-road capacity they are nearly as good as tracked vehicles.

But even better would be a vehicle that has the properties of an armored personnel carrier equipped with infantry fire-support weapons and able to float, a kind of universal vehicle. Just try to put yourself in the place of the designers, however.

You have to "mate" powerful weaponry, heavier armor, devices for amphibious propulsion, and equipment for protection against mass-destruction weapons with sufficiently spacious accommodations for the crew and assault force. Frankly, no one has succeeded in doing this yet.

But what if the vehicle consisted of two elements possessing specific properties? The first, the assault element, would have a powerful cannon, suited to engage tanks, and its armor would have to withstand hits from enemy shells. Since usually up to 50 percent of the mass of such equipment goes for protection, mechanical build-up of the armor will lead only to negative consequences. It would be better to use high-strength aluminum alloys reinforced with fiber glass, with differentiated armoring, with front plates of the hull and bottom especially reinforced, and the most important parts should also be covered by steel or ceramic armor with polyurethane filler. The engine compartment should be separated from the occupied compartment by a hermetically sealed bulkhead. The fuel should be in protected tanks equipped with automatic fire-fighting apparatus. For demolition of engineer structures and suppression of fire positions, 57- to 76-mm guns with muzzle velocity of 1100 to 1400 m/s would suffice, along with a coaxial 7.62-mm machinegun, and for combatting low-flying planes and helicopters, a 12.7-mm remote-controlled machinegun. All of them must be on the turret, as must the antitank missiles launchers. The combat mass of such a vehicle, equipped

with a 520 to 560 HP engine and with a full basic load and fuel reserve would be 20 tonnes.

The second, transport element of the combat tandem would be protected from bullets and fragments by 8-mm to 15-mm armor. To speed up the exiting of the motorized riflemen, side and rear doors would be needed, and for self-protection, a 7.62-mm machinegun on the roof and a portable air defense system. The crew and assault force would be able to fire personal weapons through 2 or 3 ports on the sides and one in the stern and bow. A 200 to 220 HP diesel and auxiliary water jet would be preferable as the power plant.

The hulls of both vehicles must be hermetically sealed, allowing amphibious movement. It goes without saying that night-vision instruments and various types of communications equipment would be required. A saddle hitch like that used in tractor-trailer rigs, when the front wheels of the trailer are somewhat raised, or a king pin, would be used to connect the lead and towed vehicles.

Now let us model the actions of such a tandem. On the march it would be hitched together and would move by the lead vehicle. When the subunits are deployed in battle formations, or the situation requires, the vehicles would move together or the personnel carriers would follow at some distance behind the lead vehicles, maintaining radio communications with them. After dismounting of the assault force, the "combat taxis" would move in bounds, from cover to cover, ready to pick up the assault troops at any moment, or to support them with machinegun fire.


The squad leader of the motorized riflemen would always be in the assault vehicle and would direct the battle while constantly in radio contact with his superior, the personnel carrier and the troops. But if the adversary starts to withdraw, the towed vehicle would at once pick up the troops and hitch up to the lead vehicle, and both would move after the retreating enemy.

But is the combat tandem realistic? Some prerequisites are required before it is made. But even now there are 30-m to 76-mm caliber cannon, and even 120-m to 150 mm, mounted on light combat tracked vehicles. Their basic load includes sub-caliber and shaped-charge shells which are carried in mechanized ammunition stowage. As for protection, types of armor made from light but strong alloys and plastics are being developed, with ceramic inserts and liners. Suspended reactive screens have been around for some time too.


The high traction characteristics of 200-HP to 600-HP diesels provide vehicles with high speed and maneuverability. Mechanical and hydraulic-mechanical transmissions have been developed, along with very simple and compact planetary transmissions with high efficiency. Tires with

differentiated thickness and plastic fillers are not new either, not to mention instantaneously reacting fire-fighting and NBC systems.

Of course the design of the combat tandem still has to be created and then implemented, but its incorporation "in metal" is quite realistic even today.



Modern variants of wheeled combat vehicles:  
1 - equipped with missile; 2, 3 - with artillery weapon in turret; 4 - with device that raises the weapon for fire from behind shelter; 5 - with special equipment in turret; 6 - with combined weapons; 7 - command-staff vehicle; 8 - with machinegun in light turret. In all the assault-force compartment is in the stern.



This serially produced wheeled armored personnel carrier could become the towed vehicle in the tandem "combat taxi" after refitting.

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Possible configuration of the wheeled combat vehicle of the future: in the front the lead fire-support element; in the rear, the towed element for the assault force.

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## **BMD Airborne Assault Vehicles**

94UM0574A Warsaw NOWA TECHNIKA  
WOJSKOWA in Polish, Nos 7-8, Jul-Aug 94 pp 4-6

[Article entitled: "Family of BMD Airborne Assault Vehicles"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt]

### **BTR-D Armored Airborne Assault Vehicles**

Soon after series production of the BMD Airborne Assault Vehicles had begun, work was begun on its special-purpose variants. In the early nineteen seventies A. Shabalin's Engineering Office introduced the design of an armored Airborne Assault Vehicles. Its prototypes were built in 1974 and series production of this vehicle, designated BTR-D [Armored Airborne Assault Vehicles], begun in 1979.<sup>1</sup>

The vehicle is an elongated variant of the BMD with a longer hull, its total length being 580 cm and its undercarriage having a supplementary pair of drive wheels. It incorporates all technical solutions characterizing the original variant and retains the main original components, including the engine. With the same maximum degree of standardization characterizing the original variant, there has thus been created a vehicle with almost the same traction characteristics and a much larger capacity. Weighing eight tons, the BTR-D has room for a crew of three and ten airborne infantrymen. Its weapons vary, except for the practice rounds, and consist of: 1. two tracking machine guns aided by two which it transports, all firing through observation ports; 2. one automatic AGS-17 "Plamya" 30 mm howitzer; 3. two 902V double-barrel smoke grenade launchers firing from inside the vehicle and having a 200-300 m wide range.

The basic transport can be adapted for various tasks like serving as staff or command vehicle, as fire-control vehicle, and as tow truck for light artillery (e.g., ZSU-23 mm twin antiaircraft or other guns). These variants were extensively used by Soviet troop detachments in Afghanistan.

Since 1983 the BTR-D vehicle has served to transport artillery and as a control station for the 478 "Malakhit" system, which includes a "Pchela" remote-controlled aircraft for TV-aided battlefield surveillance or ... for jamming the enemy's communication and troop command system.<sup>2</sup> In 1984 there was built one more special-purpose BTR-D variant: N. Korolev's armored repair and recovery vehicle (the Polish People's Army calls vehicles of this class rather idiomatically "technical assurance vehicles"). Since 1989 this vehicle has been series-produced under the designation BREM-D [Assault Landing Armored Repair and Recovery Vehicle]. Its basic equipment is a collapsible crane and sets of towing gear along with spare tools and parts for repair or evacuation of light BMD vehicles.

The dimensions and the capacity of the BTR-D transport hull are such that it can be used for construction of still other variants of this combat vehicle such as self-propelled artillery.

Toward the end of the nineteen seventies construction of "Object 925", a light self-propelled artillery with a BTR-D undercarriage and a 120 mm mortar inside a specially designed turret was begun.

Just as the BTR-D undercarriage, that of the 2S9 self-propelled artillery (also known as the SAO-120) incorporates all technical solutions characterizing the BMD, which ensure not only specific traction capability but also obstacle crossing capability (clearance-above-ground adjustment, amphibious landing capability, etc.). In 1981 the first series-produced vehicles were added to the inventory for airborne troops, having been officially displayed during the festive parade in Moscow on 5 May 1985 marking the fortieth anniversary of victory over Hitler's Third Reich.

Self-propelled mortars were undoubtedly used earlier too, during combat action in Afghanistan. There have also been built 2S23 variants (on the undercarriage of the BTR-80 rolling armored transport) for mechanized ground troop detachments. Moreover, we have information that the "Nona" turret had been mounted on the BMD undercarriage.


With its firing characteristics, weapons, and kind of ammunition, the self-propelled "Nona" gun has appreciably enhanced the firing power of airborne landing units and serves them well in the performance of diverse combat tasks such as: overcoming enemy fire power and live personnel in open areas, in hiding, or in trenches; fighting enemy artillery, rocket launchers, and armored vehicles; overrunning enemy command posts.

Weighing eight tons, the "Nona" can be transported by air (by AN-12, AN-22, IL-76 aircraft or by MI-6 and MI-26 helicopters). It can also be dropped with the aid of platforms and parachutes from 30-150 m altitudes at surface wind velocities up to 15 m/s.


The 120 mm mortar has a threaded barrel and is loaded from behind, on the lock side. The range of elevation is from -4° depression to 80° elevation. Deflection can be homed through a 35° angle (while the turret can be rotated through a full 360° circle). The turret drive is electric. The mortar can launch not only standard mines (weighing 16-16.5 kg with in-flight stabilization by vanes) but also specially constructed HE-fragmentation artillery projectiles which carry powerful explosive charge and have in-flight spin stabilization, the ranges being 7100 m and 8800 m wide respectively.

A firing unit (up to 60 cartridges) contains HE-fragmentation, incendiary, smoke, illumination and shaped-charge projectiles. The mortar fires 6-10 rounds per minute and loading it is facilitated by a special feed mechanism driven by compressed air, which is also blown through the barrel for removal of powder smoke from the bore and from the chamber.

The crew of the 2S9 consists of four members: commander and driver-mechanic seated in the steering compartment of the hull, gunner and loader seated in the firing compartment of the turret.



Airborne Vehicles Adapted for Ejection of Landing Combat Vehicles: 1. AN-12 transport aircraft, 2. HI-26 helicopter, 3. IL-76 aircraft, 4. AN-22 aircraft, 5. AN-124 aircraft. (Jerzy Kajetanowicz)



Methods of Ejection of Landing Combat Vehicles (J. Kajetanowicz): 1. ready to be dropped BMD-1 on platform, 2. transport platform in payload compartment of AN-12 aircraft, 3. ejection of landing combat vehicle from high altitude by means of multicapny freight parachute, 4. ejection from low altitude: a. with aid of braking mechanisms, b. with aid of braking parachute.

#### Footnotes

1. Volgograd was called Tsarytsyn till 10 April 1921 and then Stalingrad till 10 November 1961. Accordingly, its tractor plant was known as the Stalingrad Tractor Plant and now as the Volgograd Tractor Plant (VTZ).

In the West this vehicle was originally called the BMD-2.

2. P. Butowski describes this system in greater detail in his article "Remote-Controlled Light Russian Aircraft," NOWA TECHNIKA WOJSKOWA, No 2, 1993 pp 28-30.

### AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

#### Russian Helicopter Shot Down Over Chechnya

95UM0003A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by Oleg Kusov: "Russian Helicopter Fired on Over Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 27 September in a flight over the territory of Chechnya, an Mi-28 helicopter of the Russian military group garrisoned in the Mozdok region of Northern Ossetia was fired on by large-caliber automatic weapons.

As was reported at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of North Ossetia, officer crew members Aleksandr Andreyev and Ruslan Valeev received serious gunshot wounds while aloft. They nonetheless managed to land the shot-up aircraft near the Tersk station. On the evening of the same day, Andreyev died at the Mozdok hospital.

### NAVAL FORCES

#### V-Adm Golosov Responds to R-Adm Aleksin on State of Navy

944F1540A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Sep 94 p 4

[Article by Vice-Admiral (Ret.) Rudolf Golosov "Our Sailors Are Still the Best in the World—But Our Navy?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In two years the Russian Navy will observe its 300th birthday. Unfortunately, the Navy is experiencing far from the best times in its history as it approaches this anniversary. Periodically articles appear in the press in which often polar viewpoints are expressed about the state of the Navy and its prospects. The article by Rear-Admiral V. Aleksin "Our Sailors Are Still the Best in the World," the author criticizes the "independent experts" and the "home-grown skeptics," and draws a very cheering picture of the state of our Navy.

As a person who served in the Navy for 45 years (until 1990), from submarine navigator to Pacific Fleet Chief of Staff, I will venture to express my own opinion on the questions touched on in the article, and take the risk of being counted among the "home-grown skeptics."

First a few of the thesis statements in different sections of the article.

First, claims that "at sea the side that had Soviet naval weapons has always won out" and that "our missiles are practically never shot down" are to put it bluntly, greatly

exaggerated. Although I believe that many of our ships were designed and executed quite well, especially in the export variant. There is also a model of a cruise missile that is very hard to shoot down today.

Second, the preparations of ships for visits to foreign ports were conducted at a higher level and with much better material and other support than was the case for other ships. To judge the state of the Navy as a whole from the results of visits is possible only with some allowances.

Third, quite unfortunately, the noisiness of most of our nuclear submarines (PLA) and the levels of interference with the operation of our sonar surveillance gear are indeed higher than on American nuclear submarines. But the construction of new nuclear submarines with better characteristics has practically ceased. (The U.S. is meanwhile continuing production).

Fourth, assessing the accident rate of various navies from the index of relative accident rate (POA), as the ratio of the number of ships experiencing accidents to the number of personnel on the rolls, is correct as long as the identical percentage of these personnel on the rolls sails in the course of the year. But if a higher percentage of "personnel on the rolls" in one of the compared navies stays on shore, it is easy to see how this affects the size of the POA.

According to the author's assertion, in the postwar period (presumably since 1945), 4 U.S. submarines have sunk (of them, two were nuclear submarines), and in the USSR's Navy, seven submarines (of them three nuclear submarines). Let's clarify this. In the period indicated, at least 10 submarines sank in the USSR's Navy (including four nuclear submarines). Four submarines (three of them nuclear) were in the Northern Fleet, four in the Pacific Fleet (one nuclear, which was raised from the bottom and sank a second time at base), and two submarines in the Baltic Fleet.

The statement that "decrees of our country's government aimed at preventing the causes of the loss of the 'Komsomolets' nuclear submarine are being followed" we shall leave to the conscience of the author and the government.

Now a few thoughts on the accidents of the submarines of our fleet, since it was on them that I spent most of my service. Some articles raise the question of who is guilty for the loss of the "Komsomolets" nuclear submarine, and when will the truth be told about other grave accidents and disasters of our submarines? I assume it would be more fair to ask "what is guilty?" rather than "who is guilty?" The system that developed in the Navy was guilty.

The three basic factors preventing accidents of ships, and of submarines in particular, are: quality of design and construction of the ships, their weapons and technical equipment; quality of operation of the ships and equipment for their service life; the professional proficiency of the crews and the organization of service on the ships.

The framework of the article compels me to limit myself to theses only.

First. The Soviet Union had a considerable number of excellent design bureaus. In many implemented designs even now we lead the whole world, for example in speed of underwater travel and depth of submergence of submarines.

However instead of choosing the best of the submarine designs competitively, integrating all the best things from the developments of the design bureaus and serially producing such a submarine, we built many different types of submarines. In terms of the number of such types, diesel and nuclear, we surpass all the navies of the world. It is not hard to see how this affects the cost of production, and especially the operation of such a mixed fleet and the training of cadres for it.

**Second.** The shipbuilding industry of the former Union had significant production capacities and experienced shipbuilding cadres, which made it possible to build submarines at a rapid pace. However, I dare say that hardly a single submarine (or surface vessel for that matter) was received in the Navy without specific defects, often quite serious ones. As a rule, ships were delivered at the end of the year. The industry desperately needed to sign delivery documents on the ships before December 31. It meant money for finishing construction, and it meant bonuses and awards. Delivery fever at the shipbuilding plants would be a worthy topic for a novelist. Enormous pressure was brought to bear on the representative of the state acceptance commission for ships—all the hierarchy of the Ministry of Ship-Building, and strange as it may seem, the Navy CINC himself. Representatives were faced with a dilemma, either honestly to refuse to sign the document and be ignominiously fired immediately, or—they chose the second.

To the clinking of glasses of the delivery banquet, the ships would enter the Navy, provided of course they could sail under their own power. But sometimes they stayed right at the plant wall, waiting until the plant brought them up to that capacity. So that the shame was covered up with at least a fig leaf of legality, so-called "Joint Decisions of the Ministry of Ship-Building and the Navy" were invented, in which the industry undertook the obligations of eliminating the flaws within a specific deadline, and the Navy consented to this. A submarine which on paper had entered the Navy was included in all plans for use, including combat service. Naturally, from the first day all the plans began to unravel at the seams and preparations for sailing were made under conditions of haste and storming. This laid the initial foundation for the [high] accident rate.

Perhaps the most terrible consequence of all this was the fact that a psychology developed and took root in personnel that they could, perhaps, sail on defective ships. And so they did.

**Third.** Normal operation of a ship and its equipment was carefully planned and the corresponding rules were put forward in official documents. They provided for the conduct of a whole group of measures, from daily inspections and cranking of mechanisms to various types of repair under plant conditions. The corresponding number of ship-repair plants and shops and an assortment of spare parts and expendable materials were required to accomplish this set of tasks. Alas! The basic part of the resources absorbed by the Navy was invested in the creation and development of its assault component—ships and weapons. Whatever was left went for everything else, and nearly nothing was left. In terms of the total number of submarines, diesel and nuclear, by the end of the 80s we surpassed the submarine fleets of all the developed states put together, including the U.S. (What a strength level!). But in terms of efficiency of use? We could

achieve barely half of the American time standard for the use of submarines for their purpose, their time on duty. Everything was based on ship-repair capabilities, on an undeveloped supporting infrastructure.

**Four.** Considering the rich submarine experience of the USSR's Navy, the system of professional training of submariners, was quite well developed. Many excellent training centers were created, with unique simulators and highly-qualified teachers, and the necessary courses and training methodologies were published. One small thing remained to be done, to give the submarine crews the time and the opportunity to work at their professional training. But as a rule this "small thing" was missing.

The result of the undeveloped supporting infrastructure was that when they were in base, many submarine crews were forced to resolve many support problems by the "self-service" method. The more complex the military and indeed other equipment, the more support needed for those who directly maintain this equipment. If it is impossible to create such support, that means we have not yet grown up to the level of that equipment. Why then should we create it? There is no alternative, unless of course you count the "Komsomolets" lying at the bottom of the sea as an alternative.

**Five.** As for the organization of service on a submarine, I will dwell only on the situation of the commander. He is responsible for everything, even for failures and errors of subordinates in which their personal blame is beyond question. So many obligations are placed on the submarine commander that it is physically impossible for him to meet them all. I should add that the personnel of the submarine, especially officers, operate under conditions of continuous physical and nervous overloads, with a non-standardized work day and irregular rest.

Thus the causes for a high accident rate lie in the system that developed in the Navy. However, while saying this, I am far from suggesting that this is the primary reason. The Navy, like the Armed Forces as a whole, is part of the society and state that created them, and whose security they are called upon to safeguard.

Nowadays the serious incidents in the Armed Forces, Chernobyl, the loss of the 'Nakhimov,' railroad and air crashes, industrial explosions and fires, the stunning number of victims of traffic accidents, the wild outburst of crime and much else are all ranked together. Is there as a common reason for all this license? I think there is, the drop (if not the lack) of all types of discipline in society, below some limit. No one is burdened with discipline today, not the individual and not government structures.

The continuous struggle of the authorities for authority only produces anarchy, and the moral props of society long ago grew rickety, and continue to be rickety. Who is involved in establishing order and discipline in society and the state? There can only be one answer, a firm government, perhaps even dictatorial for a time. I won't try to say what this might be, whether president, czar, or junta. But alas the time for convincing is passed, or on the other hand, perhaps has not yet come.

Today we have to compel society to order and discipline, at least within the framework of existing laws, while simultaneously sharply increasing the convincing factor.

Perhaps we can still do this before the complete collapse and degradation of society and state. Only, what ideas can we use as the basis for conviction? No one has formulated the answer yet. In the Navy the question is, what and whom do we serve? In every age the basis for the courage and heroism of Russian and Soviet sailors has been belief in the need to protect the Motherland, the Fatherland, reinforced by the fraternity of the sea. But now the very word Motherland has somehow gone out of style, and the expression "this country" has appeared.

Of course we can call ideology the prostitute of socialism and declare patriotism an outmoded concept, but without a national unifying idea, supported by a true majority of the people, we are not likely to move in the right direction.

Of course our sailors remain the best in the world. Whoever doubts its, let him at least browse through the 300-year history of the Russian Navy.

#### **Khraptovich Answers Aleksin, Other Navy Defenders**

94UM0593A Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Sep 94 p 4

[Article by former nuclear missile submarine captain, Reserve Captain 1st Rank Albert Ivanovich Khraptovich, Obninsk: "If It Hadn't Been for the Japanese, our 'Victory' at Tsushima Would Have Been More Complete"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

#### **Naval Battle**

Missile Submarine Commander A. Khraptovich published his analysis of the state of affairs in the Navy in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA. The Navy Commander-in-Chief ordered a response to him on the entire program. Navy Chief Navigator Aleksin's article, complete with surprising arguments which A. Khraptovich contests in this article, appeared in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA.

As is known, parliamentary hearings are planned in the State Duma "On the Situation in the Russian Navy" in October of this year after publication of the article "Vsplytiye pokazhet" [The Surfacing Will Show] in NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA. As if summarizing the reports of an entire series of newspapers and magazines (ROSSIYSKAYA, ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI, MK, LG [LITERATURNAYA GAZETA], IZVESTIYA, NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA, GOLOS, STOLITSA, OGONEK and many others) as preparation for the hearings, a team of independent military experts published an article-appeal entitled "Nas zhdet Tsushima" [Tsushima Awaits Us]. I will briefly remind you what Tsushima signifies: The decisive battle of the two navies occurred at that location (in the strait between Japan and Korea) in May 1905 during the course of the Russo-Japanese War. The Russian Navy, which significantly outnumbered the Japanese Navy in the number of battleships, cruisers, armored warships and other surface combatants, suffered a crushing defeat and was practically destroyed. During the course of the battle as also

throughout the entire war, rank and file Russian seamen and officers displayed courage, bravery, and devotion to duty and to the Fatherland (remember the "Varyag"), however, they were doomed to death and defeat by the criminal inactivity of the Russian leadership which was delighted by the military departments' reports on the number of cruisers, battleships and destroyers and on the Navy's might and total readiness for battle with any enemy. At the same time, the Japanese, while modestly holding their tongues, diligently worked on the quality of their ships, weapons and combat supplies on hand for their small mobile navy which had a decisive impact on the results of the battle.

As always, prior to the beginning of the war, there were quite a few "people in Russia who were concerned about the honor and dignity of Russian seamen" who zealously parroted the people in power and who maliciously cast aspersions on individual "defamers of the navy" (for example, Admirals Makarov and Krylov) who were attempting at that time to sound the alarm with regard to the Russian Navy's true state and capabilities. After the catastrophe, the "parrots" disappeared just as if they had never existed. But the pain and shame of the Russian Navy has always remained in the peoples' memories and thousands of Russia's best sons (including Makarov) were left behind in the seas.

And what about the current leadership of the Russian Navy and Armed Forces?

The press's alarming articles are once again being perceived as "attacks", "attempts to defame" and so forth. Navy Chief Navigator Rear Admiral V. Aleksin has recently become a very typical spokesman for these views. Besides everything else, as far as I know he is the unauthorized head of the Navy press service, yet he is obviously authorized to speak on accident rate issues from the command authorities' official point of view (at any rate, he speaks both abroad and to the press and he maintains contacts with Greenpeace). So, in response to the articles of experts and navy veterans, this same Aleksin publishes an article under the painfully familiar in recent times headline "Nashi moryaki ostayutsya luchshimi v mire" [Our Seamen Remain the Best in the World] (obviously with the hint that someone thinks otherwise) in the August 9, 1994 NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (No 149). Taking into account what was said above, it is definitely impossible to ignore that article. All the more so that in it he unceremoniously, bordering on boorishness, insulted everyone who is criticizing the deficiencies in the Navy and these, I recall, are such people as G. Yegorov, former Northern Fleet commander, then Navy main staff chief, hero of the Soviet Union, retired admiral of the fleet; N. Amelko, former Pacific Fleet commander, later USSR Armed Forces general staff deputy chief, candidate of sciences, retired admiral; L. Zhiltsov, former nuclear submarine formation commander, hero of the Soviet Union, retired rear admiral (incidentally, he was the first to sail under the ice at the North Pole); I. Sanko, operational commander of the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral Kuznetsov" captain 1st rank; Colonel S. Baratynov, Russian Armed Forces main military inspectorate operational officer, and many others. So he called all of them "amateur-experts" and their conclusions and proposals—"... superficial opinions of uninformed, incompetent people who have been away from naval affairs for an extended period of time" (!).

Let's begin with the fact that it's as if Aleksin "doesn't notice" a large portion of the major deficiencies noted by the critics in the press. And therefore it is unworthy of attention that today nuclear and heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers rust without special piers, become unserviceable because they don't have proper logistical support, engine time between overhauls earmarked for combat, and simply become inoperable in record short periods of time (billions of the taxpayers' rubles are being thrown to the winds); that nuclear submarines do not have reliable antisubmarine warfare weapons or submariner protective and rescue systems; that ships are frequently turned over to the Navy in a noncombat-ready state; that their reliability is very low and that they are dangerous to operate, that manning and the seamen training system, especially for submariners, do not withstand criticism, etc. Those same "individual discrepancies" to which Aleksin condescendingly devotes some attention are completely refuted in an original, we need to admit, manner. Aleksin begins his "refutation" with a story about how our ships did not participate in combat operations in recent years but the equipment and weapons that we at one time sold or transferred to other countries are successfully operating in clashes with similar ships and with the weapons of third countries (they in turn having been sold to them by someone). Of course, it is pleasant to the Russian ear to hear this (even when we know what "for export" and "for ourselves" means). However, no method exists to prove the high combat readiness of our own Navy—in such situations there are always so many incidental and added circumstances that it is impossible to take all of them into account and therefore I will not particularly dwell on this topic. I will only add that the command authorities' spokesman must certainly be aware of the negative examples in this context, say, the failures in the Arab-Israeli War, during the period of the Caribbean Crisis, during the Persian Gulf War, and others. But there is no sense arguing with Aleksin in this case since he is silent on them, devoting attention only to those cases that are favorable to him.

It seems to me that we need to examine in more detail the specific example which he himself calls a "distinctive negative example" of the high effectiveness of our naval weapons. In the words of the article's author, a missile boat launched a "Termit" target-missile which was **shot down** (so says Aleksin) by an antimissile missile from another ship "... **'the spent bullet'** (emphasis mine—A.Kh.) suddenly showered down on the small missile boat "Musson" during the conduct of fire training exercises in the Pacific Fleet in 1987. The boat was lost, taking with it the lives of 39 seamen..."

Having revealed this, Aleksin suddenly arrives at the conclusion: "That is, our missiles practically cannot be shot down". Well, well! It's not enough that he refuted his own argument but he also found an example to be proud of! It's sad if that is the only example he has.... However, something else is even worse. Of course, Aleksin knows very well the essential details of that tragedy, which radically alter his primary conclusion. "To ensure a more accurate hit", that is, to obtain the required result, it is not important how (the window dressing that has become widespread in the Navy in recent years), Firing Director Rear Admiral L. Golovko changed the ship combat formation and the "Musson" reduced its speed to nine knots (according to certain data, it

in general came to a standstill) and the target-missile was launched from a distance that was quite a bit less than that prescribed by the plan. That is why when the missile, having been shot down, accidentally fell on the "Musson" (obviously, the "Musson" was actually dead in the water, otherwise it would have been able to avoid the falling target-missile), it was not "a spent bullet" as Aleksin asserts but with a large reserve of unexpended fuel and oxidizer and the entire small boat immediately burst into flame from them. All the more so that its superstructures were made from an aluminum-magnesium alloy which foreign navies have long since banned in the construction of superstructures. Of the "Musson's" 16 officers, [unreadable] died and five warrant officers, 23 petty officers and all five cadets also perished... Admiral Golovko, [unreadable], received a promotion and was later transferred to Moscow. **And the Navy command authorities did not even include the "Musson" in the list of losses for 1987!** While being silent about all of this, then boasting about our missiles' fictitious "invulnerability to being shot down", the blasphemously flaunted loss of our own ship with half of the crew—Whom is Aleksin trying to fool and why? What benefit for the Navy does he see in this?

The Navy Main Staff's authorized spokesman acts in precisely the same manner in subsequent statements in his article. For example, while discussing the high combat readiness of naval forces, he cites the fact that in recent years our ships have repeatedly visited foreign ports, participated in joint exercises, and so forth. Aleksin states that "No one can deny the fact that our seamen not only look the best but also moor their ships better than everyone else and fire better than everyone else". "Isn't this a convincing indicator of the state of the Russian Navy?", he passionately asks. Once again he would like you to proudly throw out your chest (but then again, it would be better to hear that from those same foreign seamen and not from Aleksin), however, something prevents that.

So, while discussing accidents and incidents on submarines, Aleksin cites a mass of numbers and uses the so-called relative accident rate index (POA) and supports the data with statistics, beginning from the Second World War in order to prove a very large (a factor of 2-6) reduction in the accident rate in the Navy in recent times (obviously, he himself undertook that task). In some of his speeches, he frankly states: "There are no similar results in any of the world's navies during the last 10-15 years!" And just in the article being examined (he was previously silent about that), he sort of casually notes in passing that: "... indeed, our two last nuclear submarines were lost in the last 10 years and that is why that is so keenly felt". Aleksin characteristically contradicts himself here: Actually, there aren't any "similar results" in any of the world's navies—they haven't lost a single submarine during that time. But that's not the main thing. The author, as in due course in the incident with the "Musson", stubbornly "does not remember" the third catastrophe, submarine "K-429" that sank off the coast of Kamchatka and took with it the lives of 16 innocent seamen (we managed to save the rest). They salvaged the submarine, put it in for repairs, but it sank again there and it was finally removed from the fleet in 1986. It's not enough that it's as if the Main Staff's "singer" "does not notice" the nuclear power plants of "K-27" (sank near Novaya Zemlya in 1982), "K-116" (1979), "K-314" (1985) that were put out of

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commission by serious accidents and then reports with satisfaction that the U.S. Navy's Baton Rouge and Nathaniel Green were put out of commission (a collision with our nuclear submarine and a navigation accident). Well, as they say, "beauty is in the eye of the beholder". But to whom and what benefit does that kind of "patriotism" impart? But then again maybe Aleksin, as he contends, is actually fighting the "defamers" for the Navy's honor since "all of these accidents—are in the past" and now the situation is quite a bit more favorable? But then why is he so stubbornly quiet about what navy officers say, including for example, submariners at a military-technical conference conducted in the Northern Fleet in 1991 (incidentally, in the presence of the current Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral F. Gromov)? Why doesn't he recall the collision of the two nuclear submarines in March of this year which only through a miracle did not end in the next tragedy? Maybe because they once again managed to get by and they managed to suppress the cause? But we have thoroughly investigated and determined that all of the primary causes of similar incidents have not been totally eliminated, even after the loss of the "Komsomolets", and no one has yet been able to guarantee that henceforth a similar incident won't be repeated.

Aleksin quite willingly discusses the collisions of our and American submarines. While stubbornly insisting that a collision can only occur in those cases when "theirs", just like "ours", "don't hear anything", basing that on the sole "argument", he arrives at the general conclusion that "theirs" have the same acoustics and noise level as ours and that discussions about their superiority in these spheres—is slander by "incompetent individuals who have been away from naval affairs for an extended period of time". And he repeats that with a certainty, almost with an ecstasy, that fills us with wonder: the unconditional lagging behind of our acoustic systems has been recognized by scientists, it has been proven by scientific research institutes (including military) and it has been confirmed in practice by intelligence, but no and that's it.

Incidentally, Aleksin's logic is unique even in discussions of the causes of the devastating defeat at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. In his opinion, the causes of the defeat "... were determined **not at all by the fact** (emphasis mine—A.Kh.) that the Red Army was armed with 1891/30 model Mosin rifles. They were determined first of all by the strategic miscalculations of Stalin and his entourage". But what will you say here?! Will you not explain to professional Aleksin what all school children know: yes, of course, there was criminal presumption and miscalculations. But the turning point in the war and, ultimately, the Victory became possible only after the Soviet people, at the cost of incredible deprivation and effort, gave the Red Army an adequate number of T-34's, Li-2's, "katyushas" and other weapons and equipment that were better than the enemy's! Maybe, this misunderstanding—is the entire essence of the delusions of the navy leadership's spokesman? He must have a reason to stress the following in his closing words: "...In the process, in all battles on the ground and at sea without exception, military seamen unfailingly performed miracles of bravery and heroism, high military skill and courage, and always (!—A.Kh.) beat a technically better-equipped enemy". Recognized tone, zeal and arguments? Once again the primary hope on the fact that Russian seamen will ultimately overcome, even at a terrible

price, everything, including the criminal inactivity of the highest levels, the inept leadership of the command authorities, and headquarters' mistakes...

No less surprising is why our Navy did not suffer losses at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War in contrast to, say, the air force. Aleksin, being wonderfully well-informed, says whatever he wants to but he does not mention that this occurred because then Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral N. Kuznetsov had declared "Combat Readiness Number One" (that is, actually "General Quarters") beforehand at his own fear and risk and the ships were not caught unawares and repelled enemy attacks in a timely manner. Isn't it interesting that Aleksin does not mention the name of Admiral N. Kuznetsov who was a man of another style: being a true patriot of the Navy and the Homeland, he did not take his personal interests into account but fought first of all for the lives of his seamen and his subordinates. Twice demoted (reduced in military rank) and removed from his post, the admiral only in our time has been posthumously restored to the high rank that he received for his military accomplishments and not due to the good graces of a high leadership that has been buttered up with reports on the complete welfare and the Navy's high combat readiness.

P.S. When "K-429" sank near Kamchatka in 1983, several submarine commanders came to my cabin on the auxiliary tender: "Someone has to go to the very top, otherwise with our disorder, there is no guarantee that what has occurred will not happen again. And in the event of war we will simply drown like cats right at the side hatches". Since by that time I had already long been involved with these issues, it became my lot "to go to the top". I well remember how one day the submarine flotilla squadron navigation officer approached me: "Albert Ivanovich, allow me to shake your hand. You know that all of the navigators are with you". Obviously, among others he had in mind his Junior Assistant Captain 2nd Rank V. Aleksin who also, like all of the rest, saw very well all of the previously mentioned "disorder" and knew the causes, knew the opinions of the submarine commanders, yes and also knew me personally. However, it seems that the squadron navigation officer was quite mistaken when he said "everyone". In all probability, someone already at that time was being "shrewd". In any case, the squadron navigation officer did not become an admiral.

Well, each person ultimately selects his own [unreadable] fate, that is a personal matter for each individual.

A.Kh.

#### Disposition of Black Sea Fleet Trade Directorate

94UM0598A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
23 Sep 94 p 1

[Report by Black Sea Fleet Press Center: "Ukrainian Navy Command Reassigns Black Sea Fleet Trade Directorate in Unilateral Procedure"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A recent directive of the chief of staff of the Ukrainian Navy proposes to include subunits of the Directorate of Military Trade of the Black Sea Fleet on the staff of the Navy. Moreover, the command of the VMSU [Ukrainian Navy] has undertaken a series of illegal actions

for the purpose of persuading the labor collectives of Military Trade to transfer to its jurisdiction.

The command authority of the Fleet expressed the hope that the provocative actions of the command staff of the VMSU, which runs counter to the policy of the new military leadership of Ukraine, will be unable to hinder the normal course of the negotiating process with regard to the Fleet.

#### **Northern Fleet: Remote Garrisons Supplied Fuel**

94UM0598C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 22 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by Dmitriy Litovkin: "Calculation, Savvy, Economy—the Motto of the POL Service]

[FBIS Translated Text] Severomorsk—Fuel has practically been fully supplied to the remote garrisons of the coast of the Kola Peninsula and on Novaya Zemlya. The Arctic delivery to these regions was completed two months earlier than usual.

As was recounted by Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Dmitriyev, deputy chief of the POL Service of the Northern Fleet, the service has concluded a contract with the Arctic Shipping Service joint-stock company. This year financial losses were eliminated entirely. The fleet saved several billion rubles.

#### **Potential for Recycling Obsolete Munitions**

94UM0598D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 24 Sep 94 p 3

[Article by Dmitriy Litovkin: "What Is the Most Profitable Way to Sell Munitions? This Question Was Asked in the Northern Fleet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Severomorsk—During the 60 years of existence of the Northern Fleet an enormous amount of ammunition and weapons were piled up in its depots which is not being used and is causing a lot of trouble. Until recently this problem was solved by blowing up or inundating surplus ammunition, but this is rather dangerous for the ecology.

"Today, many organizations are expressing a desire to acquire explosives," says Captain First Rank Anatoliy Akulich, deputy chief of the rocket-artillery weapons service of the Northern Fleet. "These are geologists, drilling technicians, and miners. But all work with them has to be constructed on a basis that is legal and profitable for the fleet. At present, this is not happening..."

Linear charges, which are in surplus in naval depots, serve as an example, and there is authorization to sell them to interested organizations. The Navy received R50 million in all from this kind of sale in six months, although profits could have been much higher.

What is to be done? In the opinion of Captain First Rank Akulich, there are ways to resolve the problem. First of all—recycling ammunition at the Northern Fleet, which will eliminate transportation expenditures.

A special alloys and metals institute and the Nitrovzryv organization exist in St. Petersburg. They have authorization and are engaged in the elaboration of technological

documents for the utilization of ammunition. Fleet specialists have already gone to this scientific research institute and familiarized themselves with units suggested for the Navy which can be assembled in small areas.

"After an article is cleared," continues Anatoliy Pavlovich, "the airframe and the guidance system, including the precious metals they contain, remain. For their extraction, a unit is recommended that is capable of breaking up and sorting metal, after which it is possible to use it again. That is, to sell it."

Employment of the units, which were developed by the St. Petersburg scientific research institute for the Fleet, unquestionably offers a way out of a dead end situation. In this case the Fleet will receive a real profit, which it will be possible to put to work to resolve everyday social problems.

#### **Amur Flotilla Base Transferred to Border Troops**

94UM0598B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 23 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by Valeriy Usoltsev: "The Amur Is a Border River...]

[FBIS Translated Text] The transfer of the Red Banner Amur Flotilla base located in Khabarovsk to the Border Troops has started.

The force of unique river ships and cutters deployed here, including the air-cushion craft, will become a border unit.

### **REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES**

#### **Epidemics Threat in Armed Forces**

MM3009115394 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 29 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by Ivan Ivanyuk: "Epidemics Do Not Threaten the Armed Forces at Present. But Still There Is Cause for Alarm"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We have gotten to the point where plague, cholera, other misfortunes, and a whole slew of purely abstract curses have migrated into very specific news summaries. Dagestan, Crimea, Ukraine, and Maritime Kray are reporting on by no means isolated cases of dreadful diseases which mankind is still not able to conquer finally. Thus, the sanitary-epidemiological situation in the country is now being ranked with the burning problems which must be resolved without delay.

The best medical forces have been involved one way or another in this work. But are these efforts sufficient? On the basis of research going back many years scientists have proved that a person's health is 50-55 percent dependent on his way of life and, thus, largely dependent on social and domestic conditions; 20-25 percent dependent on ecology; 10-15 percent dependent on heredity; and just 10-15 percent dependent on the state of health care.

The problem of the sanitary well-being of cities and villages can be resolved only as a package, proceeding from the need to strengthen people's health. Precisely this approach was made the basis of a check on the sanitary-epidemiological state of military camps and places where military units are

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stationed, which was organized by the Defense Ministry Main Military Medical Directorate jointly with the Directorate of the Chief of Rear Services of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. On 12 August this year Russia's minister of defense signed Directive D-45 based on the results of that check.

It points out that the sanitary-epidemiological situation in the Armed Forces remains complex and is tending to worsen. Among the main reasons for the growing sickness rate among personnel it names serious shortcomings in material and domestic provision for people and the low level of discipline—a consequence of inefficiency and laxity on the part of individual officials.

This is an assessment of fundamental importance. The tragedy that occurred on Russkiy Island, which exposed glaring problems in the organization of service and life in several subunits, is still fresh in the public consciousness. The results of the court investigation involving those to blame for that extraordinary occurrence are well known. Almost the most severe punishment was reserved for two military doctors—which could create the false impression that these are the people among the troops who must be held chiefly responsible if sanitary welfare has been violated somewhere. At the same time no commander (chief) and no service must be aloof now from tackling problems of protecting servicemen's health as a very important condition of the Armed Forces' combat readiness.

The check showed that last winter, in connection with the bad preparation of barracks for use in winter conditions and the unsatisfactory supply of winter clothing, there was an appreciable increase in the level of catarrhal illnesses in the Far Eastern, Transbaykal, Siberian, and North Caucasus Military Districts, at Leningrad Naval Base, and in the Pacific Fleet. In the Armed Forces as a whole up to 200 military units are unable to ensure compliance with the regulation norms for personnel accommodation, more than 180 experience a water shortage, and the water in many garrisons fails to meet standards with regard to microbiological indicators—which increases the risk of infectious diseases.

The Army is not isolated from society, and, although the sanitary-epidemiological situation in the absolute majority of military units is all right, in recent years military medical personnel have been increasingly frequently concerned about such childhood infections as diphtheria and measles. The growth in these diseases in the country is increasing year by year, and, at the same time, between 40 and 80 percent of draftees do not have immunity against them. They have to be vaccinated under army conditions—something that should be carried out before being drafted into the Army. Accordingly, military medical personnel need inoculation preparations, the need for which is met by just 70 percent.

Inadequate Army and Navy funding undoubtedly exacerbates both this and other problems on which the health of people in uniform directly depends. Thus, it will take something of the order of 530 billion rubles just to prepare barracks, housing, and communal buildings for the heating season, while current funding of the Armed Forces Rear Services amounts to less than one-tenth of requirements.

But very frequently specific commanders and chiefs are to blame for the exacerbation of the sanitary-epidemiological situation. For example, as a consequence of the unsatisfactory sanitary state of dining rooms and violations of regulations governing the preparation and issuing of food—which is to be noted particularly frequently in the Air Force, the Navy, and the Transbaykal and Ural Military Districts—the incidence of acute intestinal illnesses and viral hepatitis remains at a high level. The task of preventing pediculosis has not been entirely resolved.

It has to be said that the medical service has the right to suspend the operation of installations that are not safe in the sanitary respect, to use administrative measures of influence, and, in serious instances, even to pass on cases to the Military Prosecutor's Office. Last year over 300 such cases were passed on, and work was suspended at more than 1,700 installations until order was instilled.

Under conditions of the economic and ecological crisis only such a principled and exacting approach will help to avoid mass illnesses among the troops and other serious consequences. The defense minister's directive requires officials at all levels to establish strict control over the full and qualitative fulfillment of the requirements laid down for protecting the health of Armed Forces personnel and to rule out instances of incomplete and unreliable information on the sanitary-epidemiological situation being provided following an order.

It is perfectly obvious that without adopting a number of specific, radical measures at the state level we cannot avoid the threat of epidemics within the next few years. Clearly, the question must be raised not only of funding urgent needs, which threaten to create extraordinary occurrences, but also of necessarily investing money in the nation's health. This includes ensuring that healthy reinforcements join the Army every time and that it is not necessary, as now, to fill gaps in state social policy through the efforts of military medical personnel and commanders.

It is possible to wish that the State Duma, which is now starting the next stage of its work, will find time to address the draft laws which have now been categorized as "burning." These are the draft laws "On Making Changing and Additions to the Law 'On the Population's Sanitary-Epidemiological Well-Being'" and "On Protecting the Russian Federation's Territory From the Bringing In and Spread of Particularly Dangerous Infectious Diseases of People, Animals, and Plants and Also Toxic Substances." These threats are more than real now, and everything must be done to avert them.

## UKRAINE

### Lvov Activist on Funding Activities for Navy

WS0410084594 Kiev VECHIRNIY KYIV  
in Ukrainian 27 Sep 94 p 3

[Interview with Pavlo Volodymyrovych Havryshkevych, chairman of the Economic Movement of Western Ukraine, by Ihor Melnychuk; place and date not given: "Hetman Sahaydachnyy's First Cruise"—first three paragraphs are VECHIRNIY KYIV introduction; questions published in boldface]

[FBIS Translated Text] A year has passed since the state flag was raised over the first guard ship of the Ukrainian Navy.

Oleksandr Moroz has recently toured this vessel and has highly assessed the professional skills of its crew. The sailors have raised their qualifications during their cruise, which was the first in the history of the Ukrainian Navy. Having covered over 8,000 miles, the "Hetman Sahaydachnyy" returned to Sevastopol from France.

Pavlo Havryshkevych, chairman of the Economic Movement of Western Ukraine and chairman of the Fund for Promotion of the Building of the Ukrainian Black Sea Navy, participated in this cruise. Captain Ihor Melnychuk, representative of the Defense Ministry press center, met with him.

[Melnychuk] We would like to learn how the Fund for Promotion of the Building of the Ukrainian Black Sea Navy was founded and what it does.

[Havryshkevych] It was founded over a year ago. Ivan Levytsky, chairman of the Lychakivsky Rayon Council in Lvov, and Mykhaylo Kostiv, a well-known activist in Halychyna, were its founders. Representatives of the Ukrainian Navy came to Lvov, and some of Mykhaylo's friends were among them. That was how we met. We spoke about the troubles and needs of the Ukrainian Navy, especially our lack of funds. We were personally concerned about the building and strengthening of the Ukrainian state, so we decided to contribute to this cause and this is how the fund was established.

A variety of organizations and enterprises in Lvov cooperate with us. The liquor and spirits factory, managed by Ivan Boyko; the meat processing plant managed by Pavlo Sokol; the coffee packing plant managed by Borys Dubovyy; the mill managed by Mykola Mazur; the tobacco factory managed by Evhen Khomyk; the pasta factory managed by Bohdan Zinkevych; the chemical and pharmaceutical plant managed by Ivan Bilyak, and other businesses are among them. These benefactors decided to aid Ukrainian sailors with both funds and products.

Pasta and grain, flour and tinned meat, coffee and cigarettes are delivered to Sevastopol from Lvov twice a year—on Easter and New Year's. We send products worth some 500 million karbovanetses every time.

We have also provided sailors with xerox machines, computers, television sets, and books. We realize that our state has numerous problems, hence there should be someone to aid our Navy.

[Melnychuk] As is known, the fund was one of the sponsors of the first cruise by the "Hetman Sahaydachnyy" to France.

[Havryshkevych] Yes, when we learned that a Ukrainian guard ship was leaving for abroad to represent Ukraine on a great French national holiday, we could do nothing less than provide aid.

Products from Halychyna have improved and supplemented our sailors' cruise rations. In addition, they have paid for plates and dishes, a television set, and other necessary items.

Of course, we hoped that one of our representatives could participate in this historic cruise and report on this event, to experience all the difficulties of Navy life, and to learn what kind of assistance they require. I was chosen for this mission.

[Melnychuk] What were your impressions?

[Havryshkevych] I met with wonderful people, genuine patriots of Ukraine, who are making honest sacrifices for the building of the Ukrainian state.

I was deeply impressed by Vice Admiral Volodymyr Bezko-rovaynyy, commander of the Ukrainian Navy, and his deputies. Captain Third Rank Serhiy Nastenka, commander of the "Hetman Sahaydachnyy," is also a wonderful man. He is young, but well trained and modest and has an enormous wealth in his heart—an immense love for Ukraine and his people.

I can also highly assess the work of the entire crew of the ship. The proficiency and persistency of each officer, warrant officer, and sailor guaranteed the success of the first historic cruise by a Ukrainian Navy ship.

[Melnychuk] I observed how conscientiously you instructed and inspired our sailors during the cruise.

[Havryshkevych] Yes, I could not stand idle. I spoke with sailors and advised them on various topics. I am sure that some 80 percent of rank-and-file servicemen would accept a priest on the ship who would pray with them and set them on the right path. A two-year tour of duty with the Navy could result in sailors' illumination with great Christian morals.

In my opinion, there would be no more hazing of conscripts, as this is a legacy of the imperial army. Of course, there are fewer cases of hazing of conscripts in our Army, nevertheless, there are a few of them.

Sailors from Halychyna promised to improve the situation. There are 18 sailors from Halychyna on the ship. They perform their duties perfectly and are not reprimanded by their officers. Those sailors who have served their terms will be transferred to the reserves, our sailors from Halychyna will become the senior servicemen on the ship this fall and will stop the hazing of conscripts. All of them have been attacked and treated cruelly, but they are not going "to tolerate such treatment or let this happen again."

[Melnychuk] Pavlo Volodymyrovych, you could both observe and feel the needs of our sailors during this 45-day cruise. What conclusions have you reached?

[Havryshkevych] I could personally see their needs. Some of them are insignificant, while others are serious. Insignificant needs, however, come together to form big problems. I am convinced that we should render assistance to our sailors and see Ukraine become a great maritime power. We will render this assistance! Our contacts will become closer and more fruitful.

[Melnychuk] Former Defense Minister Morozov once issued an appeal to Ukrainian residents, urging every Ukrainian oblast to finance the construction of a ship for the Ukrainian Navy. What is your attitude toward this appeal?

[Havryshkevych] This is unrealistic. Construction of a ship costs hundreds of billions [currency not specified]. Only a state can afford this.

We supported this idea at the beginning. When we, however, discussed and calculated everything, we realized that even a rich oblast, for example, Lvov Oblast, cannot afford this. We can only help in everyday issues.

[Melnychuk] The Black Sea Navy has the anti-submarine cruiser "Moscow." The Moscow Defense Ministry is building a 100-unit apartment block for its officers and warrant officers. Could Lvov Oblast launch the construction of housing for the Ukrainian Navy? This could be real assistance to those sailors who are without housing.

[Havryshkevych] I am not speaking for Lvov Oblast, so I can only speak about our Fund for Promotion of the Building of the Ukrainian Black Sea Navy. A 40-unit apartment house is being built in Sevastopol. We are actively participating in its construction. We are providing paint, wood, and frame constructions there. To my regret, it is too early to speak about any big construction project there, however, I hope that the situation will stabilize and we will discuss the issue of constructing housing for the Ukrainian Navy. Sacrifice is a great quality of our people. I am sure that there will be people in other oblasts who would be ready to aid our sailors. If each oblast gives something to the Navy, we will become one of the leading naval powers of the world.

[Melnychuk] What new, specific steps will you take to aid the Ukrainian Navy?

[Havryshkevych] There will be several of them. I will speak about one program. We will train young people for our Navy. This will be serious and meaningful training. Military commissariats will choose candidates because service at sea is more difficult than on land: Military equipment on ships is very complicated and living conditions are rather hard. We will allocate funds to train genuine sailors.

The first group of 150 young people trained with our assistance will be called up to the Navy this fall.

I will not speak about our other programs, but we will implement them as well.

[Melnychuk] Pavlo Volodymyrovych, what is the primary result of the first long-distance cruise of a Ukrainian Navy ship?

[Havryshkevych] The most important thing is that we yelled at the top of our voice that Ukraine exists, that it has its own Navy to perform operations at sea.

## CAUCASIAN STATES

### Political, Military Situation in Gorno-Badakhshan

944Q0600A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian  
No 38, Sep 94 (signed to press 20 Sep 94) pp 15-17

[Article by Arkadiy Dubnov (Kalaikhumb—Khorog—Dushanbe—Moscow): "There Is No Peace on the Roof of the World: Badakhshan's Opposition Fighters Are Defending Russian Peacekeeping Forces, Border Guards Cannot Get Along With the Peacekeepers.... New Facets of the Inter-Tajik War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The village has such a funny name—Khikhik. We are passing through it at around the middle of our trip from Kalaikhumb to Khorog. The walls of the mountains rising on the left side of the road are almost sheer, and looming in front of us, sometimes disappearing behind the curves in the gorges, are the white-capped "6,000-meter peaks" of the Pamir (the famous "7,000-meter peaks," Lenin Peak and Mount Communism, cannot be seen from here—the Fedchenko glacier is much farther away). On the right we can see the churning rapids of the gray Pyandzh, a shallow stream now that fall is on the way. The opposite bank, the Afghan one, is so close we can make out every detail of it.

Things look quiet over there, and there is no trouble over here. The sun is shining on both sides.

#### 'Colonel, Have No Fear!'

Our "UAZ" [automobile made by Ulyanovsk Motor Vehicle Plant], marked "MS" (for "Peacekeeping Forces" ["Mirotvorcheskiye sily"]), with the needle of its speedometer hovering at around 80 even on sharp turns (we have to get to the Pamir capital before dusk falls), slows down momentarily.

"This is where it happened," the Russian colonel—"peacekeeper" sitting next to me says, pointing to the right. "We were escorting a convoy carrying humanitarian freight from Dushanbe to Khorog. The soldiers of the local Badakhshan defense forces who had asked for our protection were in front. Maybe it was a mistake to send them—with their fully armed, aggressive appearance—on ahead," the colonel says. "Suddenly shots rang out from somewhere above us. The soldiers headed by Badakhshan Commander Makhmadi, the brother of General Salam, the commander of the defense forces in the Darvaz region of the Pamir, rushed to my vehicle. They shouted 'Have no fear, Colonel!' and pulled me out of the vehicle, pushed me down on the ground, and literally covered me with their own bodies."

"Who was attacking you?"

"Oh, it was Juma; it was his soldiers...."

In this way, one group of Tajik opposition fighters protected Russian soldiers from another group of opposition fighters. Juma, incidentally, is the brother of Rezvon, Tajikistan's famous field commander of the Tajik opposition detachments that have consolidated their position in the interior of the Republic.

### In Badakhshan They Pray to the Aga Khan

The mere reminder that Gorno-Badakhshan represents half of the territory of Tajikistan, where the civil war has entered its third year, is not enough to explain the present situation in that region. The Pamir Tajiks have been insisting on the special status of their territory for a long time. Gorno-Badakhshan, which had been part of Tajikistan before the breakup of the union and had exercised the rights of an autonomous oblast, declared itself an autonomous republic last year by a decision of the oblast council. Officials in Dushanbe chose to ignore this.

Since that time the Tajik capital and its mountain province have been living separate lives, so to speak. The inhabitants of the Pamir zone have received virtually no food or any other resources from the central government for a long time. Death from starvation has been averted only with regular aid from Aga Khan IV, the Ismaili leader living in Paris. (Most of the population of the zone belongs to the Ismaili branch of Islam.) In turn, units of Tajikistan's government forces are not allowed into Badakhshan, and the laws here are enforced by local defense forces. Each village has its own soldiers, acting on the orders of regional field commanders. There are thought to be three commanders: the famous Lesha Aimbetov ("The Hunchback") in Khorog, Majnun in the adjacent regions, and Salam in Darvaz, closer to the central regions of the Republic.

The Pamir local defense forces are viewed as part of the Tajik opposition, although today they are active only within the boundaries of Badakhshan. On orders from the leaders of the Islamic Renaissance Movement of Tajikistan, based in the Afghan province of Talikan, however, the Pamir local forces are supposed to join the armed units fighting against the Dushanbe regime beyond the boundaries of the autonomous mountain region.

This is the key to the "specific nature" of the Pamir zone and the balance of power among its main operating forces, distinct from the rest of Tajikistan. I would say that there are four such forces. Two are Tajik—the local forces and the outsiders who are infiltrating the territory of the Republic through the Pyandzh border region and establishing their positions mainly in Badakhshan. The two others are the Russian border troops and the peacekeeping forces. According to the rules of combination, the number of possible pairs in a system made up of four elements is six. All of these combinations are present in the Pamir. Superimposed on one another, they create a dangerous situation with unpredictable consequences.

...We turned left when we had driven around 60 kilometers from Kalaikhumb. Empty production buildings stood by the side of the road. The marble facades of the buildings, an uncommon sight in these parts, glistened in the sunlight. "The marble combine," my companions explained. "They used to cut marble here for the Moscow and Leningrad subways...." We were on our way to Vanch. The headquarters of General Salam—or Salamsho, as the Tajiks call him—is located in this regional center.

### The 'Unruly' General and the Sacrilege of the Outsider Juma

The 34-year-old Salam has been a popular figure in Tajikistan since the Soviet era. The judo champion of the USSR

and republic champion and prize-winner in the all-union Spartacus Games is also famous for his "unruly" nature. He was put on report six times during his army service in Mangyshlak. He stood up for soldiers who were beaten by their commanding officers. "I think there is a word in Russian for this practice...." "Hazing." "Yes, that is the word. But I am still grateful to the officers for teaching me so much." Salam also had to pay for his insubordination later, when he was attending the agricultural institute in Dushanbe. He had to leave a year before graduation because the heads of the institute "did not appreciate" his statements against instructors who used profanities in their lectures. "They undermined their own authority," Salamsho explained.

"As long as the border troops do not interfere in our internal affairs, we feel we are working toward a common cause with them, protecting our villages from excesses," Salam said. "It is in our interest to have a good relationship with them, because we would do anything to get Juma and his men out of here. The people are tired of their dissipated behavior." I told the general the details of the confrontation between Juma's men and the border guards near Kalaikhumb two days earlier. A grenade lobbed at an infantry combat vehicle had killed a Russian contract sergeant, and four others had suffered severe wounds and concussions.

"What was the reason for the ambush? After all, the soldiers had already crossed over to this side and could easily find shelter."

"The people who opened fire may not have been acting on orders. They may simply have been vicious individuals. People of that type are causing most of the problems here. It is also possible, however, that this was a deliberate act of provocation, to goad the border guards into firing on the villages where the fighters had taken shelter. They have to create clashes between the local population and the Russians, so they can play one off against the other. The results so far, however, have been the opposite. Juma has turned the people against himself." Salam described how the alien fighters had robbed a convoy carrying humanitarian aid from the Aga Khan to Khorog. The act was seen as a sacrilege here, because "the aid came from Allah...." The Darvaz general had to take preventive measures against Juma. Around 30 of his soldiers were disarmed and are being kept under guard by Salam's men in the village of Porshevo.

"Our leaders, Said Abdullo Nuri and his Deputy Akbar Turajonzoda, have asked us to maintain a good relationship with the border guards and with the Russian Army, to accuse them of nothing, and to strive for cooperation with them. After all, when the present regime in Dushanbe leaves, the Russian soldiers will have to stay here. Otherwise, peace will not last long," Salam stressed.

"Are you prepared to act on any order from Afghanistan?"

"Yes. If they tell us to lay down our weapons tomorrow, my people will disarm completely."

I expressed doubt: "All of them?" "All of them in my defense forces," Salam replied. "How many soldiers do you have?" "This is a secret, of course, but I will tell you that we have around a thousand well-trained men."

I would not dare to judge the accuracy of this figure, but something else is obvious: Salam's authority among the Darvaz defense forces of the Pamir is quite strong. I found this out when we drove through the checkpoints manned by Salam's fighters in each village along the road from Kalaikhumb to the Viskharv pass, where we were met by Juma's men. My "peacekeepers" were clearly anxious about this meeting, but everything turned out fine. The advance patrol post apparently "missed" us, and the UAZ moved on without incident to the boundary of the operational zone of Majnun's forces.

Incidentally, there was a sharp contrast between the personal gear and equipment of the Pamir defense forces and Juma's fighters. Whereas the former were indistinguishable from the local inhabitants (which is what they were, of course) and carried Kalashnikov rifles on their bare shoulders, sometimes covered by a threadbare sweater worn over ordinary work pants, Juma's men were parading around in brand-new camouflage uniforms. Inlaid daggers gleamed at their waists, expensive pendants hung around their necks, and the splendor of their firearms was beyond compare....

#### A Grenade Launcher Trained on a Veterinarian

...We did not get to sleep for a long time in the small hotel of the Khorog border detachment. We were listening to the stories of a Russian major who had just returned from Dushanbe with a convoy of freight for the border guards. He was quite agitated and kept describing the same scene: How the soldiers of the government forces had kept their grenade launchers trained on his vehicles on the Khoburobad crossing to Tavildara (with the opposition-controlled zone beyond).

"I understand the mentality of a weapon operator. If his target makes any quick moves, his finger involuntarily squeezes the trigger, and this can be the start of such a mess...." the major kept repeating. "I could sense this, and I kept whispering to the drivers over the radio: 'Stay calm, avoid any abrupt movements, stay at the same speed, and do not step on the gas.'"

"What did they want from you?" he was asked.

"They wanted to search the vehicles, which was absolutely illegal. After all, we had already gone through all of the customs formalities in Dushanbe. They simply wanted us to share our fuel, weapons, and food with them, and threatened to fire on the convoy if we refused. A certain Captain Jalolov, the deputy commander of the 'MORT' [Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Tajikistan] battalion, was particularly rude and tactless." ("We know that captain; we had a run-in with him there," "my" colonel remarked.) "As soon as I assured him I would radio for Russian helicopter support from Dushanbe, he settled down."

"Doesn't he understand that he is discrediting his own government? After all, Russia is helping him!" an army veterinarian (who was sent here to keep an eye on the supplies of the border guards) exclaimed in a bewildered tone.

"But you know, I understood why he had to do this," the major suddenly declared. "After all, it happened at night,

and our convoy of 44 vehicles stretched over two kilometers, with the end right across from a village where opposition fighters might be hiding. If the MORT forces had opened fire in the dark, the fighters would have been confused and would have thought that the Russians were firing on their positions. Then they would have returned fire, shooting at the convoy. After this, we would also have had to become involved. That was his plan, and I could guess just from the captain's behavior that he wanted to provoke us. What a loathsome man...."

Then he went on: "You know how I finally got out of it?" "How?" "Without any of the MORT soldiers noticing, I was able to send an all-terrain vehicle with dispatches ahead to the border detachment in Kalaikhumb, and they sent 'armor' to support me. That, however, is not the interesting thing; it is something else: The fighters saw the vehicle, figured out what was going on, and gave it a 'green light' through all of their patrol posts. Just imagine...."

Later, when I returned to Dushanbe, I asked General Chichulin, the commanding officer of the Russian border troops in Tajikistan, what he knew about this incident. "Yes, I have received reports. I have already been in contact with the republic leaders and their Ministry of Defense, and now I am waiting for the return of our officers who witnessed what happened. We will get to the bottom of it. That captain, Jalolov, is already known here...." Chichulin replied.

#### To Shoot or Not To Shoot

Now I should probably describe the most disturbing thing I saw in the Pamir.

Relations between the Russian border guards and the "peacekeepers," who are formally part of the 201st Russian Division, are far from harmonious, to put it mildly. I use the word "formally" because many of the army officers who were sent here recently as "peacekeepers" generally avoid confrontational behavior in their encounters with the local population. They were not fighting on the side of the People's Front at the height of the civil war in 1992, and for this reason they do not sympathize openly with either side. Colonel-General Patrikeyev, the recently appointed commander of the CIS coalition peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan, is also displaying this kind of stance.

For this reason, when the army officers carrying out humanitarian functions have to deal with the kind of situation the border guards are always encountering, and these guards are always ready for battle or have just emerged from battle, it is not surprising that the two groups interpret the events in completely different ways. It seems to the "peacekeepers" that the border troops are too eager to use weapons in situations not necessarily requiring them.

The border troops, in turn, accuse the inexperienced soldiers of excessive pacifism and believe that this provokes the local fighters to attack the almost unarmed convoys carrying humanitarian freight.

Many of the border guards I spoke with at length realize the futility of the frame of mind they have been forced into by their inner feelings and outside events: They are guarding

the border with one hostile side, while surrounded by other, perhaps slightly less hostile forces....

Not once—not even in the smoking lounges and the shower rooms—did I hear anyone, from the youngest lieutenant to the most experienced major, say anything about the sacred cause of defending Russia's borders against infiltration by Islamic fundamentalism. Of course, this might not be one of their concerns.... In Khorog I asked Colonel Neroyev, the senior commanding officer of the border troops in the Pamir, about this. It is probable that no one can brag of longer service in Tajikistan. Sergey Neroyev has been here for nine years already, and has spent three of them in Gorno-Badakhshan.

"What kind of fundamentalism could they have here? There is nothing serious left after 70 years of the Soviet regime—just a few pockets near Garm," the colonel said.

Neroyev also dispelled another myth—at least it is a myth here in the Pamir. Everyone here talks about the 10 Arab mercenaries who were caught at one of the Khorog checkpoints! "There were no Arabs here," he said. "But what about the news reports?" I reminded him. "I know there were reports," he replied, "but we checked all of them out, and we learned that the initial reports were false. You know, many faces here look strange to newcomers from Russia,

and that is why the men were mistaken for Arabs. This kind of thing might have happened in Tavildara...."

I could hear the calm and detached tone of a professional in the colonel's words....

### **Georgian Procurator Loses in Clash With Defense Minister**

95UM0008B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 27 Sep 94 p 2

[Article by Vitaliy Denisov, Tbilisi: "'Why Did They 'Retire' the Procurator?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Georgian Minister of Defense Lieutenant-General Vardiko Nadibaidze's petition, Republic Main Military Procurator Aleksandr Shushanashvili has been relieved of his post. The military department head's letter to Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze in which Shushanashvili was characterized as "useless for the procuracy and an incompetent specialist" became grounds for the retirement. According to experts and observers, the main military procurator's attempts to establish the procuracy's effective supervision over the Army and other force structures of the state were the actual causes for relieving him from the post. Furthermore, he headed an investigation into criminal cases during the war in Abkhazia, during the course of which many high ministry of defense officials were interrogated.

## ARMS TRADE

### Samoylov: 'No Significant Increase' in Arms Sales Foreseen

MM0310135194 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 30 Sep-3 Oct 94 p 19

[Interview with Viktor Samoylov, general director of the "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company, by Sergey Pluzhnikov and Sergey Sokolov under the rubric "Armory"; place, date not stated: "Never Look a Gift Gun in the Muzzle"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The weapons trade is one of the most profitable and secretive forms of business in the world. It is customary to call weapons traders "hawks." What profit has the export of Russian arms brought the treasury in recent times, and how high do our "hawks" fly now? Viktor Samoylov, general director of the "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company, is probably better placed than anybody to know the answers to these questions. The "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company was set up a year ago and is called upon to implement strict control over all Russia's weapons exports. We began our conversation with the country's chief "hawk" with a very sensitive question:

[Pluzhnikov] What was the outcome of the conflict between the management of the "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company and eminent designers from Russian defense enterprises at the beginning of this year?

[Samoylov] There is a short history behind this question. Two years ago, anybody and everybody, except for three Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations structures, began to export weapons in Russia: defense enterprises and design bureaus themselves, and a swarm of Russian and foreign brokers.

This chaos reached its peak with the conclusion of the Malaysian contract, when around 20 brokers were trying to sell the selfsame MiG-29 aircraft.

This state of affairs could no longer be tolerated. Therefore November 1993 saw the appearance of the presidential edict on setting up the "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company, the point of which is very simple: Trade in weapons must be under strict state control.

But there was no conflict as such. There was a letter from eminent designers "organized," it can be assumed, by one of the departments "encroached upon" and published in the Russian press. Producers feared a return to the Soviet weapons trade system whereby they received from the state meager funds and diplomas or decorations. But when it became clear that "Rosvooruzheniye" is a professional broker which, in exchange for its services in promoting Russian special property on the markets of other countries (there are over 40 foreign offices for this purpose) will take only between 1.5 and 3 percent commission with all the remaining money going to the producers of the weapons, the military-industrial complex was pacified.

Moreover, the State Company—and this is one of its main tasks—began to conduct an active investment policy. Since the beginning of this year "Rosvooruzheniye" has advanced around 60 defense plants a total of 150 billion rubles [R].

It proved even easier to find a common language with purchasers, who are usually state governments. In our business major contracts are concluded for a period of 15-20 years, and only a state organization can be a reliable guarantor of these deals now.

[Pluzhnikov] Keeping old regional arms markets and opening up new ones entails the most acute competitive battle. What are Russia's stances in this battle, and what are our trump cards and weak points?

[Samoylov] Indeed, a most acute competitive battle has developed on the world market now. Not only in the various regions, but also in terms of types of weapon.

Sometimes the United States, France, Britain, and Germany sell their tanks at throwaway prices. Here is one unprecedented example: The Moroccans recently received 100 tanks from the United States free of charge on condition that they ship them from Europe themselves. The Americans considered it an expensive luxury to transport their own hardware back across the ocean. So they decided to "tie" the Moroccan Armed Forces to them and earn a bit of money from supplies of spare parts.

Why could we not sell our T-80U tanks to the Swedes this year despite the Swedes' delight following displays and shooting demonstrations? The secret is simple: Germany offered preferential credit terms for the organization of the production of its own "Leopards" on the territory of the Kingdom of Sweden.

As for the transition from supplying weapons to trading in them, then previously consumers "did not look a gift gun in the muzzle," since the Soviet Union generously issued credits over 20 to 30 years. I even happened across a document on credit spanning 47 years.

Which is why the sharp turn toward the export of weapons on a commercial basis caused many problems. Russia was forced to tighten up credit terms. This created many difficulties in the sphere of military-technical cooperation with India and certain other countries. In this connection we still have a lot to learn from our competitors. Especially in the area of state protectionism, market research, advertising, after-sales service....

Nevertheless, our number of main partners remains as before. The most reliable and promising partners remain, of course, India and China. Moreover, we have made a breakthrough in Southeast Asia, Malaysia, and have already held encouraging talks with Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia. We have good prospects in Latin America.

The main trump cards of Russian weaponry continue to be its high combat capabilities and the fact that it is well manufactured, durable, simple to use, and relatively cheap.

[Pluzhnikov] But the weapons trade has always been mixed up in politics. The most sophisticated advertising gimmicks cannot, in general, even compare with easy political maneuvering when it comes to increasing profits and the desire to win markets for the sale of weapons. Clearly, we are having to make up for lost time in this sphere too?

[Samoylov] Indeed, the weapons trade is not only commerce, but politics too. And unfortunately, in terms of the

number of lobbying "achievements," we still lag behind leaders of Western countries, who make active use of every possible political lever in order to increase exports of their weapons. For instance, in 1991, before defending Saudi Arabia from Iraqi aggression, the U.S. Government secured a commitment from the Saudi shaykhs to purchase American military hardware to the value of over \$10 billion. Whereas we are losing roughly the same sum each year now by complying with UN sanctions against Iraq and Libya.

However, on the other hand, there are examples of rational political initiative. Recently certain military-industrial complex enterprises began to work with South Africa, anticipating the positive changes in this country and the lifting of all restrictive UN sanctions. It turned out to be a well calculated risk, and it will pay off very soon.

[Pluzhnikov] The "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company has also been entrusted with the important task of state control over compliance with UN sanctions on supplies of weapons to particular countries. We know that in the confusion of recent years numerous brokers have actively violated embargoes. What is being done by "Rosvooruzheniye" experts to stop weapons smuggling?

[Samoylov] Our State Company adheres strictly to Russian Government decisions on complying with UN sanctions, whatever damage they may cause us. As for control over the legality of weapons deliveries abroad, this is dealt with by more than 10 departments and organizations, but this is not part of the State Company's functions. Although we do help in the sphere of control. For instance, we have analysis components which, with computer-like precision, determine whether or not it is possible to assemble a system with prohibited combat capability from a set of spare parts which are, at first sight, harmless. We carry out this kind of expert assessment for the special services.

[Pluzhnikov] For a long time now KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has been following the development of the situation in North Korea. Is it true that our military-technical cooperation with the DPRK is continuing?

[Samoylov] We have been cooperating with Pyongyang since the mid-1960's. In all, arms to the sum of R3.3 billion have been supplied to the DPRK. The Korean People's Army is over 50-percent equipped with our weapons and military hardware.

In connection with the transition to settling accounts in hard currency, cooperation was suspended on the initiative of the Korean side. Since 1991 not a single contract has been signed.

[Pluzhnikov] As of today, Russia is almost the only country trying or forced to develop a barter system in the sphere of weapons exports. Why is this? How does the "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company management view the exchange of guns for butter?

[Samoylov] Barter, in the classical sense, is not used by the "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company. As a rule, transactions are carried out with mixed forms of payment (a proportion of the weapons supplies is paid for in currency, a proportion in goods or services.) This is normal. Incidentally, the United States, France, and other weapons exporters use barter widely.

As for Russia, then there is no getting away from this, as commitments to exchange guns for butter have been inherited from the former USSR. Renouncing such deals and switching to accounting in freely convertible currency only would not allow us to preserve traditional links with India, Egypt, Finland, and other countries.

[Pluzhnikov] How is cooperation between Russia and other countries in creating various types of arms coming along? In particular, there were reports of the possible creation by Russia in conjunction with France and Germany of a European tank and European aircraft. What can this kind of cooperation give us?

[Samoylov] The "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company is taking an active part in organizing projects with Western firms to modernize Russian military hardware.

Our main partner is France, with which an intergovernmental agreement on military-technical cooperation was signed recently. CIS industry, together with the French firm SAT, has developed and already tested a thermal-imaging sight for the BMP-3 [Infantry Fighting Vehicle-3] (for delivery to third countries) which makes it possible to fire at night at any range.

It is planned to set up joint ventures to repair MiG-29 aircraft with Germany, India, and Malaysia. The feasibility study for these projects is being prepared right now.

As for possible cooperation in creating a European fighter, at the moment this does not promise any gains for Russia—on the contrary, it will only divert efforts and resources from the production of our own aviation technology. But the Russian military-industrial complex possesses enormous potential. We may well surprise the world very soon not only with sensational developments of the dynamic protection of tanks, but also with state-of-the-art weaponry in air-to-air combat with a sharply increased range, and much more.

[Pluzhnikov] Nevertheless, the export of Russian weapons is diminishing. Information has already been cited in the open press indicating that, at the moment, Russia's share of world weapons supplies stands at just 8-9 percent, whereas in 1985 it was up to 50 percent. What is the likelihood that we will be able in the near future to regain our positions in the sphere of weapons exports?

[Samoylov] According to data from the annual report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia's share of world arms exports for 1993 was 21 percent (the U.S. share was 48 percent).

On the whole, there can be no expectation of a significant rise not only in Russia's weapons exports but in weapons exports in general in the next few years. This is linked first and foremost with the warming of the political climate in the world, the saturation and shrinking of the arms market, and other objective factors.

Nevertheless, the "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company is seeking ways into new markets and is offering supplies of new types of weapon. In the first six months of the "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company's existence alone it signed contracts to the value of over \$1.5 billion. Realistically

evaluating prospects, it can be said with certainty that planned export volumes of Russian weapons for 1994-95 will exceed last year's level.

### Need for New Arms Export Strategy

944F1600A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 27 Sep 94 p 6

[Article by Igor Korotchenko under the rubric "Problem": "The West Is Trying To Block Russia's Efforts To Regain World Arms Markets: A Well-Developed Export Strategy Is Needed in These Circumstances"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The exhibition "Armaments. Military Equipment. Conversion," which has just wrapped up in Nizhny Novgorod, provided a convincing demonstration of the vitality of the Russian VPK [military-industrial complex], which, despite the catastrophic situation in the defense sectors of industry, mainly retained its technological, scientific, and human resource potential. Judging by the reaction of a numerous group of military attaches, who were present at the demonstration of combat capabilities of the exhibit samples, in comparison, domestic armaments and military equipment is by a number of tactical and technical characteristics superior to its foreign analogues. The same conclusion comes to mind in a comparative analysis of entire classes of armaments produced in Russia and the West.

However, despite such seemingly favorable starting conditions, all attempts on the part of the Russian Federation to regain the positions previously held by the Soviet Union in the world arms markets came up empty. This is not the fault of the Rosvooruzheniye state company, but the interplay of a score of factors that are having an extremely unfavorable effect on Russia's desire to realize as fully as possible the export capabilities of its VPK.

First among them is strong resistance on the part of Western defense corporations, which do not need competition in the fight for lucrative contracts. A characteristic example is the story surrounding the purchase by Malaysia of Russian MiG-29 field fighter aircraft. After this country's leadership made a decision to beef up the national PVO [air defenses], in addition to Russia the United States (F-16C and F/A-18) and France (Mirage-2000-5 and Raphael-D) offered their services, as well as the European consortium for the production of Tornado and EFA fighter aircraft. In the environment of tough competition, preference was given to the Russian aircraft on the basis of the cost—efficiency criterion. This caused a stormy reaction on the part of the United States. In its attempts to derail the deal, Washington activated both diplomatic and covert channels of influence on Malaysian leaders. The CIA mission in Kuala Lumpur inspired an anti-Russian campaign in the Malaysian parliament, where some deputies attempted to link the MiG-29 purchase with the Russian position on the Bosnian crisis. The U.S. State Department sent several sharply worded notes to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed. The Americans engaged in the collection of compromising materials on Minister of Defense Najib Abdul Razak with the purpose of influencing him in this issue. Simultaneously, a representative of the McDonnell-Douglas corporation—an aircraft manufacturer—arrived at Kuala Lumpur and

offered to deliver the tactical fighter craft F/A-18 (to replace the MiG-29) at dumping prices. Only thanks to the position taken by the Malaysian leadership (which supports restrictions on American influence in Southeast Asia) did the Russian-Malaysian agreement remain in force. As we can see, purely political factors played a role in this particular case.

As to other regions of the world, if Russian arms manufacturers want to achieve success they must take into account completely different circumstances. It is no secret that one of the decisive factors in signing some or other contracts for arms purchases is the personal material interest of the purchasing country's representative conducting the negotiations. Numerous scandals have become public knowledge, in which leading German and Japanese politicians were accused of taking bribes from American companies. In return they make decisions to give preference to the military products of the respective companies. It is a classic scheme. So perhaps along with the exhibits, advertising, and presentations the Russian side should take into account and copy the experience of world arms manufacturers. After all, not only Russian politicians are corrupt—the same goes for Western ones. It is quite appropriate to make a one-time expenditure of, for instance, \$500,000 in order to gain a contract worth hundreds of millions of dollars. With proper guarantees on the accepting side, of course. Especially considering that by all objective characteristics Russian arms are indeed among the best in the world. Confidentiality in such undertaking may be ensured by bringing in the relevant Russian structures.

The need for nontraditional approaches and development of a flexible export strategy in advancing the products of the domestic VPK into foreign arms markets is obvious. Otherwise Russia will enter the next millennium as a raw material appendix of the world industrial powers.

### Commentary on Kuwaiti BMP-3 Buy

95UM0007B Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian  
11 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Rustam Narzikulov: "A Military-Oil Novel"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The intensive contacts of Russian exporters of civilian products (particular oil producers) with Iraq have made life much easier for the sellers of Russian weapons. The contract signed by the "Rosvooruzheniye" corporation with the government of Kuwait for the delivery of BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles and the "Smerch" multiple rocket-launcher system, immediately after the conclusion of the Moscow talks between an Iraqi delegation and the MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties] and Mintopenergo [Ministry of Fuel and Energy] of the Russian Federation is hardly an accident.

In Kuwait there are no other visible reasons to diversify their import of weapons, except to support one of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, after the signing of a contract that includes this small Arab country in the zone of our economic interests. After all, the scope of the purchases of weapons by the Arab Emirate are incomparable with the volumes of military imports from the U.S. and Great Britain (also, incidentally, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council). Thus for example according

to Reuters, citing western diplomats, Russia will deliver from 40 to 50 BMP-3s, which of course cannot in any way compare (in sales price) with the purchased lot of American fighters. Thus the price of security is not very high for a state that takes in no less than 30 million dollars a day just from the export of oil.

Perhaps Kuwait is also hoping that if Russia exports weapons there, she will decrease her activity in the UN to lift the trade embargo on Iraq. For the emirate the repeal of the UN sanctions would not only have unpleasant political consequences. It would have unpleasant financial ones as well. Now the production of oil in Iraq is limited to 500 thousand barrels a day. The lifting of the sanctions would make it possible to increase production in a few months to 3.5 to 4 million barrels a day, which in turn would lead to a drop in world oil prices from the current 17.5 to 18.00 dollars per barrel to 13 to 14 dollars (prediction of Mackay Consultants). In that case Kuwait's receipts from oil production would immediately drop to 7-10 million dollars a day.

As for Russian foreign economic policy in the Near East, while we are cheered at the successes of the military-industrial complex in the Kuwaiti market (representatives off "Rosvooruzheniye" noted in a talk with SEGODNYA that the corporation "had reached full mutual understanding with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was closely cooperating with it to promote Russian arms and military equipment in international weapons markets") it would hardly be advisable to change it [foreign policy] by selling a few dozen BMPs.

Nothing keeps us from preparing ahead of time for strict competition in the Iraqi oil, chemical, and metallurgical industry, while in the process delivering some quantity of military equipment to that part of the market of its political adversary that was kindly conceded by the exclusive suppliers of the emirate.

#### State Commission Discusses MIG-29 Sale to Malaysia

95UM0007A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian  
18 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by Aleksey Kirpichnikov: "Oleg Soskovets Goes for Three Birds With One Stone. Russia To Get Jobs, Sci-Tech Progress, and Palm Oil"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The contract signed on June 7 in Malaysia by Oleg Soskovets for delivery of our military aircraft to that country in exchange for Malaysian palm oil was a cheering event for the military-industrial complex at the level of its struggle with the TEK [fuel and energy complex] for centralized financing. The agreement proved to be extremely advantageous: along with the sale of eighteen MiG-29s, it includes assistance in pilot training, creation of a technical maintenance center, and developmental aid in the aerospace, defense and other branches of Malaysian industry, i.e. not only does it give work to the defense industry, it means a virtual Russian breakthrough into the Asian-Pacific weapons market. The contract is for more than half a billion dollars. Of course according to some information, the shipments of palm oil will cover from 20 to

40 percent of the cost of the planes, but Malaysia is prepared to prepay 65 percent of the monetary amount of the contract.

However, as was learned almost immediately, the required modernization of the aircraft equipment, written into the document, is quite extensive. It is necessary to refit the MiGs with additional weapons and to give them an in-flight refueling capability. But most importantly, it is necessary to increase the service life of the engine from 750 to 2000 hours. This will all require serious financing. But as usual there is no money, and the first MiG must be delivered as early as April 1995. There were immediate rumors about an inevitable delay in deliveries etc. Yesterday's session of the government commission for military-technical cooperation, headed by Mr. Soskovets, was devoted to dispelling the damaging rumors.

As was evident from the speech by the Director of the State Concern [GK] "Rosvooruzheniye" Viktor Samoylov, Russia can kill yet another bird with the same stone, in addition to the two obvious ones (employing enterprises of the military-industrial complex and breaking into the Asian-Pacific weapons market): the scientific-technical developments required to modernize the MiG-29 will make it possible to create virtually a new plane for the Russian Air Force. The GK "Rosvooruzheniye" is prepared to obtain the necessary funds both through a state order and through a commercial contract. In order that the enterprises not spend money on the wrong things (the social sphere, for example), the GK "Rosvooruzheniye" will exercise "special oversight."

Oleg Soskovets himself took a hard swipe at the rivals of the military-industrial complex, emphasizing that the issue was not the export of raw material, but [the export] of complex equipment, and that therefore "the contract with Malaysia is a state priority." The execution of the contract must become "a model for the development of weapons exports." Naturally those gathered did not forget to mention the 500 thousand workers who will be employed in contract work. The further fate of the palm oil—re-export, soap-making, or other types of internal consumption—was not discussed.

#### Review of Nizhny Novgorod Arms Fair

95UM0004A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 20 Sep 94 p 3

[Article by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Military Commentator Nikolay Plotnikov, under the rubric: "Russia": "As Before the Russian Military-Industrial Complex's Products Remain Competitive: The Latest Arms Fair Has Been Completed in Nizhny Novgorod"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The already well-known "Vooruzheniye. Voennoy tekhnika. Konversiya" [Arms. Military Equipment. Conversion] Fair is operating in Nizhny for the third autumn in a row. This time 239 of Russia's leading defense enterprises and organizations displayed their products. These enterprises and organizations presented approximately 2,000 major exhibits. Of them, approximately 300—were individual models of arms and military equipment which, based upon their tactical-technical specifications, do not have equals in the world. Among them are the celebrated MiG's, armored fighting

vehicles, multiple rocket launcher systems, self-propelled artillery, PVO [Air Defense] systems, guided artillery projectiles and guided aircraft bombs, and small arms. Nearly two dozen Russian military-industrial complex items were demonstrated for the first time.

Judging by the number of foreign military attaches accredited to Russia (over 70 people) and arms experts from 28 countries who visited Nizhny Novgorod, interest in Russian arms has increased in recent times. The order for the delivery of 500 BMP-3's to the United Arab Emirates, where our infantry fighting vehicle beat the famous American BMP-2 Bradley and the British MCV-80 Warrior in tests under desert conditions, can serve as confirmation of that.

The arms market is a traditionally fierce competitive struggle. We know of quite a few cases of the coordinated activities of state, military and business circles of a number of Western countries, first of all the United States, to prevent Russia from entering new arms markets and to aggressively counter our efforts to reduce existing positions in traditional areas. The methods and techniques are not distinguished by a special diversity: bribing bureaucrats, discrediting Russian weapons through the mass media, disabling models of weapons and equipment that are participating in demonstrations, etc. The uproar that occurred around the superiority of American weapons over Soviet weapons during the Persian Gulf War is well known. At that time, many of the mass media raved about the American Patriot surface-to-air missiles [SAM's] which combated Iraqi Scud missiles but, in the process, were silent about the fact that the Americans were compelled to expend six Patriot missiles for the destruction of one Scud when Russian S-300 SAM's destroy these targets with one launch and while repelling not a single missile but an entire group. This is obviously why the United States has begun to undertake attempts to acquire this system.

The preliminary results of the Nizhny Novgorod fair confirm that the products of Russian defense enterprises are, as before, competitive on the world market and enjoy increased demand. According to certain data, quite profitable trade deals were concluded. In the process, we need to take into account that many specialized military-industrial complex plants are practically not subject to conversion and that enormous resources are required to shift other plants to the output of peaceful products. Therefore, the conclusion of arms deals are hardly Russian defense enterprises' only means of survival.

On one of the Nizhny Novgorod Fair's last days of operation, military attaches and foreign experts were invited to Gorokhovetskiy Combined Arms Range where Russian Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy students' exercises were being conducted. During the course of a planned exercise, Moscow Military District missileers and artillery men demonstrated the combat capabilities of the "Tochka-U" tactical missile system, multiple rocket launcher systems, tube artillery and mortars, and "Konkurs" and "Shturm-S" antitank missile systems that are in the Russian Army's Ground Forces inventory.

The new "Msta" 152-millimeter self-propelled howitzer attracted special attention. According to expert assessments,

its parameters far exceed the parameters of similar artillery systems of the Western countries. The howitzer has a high rate of fire and firing accuracy. And after the BM-21 "Grad" crew carried out a mission to inflict a strike with a full basic load (and that is 40 122-mm rocket projectiles), everyone present recognized the mastery of the Russian soldiers and officers with friendly applause. Under the impression of the combat vehicle's operation and especially the fact that the projectiles were placed in the target area, Finland's representative said: "We wouldn't want to be in the firing zone".

During the second half of the day, Colonel Aleksey Poroshin's missile brigade conducted "Tochka-U" tactical missile launches from two combat vehicles. The system is designed to destroy important small targets. Maximum launch range is up to 120 kilometers and firing accuracy is extremely high. As the officer missileers jokingly noted, it can hit a sparrow in the eye if desired.

At the conclusion of the demonstration, the "Uragan" multiple rocket launcher system, whose 220-mm rocket projectiles are capable of destroying targets at a range of up to 35 km, conducted a strike against an "aggressor". This is not a sight for the weak-nerved. One of the military attaches uttered: "Yes, you must respect Russia."

The story about the exhibition would perhaps not be complete if we didn't talk about converted production. So, the aircraft industry demonstrated models of "Delfin", "Gzhelel", and "Dingo" light civilian, multi-purpose, and administrative aircraft. The special chemicals munitions industry demonstrated technology for the production of cast items made from aluminum alloys using the liquid extrusion method and the arms industry demonstrated new materials on a metallic and non-metallic basis, sports hunting rifles and individual protective systems. The converted products of Saratov's "Almaz" NPO [Scientific Production Association] attracted a great deal of attention—these are baths for ultrasound pre-sterilized processing of surgical instruments, devices for the treatment of urethritis and prostatitis, and other medical equipment.

Next year, they plan to conduct the fair from August 21-26. It has not been excluded that similar measures will become international fairs in Nizhny Novgorod.

## DEFENSE INDUSTRY

### Outlook for Arms Development Under START, CFE

95WC0004A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian No 39, Sep 94 (Signed to press 27 Sep 94) pp 12-14

[Article by Aleksandr Pikayev, under the rubric: "Arms": "Arsenal of the 21st Century: With What Weapons Will Russia Greet the 21st Century? This Is a Vital Question That Is Determining the Fate of the Russian Defense Industry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The experience of Russian policy of the reform period gives us the opportunity to predict the basic military-political priorities for the near future. Among them are joint maintenance, with other former Soviet republics, of stability within the Eurasian space by strengthening Russia's special role there.

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Furthermore, Russia will continue a gradual rapprochement with the West. The goal is the insurance of maximum security and also access to the West's financial resources, its technologies and new markets.

And, finally, it is probable that the leading countries of the Third World will be viewed as a balance to the West's dominant role. However, the rapid strengthening of some of these states, first of all the Asian states, is capable, on the contrary, of accelerating Russian drift in the direction of Western military-political alliances.

All of this will, in the final analysis, determine changes in the structure of the armed forces and in the content of future weapons production programs.

### Strategic Offensive Weapons

From all appearances, Russia will do everything within its power to attempt to maintain approximate parity with the United States. Strategic offensive weapons that are comparable to American strategic offensive weapons will permit Moscow to maintain its superpower status and also will not let go of the trump cards that are so necessary with regard to the new world "centers of power" that are gaining strength.

Impressive strategic nuclear forces will help Russia to preserve a special role in the eyes of the now sole overseas superpower and, isn't it paradoxical, will promote a continuous dialogue between Moscow and Washington and further progress in their mutual relations.

The structure of Russian strategic offensive weapons (SOW) will be changed under the influence of, first of all, the consequences of the disintegration of the USSR and, secondly, of the START I and START II treaties. Although neither of them has yet gone into effect, they have already had an impact on the planning of Russian nuclear programs.

Loss of the two largest Ukrainian intercontinental ballistic missile production plants and four missile bases in Ukraine and in Kazakhstan along with treaty limitations will result in the fact that, already at the beginning of the next century, the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces will lose its significance as the foundation of the Russian strategic forces. More than 700 of the more than 1,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles that were deployed on Russian territory in the middle of 1991 must be eliminated by the beginning of the 21st Century due to the expiration of operating periods and in accordance with treaties. The number of warheads on them will be reduced by a factor of 4-5.

According to the terms of the START II Treaty, the sides are authorized to have only single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles. Among them are the only type of missile that Russia has—the SS-25 ground mobile missile that is manufactured at the machine building plant at Votkinsk. Furthermore, a portion of the multiple-warhead silo-based SS-19 systems that have "excess" warheads removed from them can remain in the inventory.

According to various assessments, there are from 400 to 500 such missiles in Russia and Belorussia at the present time when the provisions of the START II Treaty permit us to have over 1,000. In other words, during the course of the

next 10 years, both of the intercontinental missile production enterprises remaining in Russia will be able to produce no less than 500 new "items". Instead of the SS-25, the plant at Votkinsk can begin the production of an improved mobile system and the Plant imeni Khrushchev in Moscow could produce silo-based single-warhead missiles.

In the event of the implementation of the START II Treaty, for the first time the largest number of warheads will be concentrated in the naval component of the strategic forces even though the number of strategic missile submarines will be reduced by a factor of three by the end of the century (entirely due to obsolete systems). However, structural changes will not be so profound here in order to supply enterprises at Severodvinsk, Zlatoust, and Krasnoyarsk with enough orders for the construction of new submarines and sea-based ballistic missiles.

After the removal of "excess" warheads, the newest missiles of this type, the SS-N-18 and SS-N-23, that are deployed on "Kalmar", "Tayfun" and "Delfin" class submarines, respectively, will completely fill the limits prescribed by the treaty and will remain in the inventory for no less than 10 years. So, tests of a new type of these missiles can be delayed as a minimum until the end of the 1990's.

As for heavy bombers, after the disintegration of the USSR, a large portion of the most modern aircraft turned out to be outside Russia's borders. At the same time, the START II Treaty permits Moscow to deploy a significant number of warheads on aircraft delivery systems. With the withdrawal of obsolete Tu-95K systems from the force composition, Russia could place a weighty order at Kazan Aircraft Production Combine which would provide the opportunity to nearly double the number of Tu-160 heavy bombers on hand (including Ukrainian).

Despite that, according to certain data, Russia has not produced a single new strategic bomber since the middle of 1992.

Mobile intercontinental missiles and submarines are quite vulnerable for a surprise disarming strike when located at bases and in hangars and therefore ensuring the survivability of the strategic nuclear forces acquires increasing significance. We need to increase the effectiveness of the early warning system (ground-based and space components) and preserve a certain number of silo-based intercontinental missiles.

The anticipated radical "shift to the sea" of Russian offensive weapons requires the fundamental improvement of the strategic submarine command, control and communications system. The problem consists of the fact that, due to imperfections in the command, control and communications system, missile submarines—in the event of the destruction of the supreme high command—can generally find themselves incapable of conducting a retaliatory strike which makes their very existence senseless. This can be prevented by constructing super-low frequency communications centers and mobile and hardened command posts, as well as through their overall modernization.

### The New Role of Nuclear Weapons

In the past, the shortcomings of conventional armed forces were compensated for through numerical superiority. By the

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present time, that strength reserve has practically been exhausted. What is more, demographic difficulties, complications with the draft, and also the delay with the shift to contract manning of the Army are forcing us to assume further unavoidable armed forces personnel strength reductions. In contrast to the level of the middle 1980's, the strength of the Army has been reduced by more than a factor of two.

While considering the size of the country's territory and its frequently unpredictable neighbors, we can say that the Russian nonnuclear potential can turn out to be inadequate to repel a large-scale nonnuclear attack. It is therefore entirely natural to rely on the country's nuclear might so that it, under new conditions, accomplishes functions of deterrence—of not only nuclear but also of large-scale nonnuclear aggression.

If an enemy has nuclear weapons, then the nuclear strike that is inflicted in response to aggression must program retaliation that is insignificant in scale. First of all, the size of the losses inflicted on the aggressor cannot be too great and, second, we must not employ strategic weapons. We think that the nuclear forces that are unused in the first strike, while threatening the enemy with a series of new, more destructive strikes, will deter the enemy from massive retaliation...

This means that the role of tactical nuclear weapons will increase in the future. A potential theater of military operations can turn out to be outside Russia's borders or in Russian regions where storage of tactical nuclear weapons is impossible in peacetime due to political considerations. Therefore, we will have to stress those types of weapons which can be airlifted to the theater of military operations in a short period of time.

Tactical nuclear warheads installed on short range ballistic missiles and also on aircraft air-to-ground tactical missiles will acquire special significance.

Destruction of enemy nuclear weapons is another method to reduce the scale of retaliation. This method is most effective against a weaker nuclear power that has a small number of facilities that are subject to destruction.

Since many nuclear facilities are hardened targets, the weapons for their destruction must be highly accurate or have a high-yield warhead. The former is preferable...

Delivery systems must also ensure surprise—otherwise, they can destroy already empty targets after the enemy has carried out the launch of his own nuclear weapons. The primary factor that ensures surprise is undetectability in flight, "stealthiness" for enemy early warning and defense systems.

Long range missiles and also stealth aircraft armed with aircraft bombs with an autonomous guidance system and short range air-to-surface missiles meet all of these requirements. Ballistic missiles with short flight times can also play their role.

However, even the most stealthy and accurate delivery systems will turn out to be powerless without an effective target detection system, first of all a space target detection

system. Consequently, modernization of reconnaissance satellites is one of the defense industry's priorities.

Nonnuclear weapons systems that are capable of destroying hardened targets will evoke increased interest. The development of precision-guided delivery systems equipped with high-yield conventional warheads would permit us to deprive the enemy of his nuclear potential, without pressing the nuclear button.

Third, the most natural method to reduce losses during a retaliatory strike consists of the deployment of highly effective air defense (PVO) and antiballistic missile defense (PRO) systems. However, in practice organizational and treaty-legal regime factors will obviously impede the development of these systems in the near term.

The anticipated abolition of the National PVO [Air Defense] Forces as a separate service of the armed forces will significantly weaken the positions of the adherents of defensive weapons within the Russian military establishment. And as for antiballistic missile defense systems, the ABM Treaty, the reconsideration of which is improbable, imposes strict limitations on the development and deployment of such systems. At the same time, the growing interest in the United States in tactical antiballistic missile defense could also serve as a stimulus to corresponding Russian developments.

#### Conventional Weapons

The significant reductions in the armed forces and conventional weapons that were caused by the 1990 Paris Treaty, the disintegration of the USSR and economic-demographic realities will not permit the development of deeply echeloned defense systems in the future like those that existed on the western strategic axis during the Cold War.

More compact armed forces will most likely be deployed in several "defended areas" in order to be prepared to be airlifted to threatened axes and to conflict areas. The trend toward an increased number of highly mobile, first of all airborne assault, units and formations will be preserved. The primary load will lie precisely on them to accomplish peacekeeping missions and also other missions in the near abroad to prevent and resolve conflicts, and to prevent foreign military intervention.

Mobility will become a very important requirement facing the armed forces as a whole. This mission can be accomplished by a build up of military transport aviation, acceptance of a lighter type of armored vehicle into the inventory, and through overall modernization of the country's transportation system.

Being a continental power, in the future Russia will need a significant number of heavy weapons in the event of large-scale foreign intervention. These types of military equipment could be stored on potentially threatened axes.

The priority will be not so much the purchase of new types of weapons as the introduction of organizational measures and technical systems which would increase the effectiveness of the armed forces without conducting their large-scale reequipping.

The difficult economic situation will hardly permit military industry to begin the production of new types of weapons in this decade. At the same time, Russia is interested in preserving its positions as one of the world leaders of scientific-technical progress in the military sphere. For this purpose, it could continue scientific research and experimental design work (NIOKR) and also tests of new models of weapons (which will not require significant financial expenditures), having delayed their expensive production until better times.

So, during the second half of the 1990's the Russian military-industrial complex will have to reorient itself from the customary production of highly materials consumption-based [materialoemkiy] ballistic missiles, submarines, heavy bombers, tanks and artillery pieces toward the development, testing and, in the future, production of scientific-intensive products, first of all command, control and communications systems, and also high-yield conventional weapons.

At the same time, the production of certain traditional types of weapons, for example intercontinental ballistic missiles and heavy armored equipment, will be continued, although in significantly reduced volumes in contrast to the past. An unprecedented number of strategic and conventional weapons, and also nuclear warheads will be removed from the force composition.

#### Alternate Paths To Revive Defense Industry

944F1501A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 6 Sep 94 p 4

[Article by Oleg Antonov: "What Is To Be Done on the Ruins of the Military-Industrial Complex? Not Promote a Strengthening of Potential Adversaries"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The clinical death in which the military-industrial complex finds itself (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 1 September 1994) is compelling a search if only for some practicable paths toward its resuscitation. Which of the proposed paths to choose? An answer may be obtained by considering just two versions of the development of events starting from two different initial positions.

The first position is that Russia, like the Soviet Union previously, must not be considerably inferior in the military-technical aspect to the United States—until recently our principal potential adversary. That is, the list of arms and their quality must be no worse than their American counterparts for the observance of parity. The Ministry of Defense formerly proceeded from this when ordering military equipment in the military-industrial complex. Competition with the United States automatically ensured the necessary level of arms in relation to other potential enemies—West Europe, China, and so forth. This focus of the orders and the practically unlimited funding made it possible to develop the present military-industrial complex, which imbibed practically the entire production engineering and intellectual potential of the country.

But, on the whole, we lost the competition with the United States in the sphere of military equipment. The reasons were the higher level of the development of the engineering and production base at enterprises of the United States than with us and the absence of state monopolism in the sphere of the development and manufacture of arms (whence the most brutal competition on the market for the creation of

the latest arms) and also a number of other reasons. Our military-industrial complex basically repeated what had already been created in the United States. But inasmuch as the repetition was greatly behind-hand, this permitted certain improvements, which did not, however, signify the appearance of a new quality of the arms. For example, we are rightly proud of the Su-27 aircraft, which is the best aircraft of its class and which has been recognized worldwide. But it should not be forgotten that this aircraft began to enter Russia's military units more than 10 years after the U.S. Air Force had been equipped with the F-15, which may be considered the prototype of our Su-27. Of course, military equipment of a higher standard may be made 10 years on. But the potential adversaries (former, God grant!) were not standing still in this time and made a qualitatively new leap forward—they created the so-called stealth aircraft, which have already taken part in the war against Iraq. Our counterpart somehow is not in sight as yet.

Merely the types of arms whose creation has not required a high level of technology (light small arms, for example) are an exception to the general rule of the comparative development of American and native arms, perhaps.

Thus were we to adhere to the first starting position, we would need to continue the arms race that was customary in the past, for which now, however, there is no longer the money in the treasury and which, most importantly, can no longer be undertaken on account of the irreversible degradation of defense industry.

Consequently, it is essential to find some other starting position based on today's situation and actual possibilities in the foreseeable future.

Following the abandonment of the forcible spread of communist ideology bolstered by military strength and also the understanding of the pointlessness of a military confrontation with highly developed countries, the United States and the West European countries have disappeared from the ranks of paramount potential adversaries, but the legacy is a quantity of arms that is superfluous for the new conditions. The engineering level of the arms of the army of Russia in relation to all former (except the United States and the West European countries) and new potential adversaries remains superfluously high. The existing arms, with their level of engineering, are perfectly sufficient, therefore, for a further 10-15 years for deterrence and successful combat operations against potential enemies. If we consider, in addition, the possibility of an increase in the weapons' combat efficiency thanks to the possibility of their modernization (with less killing, conditionally speaking), this timeframe could be increased by a factor of 1.5-2. We shall not touch on the role of nuclear weapons in the new military doctrine, which does not, however, influence the essence of the considerations set forth below.

The preservation of the requisite gap is possible with the simultaneous fulfillment of at least two conditions:

1. Maintenance in a combat-capable state of the equipment in the arsenals and a personnel composition which is conversant with this equipment at the prescribed level.
2. Prevention of an increase in the potential adversaries or an increase in any one adversary, even an insignificant one, what is more, now or in the future.

Whereas the first condition is obvious and is fulfilled within the framework of the customary activity of the Ministry of Defense, the second condition is not being fulfilled at all.

There will be no increase in the potential adversaries if, first, no one sells them modern weapons and, second, no one helps them manufacture these weapons by themselves.

The opinion that we traded arms profitably earlier is widely held. Different sources indicate different figures, but one thing is clear—the weapons were supplied free of charge, in the main, out of ideological considerations. The talk now is only about the real sale of weapons. But momentary benefits from the sale of weapons could easily result in far bigger losses in the future, not all that distant even, particularly if the weapons are sold to countries with which we have common borders. The need in the future to strengthen these borders and maintain troops on them would be a heavy financial burden, if not for us, then for the next generation. The losses from the sale of weapons to distant countries are less obvious, but there are numerous examples of how these weapons subsequently stray to our immediate neighbors. Lest our potential enemies purchase weapons from other manufacturing countries, politicians and diplomats should negotiate an embargo on supplies of weapons to an agreed list of countries: we, to their neighbors, they, to ours. Then our potential adversaries would be left with just one possibility of arming themselves—manufacturing the weapons themselves, and only those that they are capable of manufacturing. They could only manufacture weapons that do not require high technology, mainly light small arms, of a low quality at that. The production of munitions would remain a tremendous problem for them here inasmuch as they require a highly developed chemical industry.

I would like particularly in this connection to analyze our policy with China in the sphere of military-technical cooperation. People of the older generation will remember full well how many Chinese students attended our technical higher educational institutions at the end of the 1950's and the start of the 1960's. Specialists trained by us and plants in the PRC built in Khrushchev's time with our money enabled the Chinese to create their own military-industrial complex. This short-sightedness subsequently caused us great losses, which are impossible to compute even. History is now beginning to repeat itself at the new juncture.

Numerous delegations of highly skilled specialists of the Chinese military-industrial complex are wandering around the defense enterprises and negotiating on the conclusion of contracts. They are being shown and told practically everything in the hope that we might obtain if only some orders. Numerous trips are also being made by our specialists to China at the expense of the Chinese side, the only difference being that a delegation of 10-20 persons visits us and two or three persons pay a return visit to China from our side, that is, there is the routine and, what is more, cheap reconnaissance of our technical secrets and the free advanced training of the Chinese specialists. And, as before, there have been practically no orders. It has even reached the point of our specialists' development of models of military equipment adapted to the production possibilities of the plants of the Chinese military-industrial complex being planned. Highly skilled specialists of the Mikoyan Design Bureau are already designing, in China, a new fighter, passing on, naturally,

their invaluable experience to the Chinese. And the world knows full well what gifted pupils the Chinese are. There is every reason, therefore, for a more balanced approach in the rendering of China military-technical assistance, however profitable it may seem in our difficult times.

So the desire to preserve the current gap in the levels of armament of Russia and potential adversaries requires the pursuit of the corresponding foreign policy, although it will signify certain losses from the limitation and even termination of the trade in expensive types of weapons. But these losses will be considerably smaller than the expenditure needed to revitalize the military-industrial complex up to its former level.

Were the second initial position to be adopted, therefore, the state of affairs in the military-industrial complex would no longer seem as horrifying, and a certain reasonable algorithm of further action, some light at the end of the tunnel, would appear. The development at the habitual pace of new classes of arms with quantitative characteristics better than their predecessors would no longer be required in this case. It would not be necessary, for example, to create new tanks or aircraft with the best operational specifications, unless they represented a fundamentally new qualitative leap forward, as was the case with the above-mentioned stealth aircraft. The main work of the military-industrial complex for the next 10-15 years should be the modernization of the arms that already exist. Especially since much work experience has been accumulated along modernization lines.

It is undoubtedly necessary to continue basic research that could permit the manufacture of qualitatively new types of weapons increasing even more the distance from potential adversaries. But the timeframe of the creation of such weapons could be quite lengthy and would not require large financial investments in the immediate future.

The modernization of the military equipment in the arsenals would not require enormous financial outlays, and for this reason the part of the military budget spent on the purchase of series-manufactured and the development of new arms would be reduced considerably. Nor would modernization require the full workload of enterprises of the military-industrial complex.

Thus following the disappearance (declared, at least) of militarily highly developed adversaries and under the conditions of the limited possibility of government funding and the exsanguination of the enterprises of the military-industrial complex, the process of conversion of the defense enterprises is already becoming a historical and economic necessity and inevitability and can not be seen as the incorrect policy of the country's present leadership.

#### **Aircraft Firms Vie To Meet Need for New Trainer**

*MM2809120094 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0700 GMT 25 Sep 94*

[From the "Test Range" program: Video report by Yuri Salnikov and Boris Orlov, identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[FBIS Translated Text] [070545] [Salnikov over video of L-39 in flight] In the not too distant past all Air Force

schools received, under a CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation] schedule of allocations, Czechoslovak-made L-39 trainer aircraft as training aids. Now CEMA is defunct, and there is no hard currency for purchasing foreign aircraft.

So what will fighter pilots train on in the future? Russia's Air Force has invited tenders. The Mikoyan and Yakovlev leading design bureaus have responded.

The MiG design is more attractive. Designers have created an essentially completely safe twin-engined aircraft. What is more, with the help of changeable cassettes the trainee can gain the impression of flying a MiG, or a Sukhoi, or an F-18 or Rafale.

[R.A. Belyakov, general designer, MiG aviation scientific and technical complex (ANTK), identified by caption] Basically, all this has been achieved with our own money, money which we do not have, money earned through other work, through joint projects with foreign countries, and credits taken out at the extortionate interest rate of 250 percent. Truly extortionate. We do not understand how the state can allow unique collectives to work for the state at an extortionate interest rate. No one here understands this. Our aircraft weighs around 5.2 metric tonnes. Theirs [Yakovlev] around 7 tonnes. Our system is more economical as regards both running costs, production costs, and pilot training. [video shows partial views of small blue aircraft with the MiG logo and the figure "821"]

[Salnikov over video of MiG production floor] The MiG ANTK and the MAPO [Moscow Aviation Production Association] Plant want to build a truly world-class fighter-trainer. They have enlisted the cooperation of the French Societe Nationale d'Etude et de Construction de Moteurs d'Aviation [SNECMA] Company (for the engines) and the Sextant Company (for the avionics). Specialists claim that the demand for the new fighter-trainer may be very big—up to 10,000 machines.

Just like its big brother [video shows MiG fighter taking off], the little MiG will soon take to the air for its first flight. [video shows L-39 in flight, MiG design bureau interior—drawing boards and computer equipment, interview with Belyakov, partial views of new trainer, MiG production floor, MiG fighter taking off]

### **Perm Defense Plants Reduce Production by Half**

95UM0009A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian  
18 Aug 94 p 11

[Unattributed article: "Perm Defense Plants Cut Production by 50 Percent"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Fifteen conversion enterprises in Perm Oblast accounted for about 8 percent of total industrial production in the first six months of 1994, the oblast statistical administration reports. (Total production, according to the administration, was 3.28 trillion rubles, which in comparable prices is 28.7 percent less than in the first half of 1993). As result of the sharp reduction in defense orders, total production at enterprises of the military-industrial complex fell by 50 percent in the first six months, with military output accounting for 11 percent. All profits at these enterprises were from the production of civilian

output. The profit of the Perm Motors Joint-Stock Company was 9.26 billion rubles; the Nytva Metallurgical Plant, 8.8 billion rubles; the Motovilikhinskiye Plants Joint-Stock Company, 7.22 billion rubles; the Kirov Scientific Production Association, 4.16 billion rubles; the Morion Joint-Stock Company, 3.91 billion rubles; the Velta Joint-Stock Company, 3.53 billion rubles; the Inkar Joint-Stock Company, 3 billion rubles; the Solikamsk Urals Plant, 2.69 billion rubles; the Perm Instrument Building Company, 513 million rubles; the Dzerzhinskiy Machinery Manufacturing Plant, 330 million rubles; the Kama Shipyard, 352 million rubles; the Telta Joint-Stock Company, 316 million rubles; and the Kungur Telephone Plant, 63 million rubles. The Precision Machinery Plant (Chaykovskiy) and the Machine Builder Plant registered losses: 544 million rubles and 102 million rubles respectively. According to the oblast statistical administration, expenditures on the implementation of conversion programs in the first half of the year were 24 billion rubles. Bank loans accounted for 60 percent of that figure, federal budget expenditures for 18 percent, and conversion fund monies for 4 percent. Past-due debts owed by consumers of the defense enterprises' output amounted to 62.4 billion rubles. Nearly 50 percent of that amount is owed to the Motovilikhinskiye Plants Joint-Stock Company and to the Kirov Scientific Production Association. For their part, the defense enterprises owed more than 46 billion rubles to their suppliers. Perm Motors, the Velta Joint-Stock Company, and the Kirov Scientific Production Association accounted for three quarters of that debt.

### **Scandal at St Petersburg Defense Institute**

944F1591A St. Petersburg *NEVSKOYE VREMYA*  
in Russian 29 Sep 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Dmitriy Travin: "Battles for Local-Level Property: Scandal Around Privatization of Major Defense Institute"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The directive dismissing VNITI General Director Dmitriy Zuber from his job, signed by Alfred Kokh, deputy chairman of the State Committee on Administration of State Property [GKI], arrived at this major St. Petersburg defense institute in the end of last week. Dmitriy Leonidovich, however, did not vacate his office to accommodate the new director appointed to replace him, but instead, waiting for reinforcements, mounted a defense worthy of the developer of the best armored vehicle technology in the world. Reinforcements are expected from the Russian Federation Committee on the Defense Industry, which so far has not consented to Zuber's dismissal.*

*The roots of the confrontation go back to the scandal surrounding VNITI's privatization. But this incident, which has been going on for several months, also has its own roots. To identify the latter we should probably look at the opinions that exist today regarding the future of the Russian VPK [military-industrial complex] and which road plants and institutes that have encountered sharp cutbacks in state defense orders should take.*

This institute employs excellent, highly skilled specialists. It would be a shame to lose them in the situation of ongoing crisis in the VPK. There are two ways to save the collective. One is to privatize, enter market relations, and attempt to

look for orders (regardless of specialization) that would allow the institute to earn enough money. Another is to remain a state enterprise and, by convincing those up the ladder of the importance of the institute's development work, fight for government financing.

The more farsighted and liberal leaders take the former path; the more conservative and communist-oriented ones—the latter. For the majority of talented directors, for whom the encounter with the market was too unexpected (among whom, in my opinion, is also D. Zuber), it means a difficult and torturous process of transition from the latter position to the former. The search for rescue is conducted in different directions. Sometimes it brings success, more often—tragedy.

At first D. Zuber did not want to privatize the institute, or, to be more precise, wanted to delay this process for some time through available legal means. The director changed his attitude after a conversation with A. Kokh, who at the time was deputy chairman of the St. Petersburg KUGI [Committee for Administration of State Property]. D. Zuber realized that sooner or later the institute would have to cut the umbilical cord from the state, but at that time the collective had a better opportunity to acquire the controlling share of stock cheaply. The VNITI director decided not to "take a high-handed stance" and instead did what was to the benefit of the people who entrusted him with managing the institute. He began to prepare for privatization.

Economists know very well that the second option of privatization (the labor collective keeps the controlling share of stock), albeit attractive at first glance, is essentially a bad deal. It makes it difficult to find a strategic investor (who will want to invest money in an entity where the collective rather than he himself will be the master?), and the enterprise's agony, if it is unprofitable, is only stretched out in time. But illusions are often stronger than sober calculations. The overwhelming majority of Russian enterprises chose the second option. So did the VNITI.

Privatization is privatization, however. When stock ends up in the hands of people, they begin to sell it. Therefore, even under the second option control may be lost when stock is sold to outsiders. A new master comes along, who may dispose of the enterprise the way he sees fit. The VNITI was very concerned that such a master may show up. For instance, the famous City company, which buys up institutes and then resells their buildings, which are valued for their location.

The more evenly stock is distributed in the collective, the greater is the probability that if a good offer comes along the stock will start floating away, with all the attendant consequences. I think that this consideration was not the least important factor that prompted the institute to develop a statute on restricted subscription. This statute placed members of the collective in unequal conditions during privatization: The general director bought up the greatest share of stock, followed by those who had worked in the institute for up to 30 years, then those who had worked there for at least 10 years, and only then everyone else. Such an approach objectively ensured the concentration of control in the

hands of a group clearly numerically smaller than the entire collective. Hence the probability of a takeover by outside structures was minimized.

The trouble is, however, that such a graduation is not envisaged by GKI normative documents. Moreover, in the KUGI's opinion, it contradicts them. Some members of the VNITI collective share this view. These people submitted applications for stock acquisition disregarding the institute's norm-making. As a result, when the envelopes containing the applications were opened, it turned out that this group possessed a disproportionately large share of stock. A scandal broke out.

Both sides believe that the law is on their side. The St. Petersburg KUGI probably could extinguish the conflict. Having studied the problem, committee chairman Mikhail Manevich was inclined to hold a new restricted subscription that would remove the bias either in favor of the director and the old-timers and or in favor of the opposition. However, the institute's collective, without waiting for the KUGI's decision, canceled the first subscription by labeling it illegal, and announced a new one. Naturally, the opposition was unhappy. The way it looks is that had everything proceeded in keeping with the institute's statute and the administration acquired a dominant role in the joint-stock company, they would have closed their eyes to the deviation from the GKI normative documents. When control began to slip away, however, they decided to start over from scratch.

The response was immediate. Two opposition leaders, until recently considered exemplary employees, were fired. There were apparently formal grounds, but there is no doubt that had it not been for the conflict these specialists would still be working in VNITI. One of them, for instance, was fired on the grounds of absenteeism: At Manevich's request he was at the KUGI during working hours, helping to sort out the dispute.

The GKI's reaction was swift, too. The director was suspended from his job until the first stockholders meeting. In other words, he was suspended only until the completion of the privatization process, which he decided not to entrust to the KUGI despite an ongoing intense conflict. If stockholders decide that D. Zuber is the person to head the VNITI, no deputy minister or even the president of Russia can keep them from making this decision.

This whole incident probably will finally be resolved in court. It does not make any sense to second-guess its decision and hand down our own verdict on legal matters. The conflict is interesting from a completely different angle. The administration's good intentions to save the institute from a takeover by commercial structures and to protect it as much as possible from the dangers of the market ended in a scandal and quite possibly the threat of an even faster disintegration of the collective. In any case, it is unlikely that the altercation contributed to normalcy in its work. It is unlikely that dismissing one of the opposition leaders—a man who, in D. Zuber's and others' opinion, had been among the first to begin working in new ways—will help the institute find its place in the environment of conversion.

The market is cruel but fair. This is what made Western countries an economic success. If an enterprise or institute

produces something that is capable of bringing in commercial profit, the owner will not shoot himself in the foot by changing its specialization or selling his buildings to outsiders. If the prospects are uncertain, however, even attempts to cling to government help are unlikely to save the situation.

No matter what steps the VNITI takes to cut off companies like City, only successful entry into the market (including the market of state orders) with their product can save the collective from disintegration and reorganization. So was it really necessary to expend so much effort on the conflict with the GKI, KUGI, and its own internal opposition? The damage from the ill-conceived restricted subscription scheme that begat the conflict already exceeds all possible gain.

D. Zuber is proud, and justifiably so, that the average salary in the institute today is R210,000; there are no delays in paying salaries, and the labor force is growing. There are also results in the area of conversion. Not too many VPK enterprises can boast of this. But compared to the opportunities opened up today by the market, where those who develop truly effective technologies can make a fortune, the VNITI's achievements are modest.

Members of the administration (at least some of them) believe that the conflict in the collective is a conflict between those who want to preserve the VNITI and those who want to grab the stock in order to sell the building. The opposition believes that this confrontation is between those who are happy to settle for saving the designers from being thrown out on the street and those who want to fight for maximum profit, who are not afraid of the vagaries of a market.

I am not a specialist in armored vehicle technology and have no intention to render a verdict as to what the VNITI's real prospects are. But one thing is not hard to predict. If those who end up at the helm of the institute after this conflict is over limit themselves to maintaining the status quo, it will not save the collective anyway. Inevitably people will begin selling stock to outsiders, and new opposition forces will keep emerging within. And all efforts expended on the current conflict will have been spent in vain. If the institute, however, finds its true place in the marketplace—whether due to D. Zuber's activities or those of his opponents—it is unlikely that anybody will conceive of the idea of selling the VNITI building to be used as a bank.

### **Merger of Zvezda, Kaliningrad Machine-Building Protested**

95UM0003B Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 3 Sep 94 p 2

[Article by Grigoriy Sanin: "Developers of Tactical Missiles Do Not Want To Merge With Their Producers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Part of the collective of the world-renowned Kaliningrad "Rocket" Experimental Design Bureau "Zvezda" is on near-strike status. The conflict has come to a head precisely at the moment when the designers have developed new tactical missiles that are unique in the world. One of the leading specialists of the bureau, who asked not to be named, described the essence of the conflict to SEGODNYA correspondents.

In early August the Deputy Chairman of Goskomimushchestvo [State Property Committee] of Russia, Mr. Kokh, signed order No 2123-r, which says that the "Zvezda" Experimental Design Bureau will become a subunit of the Kaliningrad Machine-Building Plant (KMZ) "Strela," on whose grounds the bureau is operating. According to our source, before 1989 the plant and the bureau were a single structural subunit. However several talented engineers conducted a series of successful tests and developments, making it clear that they had already outgrown the level of serial production. That was when the "Zvezda" bureau was created as an independent structure. In the years of its activity, dozens of modifications of air-to-ground tactical missiles have been invented. The unique Kh-31A and Kh-31P missiles, which operate at supersonic speeds, have created a furor at international shows. Immediately after the auction, the bureau signed contacts with the U.S., China and India.

Associates of the bureau are convinced that the ambitions of one of their colleagues, who dreams of assuming the post of chief designer, lie at the heart of the conflict. Our source stated that at present a group of young designers at the bureau is prepared to start a strike. There is now a diarchy at the bureau. The absolute majority of the collective is loyal to the "old" chief designer, completely ignoring the "new" one. The exceptional importance of the "Zvezda" developments is confirmed at least by the fact that the Ministry of Defense of Russia continues to finance the bureau, but not the plant.

As the editors have learned, yesterday the bureau collective filed a court petition. The chief associates of the bureau are convinced that in the event of its reorganization it will be impossible to work at full capacity, if only because the new chiefs plan to cut the collective in half. In addition, the subsidies that the bureau now receives must be turned over to the plant.

### **Nuclear Warhead Plant Director Interviewed**

95WC0003A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 28 Sep 94 p 9

[Interview with Yuriy Kuzmich Zavalishin, director of the "Avangard" Plant at Arzamas-16, by Vladimir Gubarev, "Nekos" Agency; place and date not given: "Yuriy Zavalishin: We Were Fed the Concept of 'Must' With Mother's Milk"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I will not hide the fact that I was pleasantly surprised when Yuriy Kuzmich Zavalishin, director of the "Avangard" Plant at Arzamas-16, invited me to interview him at his job. You see, no journalist has ever been at this super-secret enterprise that manufactures nuclear munitions.

And security at "Avangard" was stricter than even in the city itself and at the institute. I felt this when documents were checked not by soldiers, but by officers. The imposing rows of barbed wire and guard towers confirmed that fate had dropped me into the "holy of holies" of domestic secrecy.

[Gubarev] You have some serious security. Is there really a need for this?

[Zavalishin] Absolutely. Even in conditions of glasnost and democracy, our enterprise needs special secrecy—we make too dangerous of "goods." You see, there are different

people, and we cannot rely only on moral criteria—decency, honesty, the ability to refrain from talking... Before, no one in the city knew precisely what was being made at "Avangard." What is more, even the plant workers did not know precisely what kind of work they were performing. Now, unfortunately, they know everything—where, what, and how. Is that necessary? I think not. It is better if the details about us are unknown...

[Gubarev] Do you mean technological ones, those that come under the non-proliferation treaty?

[Zavalishin] Not just those. There now are many criminal structures, and that is why we can live to see elementary blackmail.

[Gubarev] You have security and various services, but will they really protect?

[Zavalishin] Of course, they will help. But we are obligated also to take into account the psychological pressure on workers. And we may as well admit it, there are quite a few who wish to "get closer" to nuclear weapons—after all, we are living in the real world, look around... Incidentally, you have the wrong idea about us: We manufactured not only nuclear munitions, but also particularly peaceful products. In our system, "Avangard" was the only enterprise that did this. I have in mind, of course, our nuclear complex.

[Gubarev] Why shouldn't people know about this?

[Zavalishin] These were charges for so-called industrial nuclear explosions. We dismantled the last six of them in 1993. They laid around for a long time here—there was a glimmer of hope that this very good program of using nuclear charges would be continued, but then it became clear that it had been given up as hopeless. And we were forced to dismantle the "devices," which was not simple, since any "device" with a peaceful purpose does not have a long guaranteed life. "Combat" products, as we know, are designed for long-term storage—their materials and design provide for this. "Regular" products can lie around for 10 years or more, but "peaceful" products were made under a precise program. We made them over the course of a year or half year, transported them to the site of the experiment, and they were activated there. There was an instance in which a moratorium was announced, but the "device" had already been lowered into the hole and sealed up. Only one day remained until the detonation when the report about the moratorium was received unexpectedly—Mikhail Gorbachev did not even inform us of his initiative... The "device" remained deep underground for a year, although no regulations called for such a thing. But it was already impossible to pull it out. Nevertheless, the "device" operated normally a year later, without any remarks... We had already dismantled the rest of the "devices." Incidentally, we even had to develop a special technology.

[Gubarev] Do you believe that abandoning this was a mistake?

[Zavalishin] I am even sure that a very big mistake was made under the program of peaceful nuclear explosions. Economically, it is very beneficial to use such powerful energy, and from the standpoint of ecology, according to all the data we have, there was no instance in which such work harmed anything. It is also impossible to solve a whole series

of ecological problems, specifically the burial of hazardous waste, by other methods. Sooner or later, capacities will be created deep underground, and that is precisely where industrial waste will go. But it is impossible to create such cavities without using nuclear explosions.

[Gubarev] Maybe this is conversion in your field?

[Zavalishin] I would quite rightfully categorize this program as "conversion."

[Gubarev] Why is it more complicated to dismantle a nuclear munition than it is to assemble it?

[Zavalishin] Several aspects play a significant role. When you assemble it, everything is visible. Every assembly is before you, and there is also military acceptance—another control of assembly. But when you begin dismantling, it is unclear what is being taken out of the "device"—the precise condition of an assembly is unknown... But I will say right off—knock on wood—so far we have been fortunate that there have been no surprises during dismantling. The design that was created by our experts is still convenient for dismantling. All problems were envisioned in advance. They say that dismantling is more complicated for the Americans precisely due to the design features... Second, the explosives, the materials, and the uranium during the years that the "device" was in service, of course, undergo changes, and this causes additional difficulties during dismantling. That is why special caution is needed. In addition, dismantling is not the program of taking apart the new "device." This is a technology. We assemble the charge, and we take it apart, which is accomplished at the earliest stage of work by batch.

[Gubarev] It is clear that the "device" will never be used?

[Zavalishin] Of course. That is a particular feature of nuclear weapons. Incidentally, we were the first series-production enterprise. At one time, it "detached itself" from the institute, and the correct decision was made to create a series production namely here. This enabled us to organize new production very quickly and in a qualitative manner, since the designer is next door and can always make the necessary changes quickly. So, we assembled the "devices," and then disassembled them, because not a single one of them, fortunately, ever flew away or was ever used.

[Gubarev] So, you feel the disarmament process directly?

[Zavalishin] Of course, the number of "devices" has decreased now. And we basically take them apart and do not assemble them. So, the "disarmament" concept is quite real for us.

[Gubarev] When was your plant created?

[Zavalishin] We celebrate our anniversary in December. Our plant has been in operation since 1951. There are two "devices" in the Museum of Nuclear Weapons of Arzamas-16 next door. The first is a copy of an American bomb, which we learned about only a year ago. Next to it is a second model. The bomb has been series-produced since 1951. It went under the code name "Troyka." Then there was "Tatyana." We also participated in creating the most powerful hydrogen bomb, which they call the "Sakharov" bomb. And, of course, the first tactical bomb... In general,

the museum has many models of "devices" that we series-produced. We also organized production of the first bombs, the first missile warheads, and other models as well... Nuclear weapons exist in virtually every combat arm. We were puzzled: Why so many? In principle, we understood that there is a limit after which nuclear weapons become terrible no longer for the enemy but for ourselves, for the country. The decision to reduce them was made sensibly.

[Gubarev] Among the country's machine-building plants, "Avangard" is unquestionably one of the leading enterprises. How do you assess your role in the development of this sector of industry?

[Zavalishin] Nuclear weapons are a special type of technology. All the best that we have is concentrated here. The technologies are exceptionally complex. We have people working from roughly 40 specialties: electronics, mathematics, physics, stamping, galvanizing, mechanics, and so forth. I do not think there is any other plant with such a wide range of technologies—it is unique. We deal with aviation and space technology, and must give them their due: they are strong in their field... Incidentally, our enterprise manufactures heat sources for polonium-210. This is a unique production facility, the only one in the former Soviet Union, and there are few of them in the world. At one time, fuel units for the "Lunokhod-1" and "Lunokhod-2" were manufactured here. We became so accustomed to the secrecy conditions that no one knew about this! We produce such sources to this day. There is a Mars vehicle program for which we also make a fuel unit. Several years ago they tried to get by without our units, but it ruined the entire Mars program—the equipment malfunctioned. Now, in creating the Mars vehicle, they have again turned to our fuel units—of course, this costs a pretty penny, but, as you know, you get what you pay for... From a safety standpoint, a fuel unit with active matter is very complex. It happens that rockets explode during launch and fall, and our unit, in which there are thousands of Curie units, must remain completely safe. It must not burn in a fire, must survive many years in sea water, survive an explosion, and also survive an impact with granite... We fire from a cannon and develop and invent new materials for these ampules.

[Gubarev] Now I understand who is truly responsible for our troubles... The thing is, I worked on the first lunokhod [lunar vehicle]. The program was designed for three months. But the lunokhod continued to survive and operate on the moon; your fuel unit—we called it the "stove"—kept on operating...

[Zavalishin] One rocket launch with our unit was unsuccessful. The rocket broke up during launch, and they were looking for the unit for a long time in Kazakhstan. Suddenly, from a helicopter they notice two soldiers squatting and warming themselves over our unit—it was in December and terribly cold, and here the "stove" fell from the sky... So, we not only are involved in nuclear matters, but also space. Fortunately, this direction of work continues to develop.

[Gubarev] The world is now alarmed about another danger: the proliferation of nuclear materials. Tell me frankly, did you have any cases of theft?

[Zavalishin] I think that all the information about the theft of plutonium-239 is still a provocation. We not only have the strictest accounting procedures and special storage conditions, there is a special subunit that deals with this. Every part is in a separate container located in special storage facilities. And there is not only heavy security, but also special physical control... A worker who deals with plutonium and uranium-235 understands perfectly well that he cannot put it in a pocket. This is very dangerous for the person, for his health. So, we have not had any incidents of theft in the past, and I hope there will be none in the future.

[Gubarev] What about terrorists?

[Zavalishin] We try to envision this, too. The leadership of "Alfa" asked us to organize exercises. We did not conduct such training before. Access to the special production facility is extremely restricted: each person passes through many sieves. But, all the same, on a Sunday, in one building that was empty—reconstruction was under way there—we tried to use the "Alfa" team to capture a terrorist... They work in a very skilled manner: they captured the terrorist in an instant. After all, these are professionals.

[Gubarev] It is a shame that "Alfa" now performs other functions—it guards the president; it would be better if it provided security for enterprises such as yours... But that is another story. Tell us a little about yourself.

[Zavalishin] I was born in the Urals. My father and mother were teachers. In 1942, my died at the front near Leningrad. I graduated from school and enrolled in the Ural Polytechnical Institute. In 1954, I was one of two from a group—we studied well!—called to the dean's office for an interview. I filled out a questionnaire and a year later at an assignment board learned that I had a "special assignment." Incidentally, there are many of my contemporaries at Arzamas-16—this was the famous "second recruitment," when not only physicists were required to work on weapons, but also specialists of the most diverse professions. We knew at that time that the "special assignment" was Chelyabinsk-40 and Sverdlovsk-44. These enterprises were "somewhat ahead" in technology. I arrived here. I was assigned as a production engineer in the first shop. Later I became deputy chief of the shop and chief, and was elected the secretary of the plant's party committee. I later became chief production engineer, chief engineer, and plant director. The usual destiny, perhaps somewhat more successful than others.

[Gubarev] The first shop—is this a special production facility?

[Zavalishin] Oh go on! It is a machine shop. I worked in it for 11 years and had absolutely no idea what our plant produced!

[Gubarev] Even as shop chief?

[Zavalishin] Of course, I did not know... It is difficult to imagine according to the machines that you make what the end result is—you do not put together the "device"... Only the top leadership and of the plant and of the special shop knew exactly what "Avangard" was producing. Even now, many have no idea what they are making. One can look at the "device" only at the Museum of Nuclear Weapons, but it opened only quite recently...

[Gubarev] Do the working conditions in the special shops differ from the regular shops?

[Zavalishin] Even the clothing is special. It is white, as is customary in the atomic industry, but it must be cotton. They wear sneakers with a wire—to combat static electricity. In general, there are very many technological peculiarities and, accordingly, demands on personnel. There are a number of methods for increasing special safety. I want to emphasize that safety in our job is based on two aspects: first is the design; second is the people who work with the "devices." They all go through a special selection process, here there is both medical and psychological tests... No one can just come off the street and work inside the plant. Here they are looked at closely, studied, selected, and then gradually transferred to a special production facility... Men work here until age 50; women until age 45. The conditions created in the special production facility and the design of the "devices" have made it possible during all the years of the plant's existence to avoid instances of overexposure of people. Never once has this happened in assembly during the many years! We can rightfully be proud of this, and that is why people, naturally, also work even after retirement age. However, we closely monitor health—these are also work safety conditions. Everyone in the special shops undergo a mandatory check once every three months and daily at the checkpoint where medical personnel are on duty. In case of the slightest deviation, we suggest that such a person be transferred to another job. We have increased the wages in special production facilities; in the assembly facilities they are one and a half times more...

[Gubarev] Is personnel turnover high?

[Zavalishin] It is zero in the assembly shops... People do not leave the plant, but there is a waiting list of people wishing to come here. Incidentally, we pay wages on a regular basis—perhaps the only enterprise in the sector. Although we are owed much both by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Finance, I do not want to give any figures, but it is in the billions... We call, dislodge some funds, and fight for them, but we pay wages on a regular basis because we believe this is the most important thing for preserving the collective and ensuring work safety.

[Gubarev] How about conversion at your plant?

[Zavalishin] There is a small production facility. To be honest, it is a very small section of the plant, but we are trying to expand it, since we are thinking about the future. It is clear to us that there will be a drop in primary production, and a considerable one. In time, the dismantling of weapons will begin to decline, and for weapons we will arrive at a small amount... In 1988, we were at our peak for conversion. We became actively involved in the state conversion program and began working on a broad front, but then the program turned sour... No, not at our plant, but in the country... We had developed several directions at that time. In particular, we organized production of valves for the dairy industry. They control milk flow and are generally needed everywhere. We did this on instructions from the government.

[Gubarev] In addition to primary production, of course...

[Zavalishin] Naturally... Next year I will have been at the plant 40 years. I have not worked, but lived here. You see, we have spent day and night here; we have had to work until midnight; we have had to work until morning without leaving the plant... We were fed the concept of "must" with mother's milk. That is why we always reacted to our assigned job with understanding and responsibility. That is also how we perceived our assignment on the valves. I will say frankly that we really went broke on milk. Not only us, but our entire ministry.

[Gubarev] Lots of valves, but no milk?

[Zavalishin] There was a lot of milk. They simply stopped building dairy plants. Consequently, no one needed our equipment. There are still valves in warehouses, but we curtailed production of them two years ago. However, we have not abandoned the "dairy direction" altogether: we are quietly selling the remaining valves and making two units for baby food. One for Voronezh, and the other for Belgorod. A splendid milk pump design has been created, an outstanding technology. The experience of creating pumps for nuclear-powered submarines was used. All this is very resistant to corrosion. Milk is a corrosive product; it eats away at any material and has many acids. We are beginning to produce remarkable pumps, but there is no market for them. We are selling literally in the single digits. It is a pity, because the dairy industry could be improved sharply and become modern.

[Gubarev] Maybe they can be purchased cheaper overseas?

[Zavalishin] First, the equipment is more expensive. Second, they do not have pumps of such high quality.

[Gubarev] But weren't you engaged in conversion much earlier than 1988?

[Zavalishin] At that time it was called consumer goods. A plan for production of these goods existed, and it was more strictly controlled... We began producing security systems in 1962. These were very large jobs and orders. The first such system was created for security at the Mausoleum, then the Kremlin. These units were made long ago and are still operating reliably today. The last "government order" was equipment for Gorbachev's dacha in Foros. Expensive systems were installed there, large expenditures for those days... Now there are no such orders, but at least we continue to make systems for gathering information from various installations and sensors. We are now receiving orders for them from banks and other commercial organizations. We made much equipment for customs houses. Incidentally, for some reason they are not ordering anything for them now! This is simply remarkable: many customs houses are appearing on the new borders, but equipment is not being ordered for them. How will they operate?!

[Gubarev] Maybe other plants are making the equipment?

[Zavalishin] They do not exist. We made very interesting things for border security. During the war in Afghanistan, we had to work a lot. We made a system for receiving reconnaissance data. A sensor was installed on a mountain path, and it counted how many people passed over it during the night. We made a set of instruments for guarding our embassy. There were several lines of protection there, and the equipment operated very reliably. Now, in addition to

all this, we are producing instruments for motor vehicle and apartment security. Reliable and effective guards, but, paradoxically, the market is small. They are inexpensive, simple, and not inferior to foreign makes, but they do not enjoy any special demand. Obviously, we did not advertise and were not yet used to market relations. We do not know how to trade, because we never engaged in this. We produced the "product," the military accepted it and signed all the necessary documents, and that was all! Now we have to trade... We even now have created a marketing department and are beginning to travel through the country and participate in exhibitions. But I repeat, this does not pertain to primary production—we remain conservatives here.

[Gubarev] All the same, you managed to find your niche in conversion?

[Zavalishin] We were engaged in the production of an artificial kidney. There was one enterprise in Kiev that produced a "multi-place" kidney, that is, all patients were on one solution, all were hooked up to one machine. The whole world has long ago switched to individual artificial kidneys, but they were not produced in our country. We chose the difficult path for us and together with the institute in Moscow began creating a kidney. We organized a department in our special design bureau, which was accustomed to constantly working in the "development mode"—after all, we never lagged behind our assumed adversary. And this principle was transferred to the creation of an artificial kidney. Last year we produced the first 10 machines, and in 1994 we will produce about 30 of them. In particular, the Ministry of Defense has ordered 10 kidneys from us—they are giving up on imported machines and switching to ours. The main thing we have encountered is competition from foreign firms. They have filled Russia and the former Soviet Union with their machines. That is why we were forced immediately to begin competing with the largest firms of the West, where large collectives work and have been working on the artificial kidney for dozens of years. While we were developing our first kidney, they moved ahead. However, here our old principle of "do not lag behind!" began to operate, and that is why next year we already are completing development of a new kidney. So, we will continue to compete with them in the future... But our kidney is one-third the cost of a foreign-made kidney. We will try to equip "kidney centers" with everything necessary—we have all the capabilities to do this, although we understand very well that it is hard to withstand competition with foreign firms.

[Gubarev] Is the kidney very popular?

[Zavalishin] We have orders... The machine is reliable: we treat the production of the "artificial kidney" as if we were producing a modern nuclear device. And this is a guarantee of high quality.

[Gubarev] Incidentally, let us get back to the "devices." In your view, what is the greatest danger today?

[Zavalishin] Accidents during shipment. You yourself know what goes on in transportation... That is why we have created a special accident brigade of officers. Now an exercise takes place: a car with our "devices" inside is derailed. The brigade also practices different variants of actions. These are specially trained people. They have

special buses with the necessary tools for emergency work and the necessary equipment and clothing. There is nothing you can do about it: the conditions are changing, and we must react adequately in them.

[Gubarev] Do you believe that the constant contact with explosives, nuclear explosives in particular, has an effect on a person's psychology?

[Zavalishin] The danger of getting used to working with explosives really does exist. And this element is very important. Therefore, we have a number of measures to keep people from "getting used" to it. In particular, constant inspections by all sorts of commissions and organizations that engage in this. There are several levels of inspections and monitoring... None of our people working with explosives have had any psychological breakdowns. To assemble nuclear weapons and dismantle them—for the people who do this there are no special psychological stresses. All the same, this work is very interesting and critical. And, of course, it is very honorable work.

## DOCTRINAL ISSUES

### Gareyev: 'War and Military Art in a Changing World'

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[Article by General of the Army Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareyev, academician of the Academy of Natural Sciences of Russia, doctor of military and historical sciences, and professor: "War and Military Art in a Changing World"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since the times of Clausewitz, it was customary to believe that war is a continuation of politics by other, forcible means. But with the appearance of nuclear weapons, the point of view that war would develop into a continuation of politics prevailed. Two completely different questions merged: Are wars feasible or permissible in modern conditions? Can the appearance of a new weapon change the sociopolitical essence of war? A firm and definite answer can and should be given to the first question: wars in general must be eliminated from the life of mankind, and nuclear war is especially impermissible, fraught with catastrophic consequences both for the states participating in it and for those not participating.

However, despite the obvious validity of this tenet, which is becoming the command of our times, contrary to the best wishes, even after the appearance of nuclear weapons far from all contradictions in the world have been able to be resolved by political means, and the use of armed force in various forms continues. And there is still no guarantee that the numerous local wars and conflicts will not develop into larger armed clashes.

It is easiest, without adhering to any new trend that is in vogue, to avoid the essence of the question. But whether we denounce or recognize some or other phenomena, they do not cease to exist. And in order to react correctly to them, we must know their true essence. What are the incessant wars

and conflicts, what gives rise to them, if politics, as is sometimes asserted, has already eliminated military force from its arsenal?

Yes, in our time it is indeed unreasonable to link rational politics with military force. But in addition to rational, there also exists irrational politics, giving rise to its characteristic phenomena. Some countries truly want peace, and some representatives of the ruling circles of other countries have stated quite recently: "There are things more important than peace" or "there are things worse than war." But both the former and the latter states are convinced of the rationality of their politics. What are we to do if war is imposed on some or other country and its national independence is threatened? What are we to do with war between Iran and Iraq, war between Kuwait and Iraq, the war taking place in the Caucasus, and many other conflicts where military force is being used?

All these wars arise from specific political objectives being pursued by rival states. If this is not so, then we must explain why and how these wars take place. But for now there is no proof that any of them broke out apart from politics, just as there are no other explanations for the causes of the wars breaking out.

Nuclear weapons also cannot change the essence of war (if it has already happened), as this was with the use of American atomic bombs against Japan in 1945. And if, heaven forbid, they proliferate further and these monstrous weapons end up being used, such a war, regardless of its consequences, cannot be anything other than a continuation of a specific, extremely irrational, murderous policy. Any deliberate use of nuclear weapons, no matter how it ends (except in cases of unsanctioned launches), will inevitably be caused by specific political decisions. War outside of politics is impossible.

Therefore, it would be more correct to say that in today's conditions, war—neither nuclear nor conventional—must not be a means and continuation of politics. But if war has already begun, this means that, contrary to this imperative, politics has linked itself to military force or was forced to resort to it for the purpose of self-defense. There is a fundamental difference between how we want to see some or other phenomenon or how it should not be and what it becomes in reality. To close one's eyes to wars and conflicts taking place and to portray things as if they are not linked to politics and sort of emerge on their own means to renounce reality and deprive oneself of the ability to objectively and realistically evaluate the events taking place, to influence the sources and political processes giving rise to the armed conflicts.

#### Old and New Sources of Threats of War

If one looks at the past, there has never been a shortage of appeals for peace and to reject war. The most lucid minds of mankind have spoken out in favor of this. Suffice it to recall the appeals of Kant for a peace-loving union of democracies, the manifesto of Russell and Einstein, and others. "Eternal peace" has been concluded countless times between warring states. Still, only about 300 of the last 4,000 years of the history of mankind were absolutely peaceful. Armed clashes

were taking place in various places in the world the rest of the time. And peace has not become more stable after the end of the "cold war."

The majority of the leading capitalist states, undertaking specific steps to overcome global confrontation, reduce arms, and establish partnership relations with former socialist countries, at the same time in international affairs continue to proceed from their own national interests and place primary emphasis on strengthening their own military security. The republics that left the USSR also have been forced to continue to do the same thing due to the extent of their capabilities.

Certain presumptuous political figures, who believed that they could solve all global contradictions with great ease by political means alone, now cannot resolve a single problem within one small republic without the use of force. It turned out that the world community has by far still not matured for practical implementation of the politics of "new thinking." Therefore, more sober approaches are needed that objectively take into account existing realities.

Still, one can definitely say that despite the complexity and contradictory nature of the development of the international situation, there are more opportunities to prevent wars than ever before. All of history's tragic experience of settling international disputes by military means and life's wisdom developed by mankind must at sometime erect more reliable obstacles in the path of unleashing wars.

New international legal acts regulating the military activities of states, not limiting the activities by merely a quantitative reduction in arms, may help prevent wars. In particular, specific framework guidelines could be developed and general requirements to which national military doctrines should correspond in order to ensure mutual security, introduce restrictions on military activities creating additional sources of threats of war for other states, strengthen the inviolability of existing borders throughout the world, as was done for Europe by the Helsinki Accords, and other things. Attempts to revise the borders established after World War II may lead to the most unpredictable consequences.

Nuclear weapons and new types of high-precision conventional weapons also will continue to have a deterring effect on the unleashing of large-scale wars. Certain other factors also arise that contribute to a significant reduction in the capabilities to unleash wars and accomplish aggressive political objectives.

But militarism dies hard, for it does not exist in and of itself, but feeds on objective political and economic processes. Today, one must consider that not only have the former sources and cause of wars not disappeared, but quite a few new, fairly sharp sociopolitical, economic, territorial, and international contradictions between various states and entire regions are appearing. Gradually, sharp class and ethnic contradictions emerge within states, giving rise to civil wars and conflicts and also posing a danger for the countries surrounding them.

The nature of threats of war will largely depend also on the kind of political structure of peace that will replace the bipolar world based on confrontation of two superpowers.

Life shows that in the conditions that have developed, establishment of an objectively developing, multi-polar world with such centers of power and political and economic influence as the United States, Western Europe, Russia and other countries of the CIS, China, and Japan seems to be the most realistic and to correspond to the long-term interests of the international community.

But one also must not rule out the fact that before the majority of the leading states become convinced once and for all of the objective need to shift to a multi-polar world, attempts may be undertaken to establish a multi-polar or new variant of a bipolar world, which will lead to a serious complication of the international situation and violation of global strategic stability.

One of the most important factors determining the development of international events and sources of contradictions may become the new upsurge of national self-consciousness of many peoples, which must not be reduced just to narrowly understood nationalism. Only 10 percent of the 170 nations are ethnically homogeneous. Everywhere, in Europe (not only in Yugoslavia or Russia, but also in such relatively politically stable countries as Belgium and Spain), in the Near and Middle East, and in Asia (Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, in areas populated by Kurds), the movement for national self-determination is growing and expanding.

Its manifestations are well known. Just in recent years, 22 new nations have appeared in the world. The struggle for sovereignty and independence on a national and ethnic basis continues, which may give rise to a large number of inter-national and intra-state conflicts.

Russia has ended up in a particularly difficult position. Its geopolitical position has worsened; it has been crowded out of the Baltic and Black seas, to where it took centuries to break through. Many other specific threats of war are also emerging with respect to Russia, in addition to the threats of a general, global nature. In certain countries of the near abroad, nationalistic circles are declaring Russia to be their enemy. There are many complex contradictions between the republics of the former USSR. Efforts are being undertaken to isolate Russia further.

In the Caucasus and Central Asia (especially in the vicinity of the Afghan-Tajik border), new military conflicts are raging or coming to a head in immediate proximity to Russian borders. No matter what it is called, there is a real war going on between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Along the entire perimeter of the borders to Russia, territorial claims are already being made, its state interests are being openly infringed upon, and the spheres of influence of other states are being expanded in the Baltic, the Balkans, and the southern region.

Finally, the nuclear weapons of the majority of countries having these weapons, despite the fact that they have been officially "retargeted," are, as before, for all intents and purposes, intended for use (aimed) against Russia. True, the opinion is sometimes stated in the press that no external threats now exist for Russia. But how can one deny all these dangers or at least the nuclear threat?

One cannot help but be put on guard by the preservation of the enormous military might in the most important regions

of the world. Despite a certain amount of reduction in armed forces by leading states, the arms race essentially continues, particularly in the area of their qualitative improvement and the development of new types of weapons and military equipment. Numerous military bases remain in Europe and in many other regions of the world. Member-states of NATO and certain other countries of the East and South continue to maintain large groupings of troops, aviation, and naval forces. For example, as Russia's minister of defense, General of the Army P.S. Grachev, noted, there are 530 divisions, 42,000 tanks, and 12,000 combat aircraft concentrated near Russia's borders.<sup>1</sup>

#### **The Anti-Nuclear Revolution in Military Affairs Is Coming to a Head**

Taking into account the realities of the new times, it should be expected that the evolution of military art and the military doctrines of the leading states of the world in the near future will proceed along the following basic directions:

- Renunciation of nuclear weapons as the main means of waging war; their use only as a means of deterrence; ending the global military confrontation between the two coalitions of states; shifting from open hostility and regarding one another as enemies to partnership and cooperation. In accordance with this, for the first time in the postwar years—a renunciation of preparations for waging both a world nuclear and conventional war.
- Preparation of their countries and armed forces to safeguard security and accomplish military missions in one or several local wars and military conflicts, acting as unified coalition groupings of forces as much as possible. At the same time, preparation to repel aggression and participate in a large-scale war, if it cannot be resolved for some or other reason.
- Main emphasis in military organizational development on qualitative improvement of conventional weapons, increasing the combat might and mobility of troops, and training the armed forces to conduct military operations using conventional means, but with constant consideration of the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, particularly the unsanctioned use, guaranteed delivery of a retaliatory strike, and protection of troops from weapons of mass destruction.

In addition to the general trend of forming such a balanced approach to the military-political and strategic problems that have taken shape, we cannot get by, as is always the case, without the manifestation of certain extremes and extremism. One such manifestation is the point of view whose essence is that to defend any country it is sufficient to have a minimal number of nuclear weapons and, using them as a means of deterrence, be able to guarantee a state's military security. In doing this, it is sometimes even asserted that the existence of nuclear weapons eliminates the need for any other armed forces. But it should be said that these opinions are based on a big misconception.

First of all, a potential aggressor already now has the capability (and in the future this capability will increase even more) with a surprise strike, by not only nuclear but also high-precision conventional weapons, to destroy the

other side's nuclear weapons, depriving it of the capability to deliver a retaliatory strike and execute nuclear retaliation.

Second, armed forces, if only of minimal strength, are needed in order to cover both from the air and with ground assets one's own nuclear weapons and ensure their survivability. In general, without the minimum necessary armed forces it is impossible to ensure the sovereignty and overall defense of a country, not to mention its readiness to respond to various military conflicts.

Therefore, in supporting, on the whole, the principle of defense sufficiency, it should be said that defense today and in the future may be ensured only by armed forces balanced in a certain manner and capable of fully safeguarding a state's military security. Such a sensible approach will also restrain some countries from the illusory temptation to obtain nuclear weapons at any price and use them to carry out and accomplish their goals.

Taking all this into account, what can the fate of nuclear weapons and the approaches to using them in the future be? In the future, as we know, the question is being raised about their complete elimination, as well as chemical, bacteriological, and other types of weapons of mass destruction. However, nuclear weapons will remain for the next several decades. Even in the new century, the United States and Russia will each have 3,000-3,500 nuclear warheads. France, England, China, and other countries that have them legally or illegally do not plan to get rid of them. Despite their monstrosity, nuclear weapons remain the most reliable and inexpensive means of safeguarding state security and deterring aggression, although, it would seem, one cannot help but understand that this "inexpensive" weapon may turn out to be too expensive for mankind. But such is the objective logic of the development of events.

Since nuclear weapons still remain, the question of what to do with them and how and for what purpose to use them also remains? An answer is seen in the following. Political and strategic insight and realization of the senselessness of nuclear war in principle must be realized in practical steps aimed at the renunciation by all states, including NATO members, of plans and scenarios of waging nuclear war. **All states must conclude agreements or make unilateral commitments on the renunciation of first-use of nuclear weapons,** as the USSR and China did at one time. In other words, it is necessary to preclude every possibility of planning and conscious unleashing of a nuclear war with any objectives and under any pretext.

However, NATO's doctrinal guidelines, as before, call for the first-use of nuclear weapons in response to any aggression, including if it is undertaken using only conventional weapons. The existence of such a concept before was explained by the Soviet superiority in conventional forces and the "Soviet military threat." But now, when all this is no longer, it is difficult to justify the intention to use nuclear weapons first. Therefore, such intentions of the United States and NATO member-states have come under public criticism, and their ruling political and military circles could not help but understand the vulnerability of their position in this matter.

And, it seems, they breathed a sigh of relief when now Russia in its new military doctrine has also rejected the

principle of not using nuclear weapons first. The West reacted positively to this, apparently based on the fact that Russian nuclear weapons no longer threaten it, although their use is a threat to everyone. Such an approach is also contrary to the defensive nature of the military doctrine. How can we say that we will not start a war first and at the same time declaim the possibility of using nuclear weapons first?

From the political standpoint and the interests of global strategic security, **the principle of using nuclear weapons first also has its significant negative aspects.** Above all, with complication and aggravation of the international situation, the very aspiration to not delay and have time to use nuclear weapons first will cause a dangerous competition over who uses them earlier, supercharging an already strained situation and encouraging the delivery of a preemptive nuclear strike.

In such conditions it will be difficult to determine for what reason and who used nuclear weapons first. This creates grounds for a variety of speculations and covering up of aggressive actions being undertaken. Preemptive actions may be undertaken, and nuclear weapons may end up being used in "response" to totally unproven aggressive "intentions" of some or other state.

The orientation on making a nuclear strike first will encourage the creation more effective strategic offensive forces and means of strategic defense.

Some military experts assume that the possibility of using nuclear weapons first was proclaimed by Russia for the purpose of frightening certain obstinate neighboring states. But such an approach can give rise only to mutual suspiciousness and hostility, making it difficult to safeguard military security. Who after this will want to give up nuclear weapons? Considerations of seizing the strategic initiative and other purely military principles do not always apply to nuclear weapons. Political approaches are especially important in this area for the purpose of preventing the use of nuclear weapons. In the age of nuclear-missile weapons, the lack of any limiting agreements and obligations creates grounds for even greater production and manipulation of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, when concluding international agreements on banning the first-use of nuclear weapons and corresponding commitments of nuclear powers, these agreements and commitments (even in the absence of a complete guarantee of their observance) would serve as definite legal and moral obstacles, deterring to some degree the use of nuclear weapons.

It is also hard to agree with the references to the fact that commitments about not using nuclear weapons first have only propaganda importance. With such an approach, one can also declare as purely declarative the military doctrine provisions about not using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear powers, as well as any other agreements and commitments. There are quite a few cases in history when concluded treaties and agreements were perfidiously violated, but there are also examples when they were observed, including international legal rules on not using chemical weapons during World War II. If international monitoring of the planning and use of nuclear weapons is established

and agreements aimed at this are concluded, the guarantees of deterring the unleashing of nuclear war will be even greater.

From the military-strategic standpoint, ensuring the guarantee of the reliability of a retaliatory nuclear strike may be an alternative to a preemptive nuclear strike and a way of increasing the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. It is necessary to achieve this at negotiations on strategic offensive arms and in such a way that none of the agreeing parties is deprived of the capability of making a retaliatory nuclear strike. To this end, it is also very important that the limitations established on deployment of antiballistic-missile defense systems be strictly observed.

Taking all this into account, there is reason to believe that the principles of using nuclear weapons will, apparently, be subsequently updated and improved so as not to make it easy, but, on the contrary, make it as difficult as possible, restrict, and in the end not permit their use under any circumstances. It is also required that all states renounce the concepts of "limited nuclear war" and "limited nuclear strikes, since they may provoke a broader nuclear war.

Only the readiness to deliver retaliatory nuclear strikes should be ensured. In this regard, planning the use of nuclear weapons, limited by the framework indicated above, will remain, and armed forces will practice operations to make retaliatory nuclear strikes and protect against weapons of mass destruction.

The shift to the new concept of nuclear deterrence cannot be limited to its political declaration. For its practical implementation it is necessary to change the entire system of nuclear planning and the orientation of training of armed forces. But for the time being, there is little that is changing in this respect in the nuclear powers. They are stating only the intentions to review the system of nuclear planning. In the United States, for example, planning the possible use of nuclear weapons, as before, is officially determined by the National Security Directive No. 13, signed back in 1981 by R. Reagan, which is oriented on the strategy of preparing and waging a global nuclear-missile war.

The previous system of nuclear planning and, on the whole, training of the armed forces is essentially retained in Russia, China, and other nuclear powers. The field manuals and training programs of the troops and military-educational institutions call for preparing and conducting combat operations under conditions of the use of nuclear weapons.

Taking all this into account, **renouncing the strategy of global nuclear war and implementing the new concept of nuclear deterrence require the accomplishment of a set of practical measures aimed at this.** In our view, the main ones of these could be the following:

- Further limitation of strategic nuclear forces to the necessary minimum and total elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, including aircraft weapons.
- Official announcements by all nuclear powers on their renunciation of the strategy of nuclear war and delivery of nuclear strikes first, and the transition to the concept of nuclear deterrence providing for readiness only for retaliatory strikes.

—Conclusion of international agreements on the issues outlined about, involving all nuclear powers in this.

—Increasing and strengthening international control of the impermissibility of further proliferation of nuclear weapons, planning of their use, safeguarding nuclear security, and organizing alert duty of strategic nuclear forces.

To this end, a special body could be created under the Military Staff Committee of the UN Security Council. It would be called upon to monitor observance of the norms and limitations on questions of nuclear planning established by international agreements. The question of quickly putting a stop to attempts to use nuclear weapons with terrorist and other such goals should be studied separately.

—Restructuring the training of armed forces in all states; review of field manuals and training programs of troops, aviation, naval forces, and military educational institutions; orienting them not on nuclear-missile war, but on carrying out combat missions using conventional weapons, ensuring the deterring effect of nuclear weapons, and on protection against weapons of mass destruction.

Other measures are also possible for changing the orientation of military organizational development and operational and combat training of national armed forces.

Thus, nuclear war itself is becoming obsolete and becoming increasingly less likely. Therefore, in the future, military affairs will be oriented on the possibility of the outbreak of conventional wars. But nuclear weapons will continue to have a decisive influence on strategic stability in the world, on political and strategic objectives, and on the course and outcome of conventional wars, even when these weapons are not used. With the opposing sides having nuclear weapons, both in the process of pre-war confrontation and in war with conventional weapons, in all likelihood the sides will not risk making excessive demands, expanding military operations, or set conquering goals above certain limits capable of causing the use of nuclear weapons.

#### Footnote

1. VOYENNAYA MYSL, 1993 No. 6, p 4.

### FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

#### Military Aspects of U.S. National Security Policy

94UM0597A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
23 Sep 94 p 3

[Article by Colonel Aleksandr Ivanov: "Military Aspects of U.S. National Security Policy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The U.S. President presented the report "United States National Security Strategy" to Congress for the first time in 1987.

In accordance with Article 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols law "On a Reorganization of the Defense Department," enacted in 1986, this document is to be submitted in January-February concurrently with the budget for the next fiscal year and is to include a detailed exposition of the international interests and objectives of the United States.

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The "U.S. National Security Strategy" report submitted this year has a number of special features. First, it was published after a six-month delay due to both domestic political circumstances and the need to reassess U.S. policy priorities in connection with the highly dynamic and considerable uncertainty of the emerging politico-military and strategic situation in the world. Second, for the first time the report devotes a special section to the problem of expanding U.S. intelligence capabilities as one of the most important conditions for ensuring national security. Third, the report emphasizes the heightened role of NATO in European affairs and in the emerging conditions of the international situation.

The report "U.S. National Security Strategy" has never before been published on the pages of our periodicals, including our military publications. This year, in connection with the increased interest in and active discussion of the problem of protecting Russia's national interests and the role and place of the Armed Forces, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has prepared a special summary of the military aspects of that strategy for its readers. We hope that this article will be useful from the standpoint of familiarizing readers with American approaches to the problem of ensuring the national security of the American state.

#### **Characterization of the World Politico-Military Situation**

We live in a new era, the cold war is over. The collapse of the Soviet empire has radically changed the security situation that the United States and its allies have to deal with. The chief motivating factor in the security field for the past 50 years—containing communist expansion and simultaneously averting nuclear war—has disappeared. At the same time, there still exists in the world a complex set of new and old security threats that America must counter as we approach the start of a new century. The new independent states that have arisen in place of the Soviet Union are going through a painful economic and political transitional period. The future of Russia is uncertain, and a repressive regime remains in place in China.

It is becoming clear that we cannot perform police functions throughout the world. But it is also obvious that although the "cold war" may have ended, the need for American leadership abroad remains very great.

#### **Objectives of National Security Strategy**

Our national security strategy is shaped by American interests and values. The chief objectives of the new national strategy for the new historical conditions are: to reliably maintain our security, based on the combat readiness of the armed forces; to promote a robust American economy; and to promote the strengthening of democracy abroad.

In any event, the character of our actions must to the greatest possible extent serve our long-term national interests, which are ultimately determined by our security needs, including the maintenance of our defense and economic prosperity.

Although insuring the security and prosperity of our country depends on many factors, not one of them is as important as the men and women who wear the American military uniform and who stand guard over our security. Their

professionalism, service and commitment constitute the nucleus of our defense. Today our armed forces are the best trained and equipped in the world, and the United States is determined to do everything in its power to see that they remain so.

#### **Maintaining a Strong Military Potential**

The U.S. Armed Forces play a key role in achieving success in the implementation of our strategy. Our country has no equal in terms of military capabilities: The United States is the only country capable of carrying out large-scale and successful operations far from our borders. Our desire and ability to play a leading in the defense of shared interests also promote the preservation of the United States' position as an influential force in international affairs, which will have an affect on our prosperity as long as we have the required military potential to meet our commitments.

In this regard, we will maintain our strategic nuclear forces at a level sufficient to contain in the future any nation that is hostile toward us. For this reason we continue to maintain our nuclear forces at a level that enables them to destroy a wide spectrum of targets of key importance to the political and military leaders of other nations.

#### **Missions of the Armed Forces**

The U.S. Armed Forces must be capable of reacting swiftly and effectively and prepared to fight and win. For this purpose we need well-trained personnel who believe their cause is just; modern weapons maintained in combat-ready condition; personnel training in conditions that approximate actual combat; strategic mobility; and the development and maintenance of a dependable material and technical supply system. The armed forces' basic missions include:

- involvement in major regional conflicts. The American armed forces must be capable of countering the military potential of regional powers whose interests may conflict with the interests of the U.S. and its allies. This requires effective deterrence or the defeat of an aggressor brought about by the establishment and buildup of groups of U.S. Armed Forces in more than one region of the world, if the situation requires.

The systematic development of the armed forces being carried out by the U.S. leadership will enable them to defeat an aggressor in two major regional conflicts occurring almost simultaneously. It is important that the United States, as a nation with global interests, have Armed Forces that meet these essential requirements. The capability of the U.S. Armed Forces to conduct combat operations in "two wars" guarantees that the United States will have sufficient potential to deter and repulse hostile coalition forces or a lone powerful adversary with capabilities that surpass our assessments:

- the maintenance of the required presence in overseas territories. The need for a U.S. military presence abroad in peacetime is also an important factor in determining their overall structure. We will continue to maintain our military presence outside the United States in such forms as the stationing of forces abroad

on a permanent basis, temporary deployments of forces, the conduct of joint exercises, calls by warships, exchanges of visits, and the maintenance of contacts in the military field;

- countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, biological, and chemical and their delivery vehicles—pose a great threat to our security. In this connection, a key aspect of U.S. strategy is the effort to stop their proliferation and to devise effective measures to combat this threat. We also need to maintain sufficient strategic nuclear potential. Other nations' weapons development programs and the degree of their participation in joint efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will be a principal factor in determining the character of our bilateral relations. In this connection, we continue to press Ukraine and Kazakhstan on the issue of dismantling the intercontinental ballistic missiles on their territories and to encourage China to assume treaty commitments in the field of missile technology controls. The United States retains the capability to strike at countries that seek to use weapons of mass destruction in such a manner the consequences of our strike would significantly outweigh the benefit of using such weapons;
- participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations. When our interests require, the United States must also be prepared to take part in international efforts to settle local conflicts and to support new democratic governments. The U.S. Armed Forces must be prepared to participate in peacekeeping and other operations to accomplish these tasks. In instances in which we are considering the possible use of American forces in peacekeeping operations, we will proceed from strict requirements that include the principles that will govern any decision to use American troops. In short, the United States views participation in peacekeeping operations as a means of insuring its national security, not as an independent action;
- support for efforts to combat terrorism and other actions in the interests of insuring national security. The U.S. Armed Forces and their installations will also be used to accomplish a broad spectrum of other, no less important tasks. These tasks include: antiterrorism and punitive operations, the evacuation of civilians, the combating of narcotics trafficking, the provision of humanitarian assistance, and operations to relief the effects of natural disasters and catastrophes.

#### Character of the Use of Armed Forces

The basic principles to be followed in taking a decision to use military forces are: First and most importantly, our national interests must determine the degree and scope of our involvement. In special cases, when vital interests and questions of survival are at stake, our use of force will be decisive and if necessary, unilateral. Second, we will seek to use the assistance of our allies or to act within the framework of international organization. If important national interests are at stake, we are prepared to act alone. Third,

our intervention must take into account such factors as the reasonable cost of an operation and whether the mission can be accomplished.

#### Criteria for Using the Armed Forces

In any case, before using military force we must answer several extremely important questions: Have nonmilitary means that offer an acceptable chance of success been exhausted; which capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces should be used, and does the use of military forces serve our political objectives to the required extent; do we have sufficient certainty that our actions will have the approval of the American people and their elected representatives; have time frames or stages that will allow us to assess the degree of success or failure been devised, and has a mandatory plan for ending military involvement in a conflict been formulated.

#### Development of Intelligence Capabilities

Only strong intelligence can insure the required degree of warning of threats to U.S. national security and detect possibilities for furthering our interests. Officials of all levels will continue to rely on our intelligence community to obtain and analyze information that cannot be gathered from other sources.

In this regard, the very concept of national security has expanded considerably since the end of the cold war, and intelligence must identify and analyze a significantly broader range of threats and dangers and play a key role in tracking threats of a military and technical nature; influencing the armed forces' development and weapons procurement; accomplishing combat support missions; settling regional conflicts; combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; combating terrorism and narcotics trafficking; and carrying out counterintelligence activities.

The intelligence community must monitor political, economic, social, and military developments in regions of the world that have a significant bearing on American interests and in which information gathered from open sources is insufficient. Economic intelligence will play an ever-growing role. It can provide assistance by identifying threats to American companies on the part of foreign intelligence services and from dishonest trade practices.

The primary tasks in the intelligence field are: to ensure timely strategic warning of threats posed by the weapons that remain on the territory of the former Soviet Union, as well as by weapons of mass destruction possessed by other nations; to provide intelligence support for operations being conducted by the armed forces; to identify potential crises at an early stage and to facilitate preemptive diplomacy; to devise techniques for obtaining, processing, and disseminating intelligence data; to improve technical capabilities at the global level to detect and ascertain the nature of actions by other nations in the development of weapons of mass destruction; to bolster counterintelligence activities; to insure steadfast support for the actions of law-enforcement agencies in such areas as combating narcotics trafficking and terrorism and illegal technology transfers; to improve operational methods and organizational structures in order to enhance their effectiveness; and to strengthen relations and increase exchanges of information with the intelligence

services of friendly nations, especially in regions in which U.S. intelligence capabilities are limited.

### NATO

We need to reorganize the institutions that ensure our security so they can act more effectively in conflicts like that in Yugoslavia. Many institutions, such as the European Union, the West European Union, the Council of Europe, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the UN, will play a role in this process. However, the NATO alliance, the most powerful politico-military alliance in history, must play a central role in this field.

Only NATO has the armed forces, allied command system, broad legislative basis, and experience in multinational activities that are essential in enlisting new members and that will enable it to respond to new challenges. We have come to the conclusion that the contingent of U.S. Armed Forces in Europe, approximately 100,000-strong, can insure the United States' leading role and influence in NATO and an effective deterrence policy. This level of permanent presence, supplemented by forward-based naval forces, and in conjunction with reinforcements stationed in the continental United States, is sufficient to respond to likely crises and to insure stability in the region. It also provides a sufficient foundation for sustaining the capability to deter or to respond to large-scale threats in Europe or to support limited NATO operations outside NATO's zone of responsibility.

With the end of the cold war, NATO's role is changing. Today NATO is playing a key role in the settlement of ethnic conflicts in Europe. With the adoption of the American Partnership for Peace program in January 1994, NATO has begun playing an even more important role in our strategy for European integration.

### SECURITY SERVICES

#### Russian Border Guards Chief in Tajikistan Interviewed

MM0610130594 Moscow TRUD in Russian 5 Oct 94 p 7

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Chechulin, commander of the Group of Russian Federation Border Guard Troops in the Republic of Tajikistan, by Aleksandr Korolev in Dushanbe; date not given: "They Can Only Dream of Peace. Danger at Every Turn for Russian Border Guards Doing a Difficult Job in Tajikistan's Mountains"—first paragraph is introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] This was a war assignment. I mean the border war being waged on the Tajik-Afghan state border. Moscow journalists, including your TRUD correspondent, observed it for themselves during a visit to the border detachments, details, and posts on the right bank of the Pyandzh River. We had an opportunity to get answers to all our questions firsthand—during a conversation with Lt. Gen. Anatoliy Chechulin, commander of the Group of Russian Federation Border Guard Troops in the Republic of Tajikistan.

[Chechulin] We predict that the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border will, regrettably, deteriorate. Why? Because the opposition has mainly gambled on armed struggle as the

means of attaining its objective of taking power. And the border is in many respects the only channel whereby the opposition can build up its forces. Another channel being local underground armed formations, and yet another being the enemy's legally crossing the border (in the guise of refugees). But I repeat that the border is the enemy's main "alimentary canal." And that is why it is under fire.

[Korolev] Are we to understand the situation as being that the opposition is gradually building up its might in preparation for taking the capital by storm, overthrowing the incumbent government, and taking power?

[Chechulin] No. The opposition leaders' strategic plan (and they make no secret of it) is, where possible, to saturate the Garm group of rayons via Gornyy Badakhshan with a critical mass of armed formations, to use that bridgehead—including during the coming winter—to conduct sabotage and terrorist activity, shifting that activity toward the center, and thereby to so destabilize the situation as to really shake the ruling authorities and render the seizure of power far easier.... That is how the situation is developing in the Khorog sector.

Whereas in the Moskovskiy and Pyandzh sectors the attackers are setting themselves the limited objectives of containing and diverting border guard forces and assets, from Badakhshan in particular. Here the details and posts are coming under the same kind of bombardment as in the Khorog sector, and similar attempts to breach the border are being made.

The Pyandzh sector is characterized by even more "pointed" and daring actions by the enemy: brief penetrations, rapid attacks relying considerably on the border underground, which is well organized and well armed and often tries to take the border guards from the rear....

Those are the conditions in which Russian border guards are serving on the CIS's external border.

[Korolev] I would like to stress that we are not fighting for or against the republic's government here; we are not fighting for or against the opposition—we are fighting everyone who is acting unlawfully on the state border.

[Chechulin] Certainly, Tajiks now make up 66 percent of our group's inducted personnel. Let's be sensible. Last year Russia was incapable of staffing the group 100-percent with its own draftees, nor is it capable of doing so now.

Second, why do we not have the right, when defending this part of the border, to give a son of Tajikistan the same opportunity? A worthy son.

We are now increasing the proportion of Russians in the group of forces. First, subunits from other border districts regularly perform a tour of duty here. Those acquiring skill and experience from us—over 1,500 men—are pure Russians. Second, the number of contract personnel is increasing: Two dozen of our officers are working with servicemen in central districts of the Russian Defense Ministry, and people are coming to join us. It is thought that by the end of the year around 20 percent of our personnel will be serving on contract. Notwithstanding the inevitable weeding-out process (roughly one in 10 are expelled from

the troops), you will agree that this is a qualitative means of manning the group. Other decisions are being prepared now that will make it possible to "even out" the ethnic composition of the group of forces.

We are also carrying out the selection process among local draftees. We now need to draft around 3,000 new recruits from Tajikistan. Officers recently returned from military commissariats having already recruited 6,000 people!

[Korolev] I saw "museum pieces" dating back almost 30 years in the subunits, particularly those stationed in the Pamirs.... I also noticed our border guards—to put it mildly—poor gear and equipment....

[Chechulin] Let me start by saying that since the tragic events at the 12th Border Post last summer not only our own command but also the government has addressed the problems and needs of the group of forces. In the past year we have received over 100 new BTR-80's and our artillerymen have received new armaments. It is difficult to list everything but, believe me, we have experienced a real revolution here. This assistance has been highly opportune. The fact that equipment which served in Afghanistan is still with us by default is another matter. It is now gradually being written off....

As for soldiers' gear and equipment.... To our shame, some people look extremely "unpresentable." But within two or three weeks, once we have received our new winter uniforms, we will look different.

I sometimes hear people saying that the mujahedin are far better equipped than our border guards.... If the state could put as much into our border guards' "coffers" as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and other countries are "pouring into" the armed opposition, we could of course dress better. But we have but a single benefactor—Russia....

[Korolev] How conscious are border guards of the support from the collective peacekeeping forces [CPF], the 201st Motorized Rifle Division?

[Chechulin] At the moment I cannot say that the peacekeeping forces have had a more or less effective influence on the state of affairs on the border. We have developed ties with the 201st Division, which can help us in some ways. We give credit to the courage and selflessness of this formation's personnel and officers who are guarding the same borders with us. Admittedly, in physical terms this represents a meager reinforcement—less than 1 percent of what we have on the border. That is why I would like to see more support for the border guards from the leadership of the CPF and the 201st Division and, probably, from the Russian Armed Forces altogether. At the moment, believe me, the border guards group is bearing the full brunt of the responsibility for the state of the Tajik-Afghan border.

[Korolev] We know that the border guards have lost over 20 men in combat since the beginning of the year. Have there been losses of personnel outside combat?

[Chechulin] Regrettably, the number of those who have died as a result of accidents, negligence, and unprofessionalism is almost the same as the number of those who have died in battle. Although there have been isolated incidents of people dying as a result of nonregulation relations, whereby the victims have committed suicide with their own weapons. We recently conducted a major investigation into such incidents and five criminal cases have been instituted. All this is being made public.

The greatest losses of manpower outside of combat are due to imprudent handling of weapons. That is a real scourge for us....

[Korolev] I heard from officers in the border guards that, if intruders reached the middle of the Pyandzh, they can shoot to kill. Is that true?

[Chechulin] If it is a question of an armed group being identified. Pardon me for saying so, but why do they have to reach the middle of the river when they are carrying mortars and firearms? What are they doing, coming to surrender?

We also have at our disposal various kinds of technical and visual reconnaissance systems. And according to Russian law the border guards are authorized to carry out operational-investigative activity. Certainly, someone on the other bank may often only be pumping up a boat or lashing together a raft, but we know who they are and why they are crossing to our side.

At the same time, by no means do we designate as enemies all those people in the border district who are bearing arms. In the Pamirs, for instance, many so-called self-defense detachments loyally coexist with the border guards. And I am not about to disarm them. If the state considers it necessary to disarm them then let it do so, that is an internal matter.... But if tomorrow any of these "loyal" people were to cross the border with contraband, that is when they become the enemy of the border guards....

I think you will be interested in the following information. Last year the group of border guards was awarded 311 orders and medals, six border guards were awarded the title Hero of Russia. This year 231 of us have already won awards and another 204 have been put forward for state awards. Among them three officers—Vyacheslav Tokarev (posthumously), Oleg Khmelev, and Sergey Medvedev—for the Hero of Russia title.

An award is not of course an end in itself, but it is important for the border guards to feel that they are not forgotten at home and that their work receives a fitting assessment from the country's leadership. We simply could not survive here without Russia's attention to and concern for us. Border guards do not have to face the question: Is the price that has to be paid for Tajikistan's interests not too great? We are sure that Russia here is paying the price for its interests, for its obligations to the state of Tajikistan, nothing more and nothing less. And if that price is not paid today, you cannot rule out the thought that tomorrow it would be immeasurably higher and, if you will, bloodier.

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